


IOM IRAQ

# ACCESS TO DURABLE SOLUTIONS AMONG IDPs IN IRAQ: THREE YEARS IN DISPLACEMENT





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## ABOUT IOM

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the United Nations Migration Agency. IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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The Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) applies the best in social science research and policy expertise to understanding international migration and its consequences. Founded in 1998, ISIM is part of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and affiliated with the Law Center at Georgetown University. ISIM focuses on all aspects of international migration, including the causes and responses to population movements, immigration and refugee law and policy, integration in host societies, and internal displacement. <https://Isim.georgetown.edu/>

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# FOREWORD

Since 2014, Iraq has experienced repeated waves of internal displacement. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) crisis induced displacement from the beginning of 2014 to the end of 2017, when the last occupied areas were retaken. However, while ISIL spread across the country, IDPs started to return in parallel, following the recapture of occupied areas in 2015. As per January 2019, 1.8 million IDPs remain displaced facing a situation of potential protracted displacement while 4.1 million have returned to the place of origin.

In the last few years, the government of Iraq, local and humanitarian actors have undertaken considerable efforts to support IDPs, returnees and host communities with humanitarian assistance and stabilization programmes. However, little is known about the mechanisms and strategies put in place by displaced persons themselves to progressively resolve their situation and achieve some level of stability.

IOM Iraq, in partnership with Georgetown University (Washington DC, the United States), has been implementing a Longitudinal Study on Durable Solutions for IDPs in Iraq since 2015, to deepen the understanding of durable solutions to internal displacement. The study, which is based on the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs (2010), aims to understand how IDPs navigate over time their displacement and what it means to them to achieve durable solutions. The solutions IDPs identify themselves can in turn be adopted and supported by government and humanitarian actors alike to better address their needs.

This study offers key insights into the challenges and survival strategies of Iraqi IDPs who were displaced by ISIL between January 2014 and December 2015 to the 4 governorates of Baghdad, Basra, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. A sample of 4,000 displaced families living out of camps were enrolled in the study in December 2015 and they have been interviewed four times since. Many of these are still displaced, others have returned to areas of origin while some have moved to other locations.

The collaboration with Georgetown University has led to a joint publication of the Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq (capturing the findings of Round I) report in 2017, as well as the joint International Conference on Migration and Displacement in Iraq (2017) in partnership with the University of Kurdistan Hawler (UKH), which offered a platform for dialogue on durable solutions for Iraq's displaced population. A special edition of the International Migration Journal is about to be published gathering the academic articles that resulted from the conference.

I am proud for IOM Iraq to present the latest findings of this unique study in this report, which captures three rounds of data collection gathered between 2016 and 2018. We look forward to receiving your feedback.

Gerard Waite  
Chief of Mission, Iraq

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) make up almost 60 per cent of the forced migrant population worldwide. Frameworks to understand what constitutes durable solutions for IDPs have been developed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). But little is known about how IDPs' experiences fit into these frameworks. Which criteria are most important in determining whether or not IDPs are able to find solutions? Do the frameworks offer helpful guidance in supporting IDPs to achieve solutions?

This mixed-method longitudinal study conducted by IOM and Georgetown University, based on interviews with almost 4000 Iraqi IDP households, addresses these questions and more. The joint study offers key insights into the challenges and survival strategies of 31 per cent of the non-camp population of Iraqi IDPs first displaced by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) between January 2014 and December 2015. This report details three rounds of survey findings from data collected between March 2016 and August 2017.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of the longitudinal study is to understand the challenges that Iraqi IDPs displaced by ISIL face in accessing one of three durable solutions—return, resettlement, or integration. The solutions, as defined in the IASC framework, are rights-based and comprised of eight specific criteria. IDPs have found solutions when they “no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.”<sup>2</sup>

In particular, *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq* adds to understandings of protracted displacement by analyzing IDPs at different stages of displacement to encourage nuanced conceptualizations that could support more targeted programmatic responses. The study finds that Iraqi IDPs utilize multiple strategies and find different solutions to deal with their new lives in displacement. But at every juncture these strategies are temporary rather than durable. Iraqi IDPs displaced by ISIL find different solutions at different points in time in part because they are not at

odds with their government, making it possible for solutions to be found that at times rely on local and national governmental projects and programming, whether for citizens generally or specifically for IDPs.

### IDPs Rely on a Triangle of Support

IDPs are able to survive in displacement because of: 1) IDP initiatives and connections, 2) governmental support through jobs and assistance, and 3) humanitarian, emergency, and charitable aid. None of these on its own is enough; all three elements must stay in play so that the situation does not deteriorate. Decreased levels of aid provision were being experienced just as Round 3 was being administered and its impact will appear in future report findings. Round 4 interviews will assess the impact of different levels of assistance on the lives, survival strategies, and standards of living of IDPs, movers, and returnees. While a key stressor to watch out for is the new waves of IDPs created with the liberation of Mosul and other areas, neither the government nor aid providers should forget older waves who are still in need of assistance.

1 Round 1 March – April 2016; Round 2 February – April 2017; Round 3 July – September 2017; Round 4 August – November 2018.

2 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin: Framework on Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, A/HRC/13/21/Add.4, (9 February 2010), p. 1. Available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/HRC/13/21/Add.4>



### Displacement Timeline: Profound Loss, Improvements, then Plateau

The study shows the stark improvements that are achieved in the initial one to two years of displacement, but these gains do not continue as displacement continues. Instead, IDP standards of living plateau at a level that is lower than what they reported before being displaced. That level is built on temporary solutions – working in the informal labor sector, living in small spaces with large extended families, relying on loans from family members and government pensions, and changing consumption patterns of food and clothing, among others. What we do not see in large numbers are children being pulled out of school in order to work, which is an encouraging sign. But ultimately, for large numbers of Iraqi IDPs, the solutions are temporary, not durable. IDPs in displacement have mostly found ways to meet their basic needs, but they have done so by lowering their standards of living or depending on others by borrowing money and receiving aid or charity. Over time, we see that people are surviving, but primarily by resorting to these short-term or crisis-driven solutions rather than long-term or sustainable solutions.

### Returnees: Starting Over

The study finds that IDPs who return to their communities basically have to start over to fulfill the criteria for achieving a durable solution. Some return to homes that are partially damaged, while others have to find housing and pay for rent. IDPs have to find jobs or rebuild businesses, find schools, obtain healthcare, and reconnect to the communities they left. Housing availability and quality remains an issue; while about 60 per cent returned to their original homes and therefore no longer have to pay rent, many of these properties are damaged or partially destroyed and the families need money for repairs.

### Compensation: A Potential Solution

Government compensation for damaged property, deaths, and injuries among those displaced by ISIL is handled through the Central Committee for Compensating the Affected (CCCA). However, the study finds that very few IDPs have been able to access this government compensation. Round 4 results will reveal whether compensation is paid to more IDPs and if so how this affects changes returnees' and IDPs' abilities to rebuild their lives.

### Temporary, IDP-Driven Solution: Access to Cash

The importance of loans for IDP survival highlights the importance of access to liquid capital for IDP survival. Borrowing or receiving money is the primary strategy used by 55 per cent of IDP households to provide for their basic living needs. And yet, the number of families who needed to borrow money rose to 95 per cent in Round 3, but the number who were able to borrow money remained at 50 per cent. The destruction associated with displacement extended to the microfinance and banking sectors, which prevents IDPs from accessing credit outside of informal social institutions. Family and friends are the main source of loans, burdening already stressed communities. One solution is to prioritize lending schemes and microcredit in aid programmes for IDPs. This strategy could help rebuild and reinvigorate the business and agriculture sectors, which have been the hardest hit due to ISIL's expropriation of property and lands.

### Civic Participation: Low But on the Rise

Participation in both civic groups and local reconciliation initiatives increases throughout IDPs' time in displacement, but overall participation remains very low. In contrast, among sampled returnees, 20 per cent participate in local reconciliation efforts. Both IDPs and sampled returnees feel unable to change their communities and more than half report little or no influence in making their communities a better place to live. While these participation numbers largely mirror civic life under Ba'ath party rule as well as post-2003 Iraq, IDPs ask that security and fairness be part of such initiatives.

### Justice: A Desire to Believe in State Institutions

IDPs overall retain a high level of confidence in the ability of traditional state enforcement institutions to pursue and achieve justice, rather than tribal or religious authorities. They consistently cite the prosecution of criminals as the most important aspect of achieving justice. Over time, there has been a significant increase in the belief that reparations and compensation are key to achieving justice. The Iraqi state's ability to provide compensation, security, and prosecution of criminals will ensure the support and confidence of the populace.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

“ In all honesty and to be transparent, I didn’t make any decision that I regretted because all of the decisions that I made were correct, among them leaving my home at the appropriate time and getting all of my family members out with me—this was one of the most important decisions. But there was a reality that wasn’t really a decision, because there wasn’t enough time to think about bringing the furniture, clothes, or things that we would use during displacement. We thought we wouldn’t be away from our home for long. But instead, our displacement has lasted for more than three years. ”

– Father from Salah al-Din displaced to Baghdad, September 2017

When the Iraqi military declared the country to be liberated from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in December 2017,<sup>3</sup> the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that for the first time since the beginning of the crisis in December 2013, the number of returning internally displaced persons (IDPs)—3.2 million—surpassed the number of newly displaced IDPs.<sup>4</sup> Still, more than 2.6 million individuals remained in displacement at the end of 2017. For them, three years in displacement has been both unexpected and trying.

In the twenty years since the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement enshrined the rights of IDPs to access “durable solutions,” there remains a dearth of knowledge on how evolving conditions of prolonged displacement change the lives of IDPs over time. Equally absent are nuanced understandings of how IDPs themselves adapt and engineer solutions to displacement-related challenges.

To fill this gap, IOM and Georgetown University pioneered a mixed-method, longitudinal study conducted among approximately 4000 IDP households who were displaced by ISIL between January 2014 and December 2015. This joint research project, *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq* seeks to understand how and why IDP households’ access to “durable solutions” changes over time. The study is

based on analysis of survey and interview data collected from households displaced to four governorates in Iraq: Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. This report represents the second installment in a series summarizing key findings from the ongoing study.<sup>5</sup>

In investigating access to durable solutions, the IOM-GU study relied on the definitions and measurement standards presented in Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) Framework for Durable Solutions Among Internally Displaced Persons. The framework defines three “durable solutions”—sustainable return, sustainable reintegration, or sustainable resettlement—each of which depends on the fulfillment of eight criteria: long-term safety and security; adequate standard of living; access to livelihood and employment; access to effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land, and property; access to personal and other documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; and access to effective remedies and justice. IDPs are said to have reached a durable solution when they “no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.”<sup>6</sup>

3 Margaret Coker and Falih Hassan. “Iraq Prime Minister Declares Victory Over ISIL.” *The New York Times*. December 9, 2017. Accessed October 15, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-haider-al-abadi.html>

4 International Organization for Migration Press Release. “Number of Returns Exceeds Number of Displaced Iraqis” January 12, 2018. Accessed October 15, 2018. <https://www.iom.int/news/number-returns-exceeds-number-displaced-iraqis-un-migration-agency>.

5 The first report, *Access to Durable Solutions among IDPs in Iraq: Part I*, is available here: <https://www.iom.int/news/access-durable-solutions-among-idps-iraq-un-migration-agency-georgetown-university-publish>

6 United Nations General Assembly. *Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin: Framework on Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, A/HRC/13/21/Add.4*, (9 February 2010), p. 1. Available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/HRC/13/21/Add.4>

The decision to carry out the study in Iraq was partly a function of its long history with displacement. For over four decades the country has witnessed successive waves of displacement but the one caused by the 2014 ISIL onslaught was unprecedented. Nearly 6 million Iraqis were displaced in this wave, more than the combined total of those displaced during the Kurdish displacement campaigns of the 1970s and 80s, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, and the invasion's ensuing wake of instability between 2006 and 2013. At the end of 2017, one in 10 Iraqis was an IDP.<sup>7</sup>

This latest displacement crisis in Iraq is emblematic of a global trend observed over the past 10 years, wherein each successive calendar year has seen record high numbers of displaced persons around the world.<sup>8</sup> In 2017, the global displaced population reached 68.5 million, of whom the majority—40 million (58.4%)—were IDPs.<sup>9</sup> In spite of their large number, there are relatively few academic studies focusing on IDPs. Furthermore, most of the world's internally displaced persons do not live in camps but are rather dispersed in host communities and urban centres. Yet, many of the few existing studies on IDPs focus on the IDP camp population. These studies tend to be needs assessments conducted during crisis moments to help meet the immediate, primary needs of newly displaced individuals. Consequently, most of what is known about IDPs reflects experiences of only a fraction of IDPs – those who live in camps and those who have been recently displaced.

There are two novel and distinguishing features of the study that address this disparity. The first is its focus on non-camp populations, an often-ignored segment of the IDP population. Thus, this study produces basic knowledge on the conditions facing this large and under-studied population, enabling the humanitarian community to appreciate the heterogeneity of IDP populations and to develop policies and responses better attuned to their needs and resources.

The second unique feature of this study is its longitudinal nature. By tracking the same families over time, the study provides an answer to a question that has been a long-standing concern of the international community and that motivated the UN's adoption of the IASC's Framework on Durable Solutions: When does displacement end?<sup>10</sup> Assessing the extent to which IDPs have achieved any one of the three durable solutions—return, integration, or relocation—requires tracking the experience of IDPs from the time they are first displaced to the time they attain one of these three solutions. In its longitudinal design, Access to Durable Solutions Among Iraqi IDPs allows for just that. As such, the study complements the existing canon of information and broadens understandings of the IDP experience.

One way the study broadens such understandings is by defining and exploring trends among different groups within the non-camp IDP population. This study defined three such groups:

- *IDPs*: households who remained in the same location throughout displacement;
- *Movers*: households displaced to one district in Round 1 but who moved to another district subsequently; and
- *Returnees*: households displaced in Round 1 but who returned to their districts of origin in subsequent rounds.

7 *Access to Durable Solutions among IDPs in Iraq: Part I.* <https://www.iom.int/news/access-durable-solutions-among-idps-iraq-un-migration-agency-georgetown-university-publish>

8 *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Global Trends: Displacement in 2017.* June 25, 2018. pg. 6. Accessed October 16, 2018. <http://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf>

9 *Ibid.* 2.

10 *The Brookings Institute- University of Bern. When Displacement Ends: A Framework for Durable Solutions.* June 2007. Accessed October 17, 2018. [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2007\\_durablesolutions.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2007_durablesolutions.pdf)

By disaggregating the non-camp IDP population into these three groups, this study is able to draw out two key findings on movers and returnees – groups which have received little attention in previous studies. Among movers, relocation after initial displacement appears to be a strategy used by IDPs to solve problems they initially faced in displacement. Notably, unlike initial displacement—which for all IDPs was an effective way to address safety and security—moving again is motivated by economic considerations. While movers initially faced problems upon moving again after their first displacement, in the long term, movers are better able to provide for their basic needs, secure sources of livelihood, and access housing. Among returnees, geographic return does not immediately translate to having reached the durable solution of return: returnees still report facing problems related to their standards of living, livelihoods, and housing.

Findings on movers and returnees are important in this report, but the bulk of the discussion focuses on how IDPs' experiences have evolved after three years in displacement and how IDPs themselves have found ways to overcome challenges related to their safety, standards of living, livelihood, housing, and social integration. The clearest picture that emerges is that IDPs' strategies are temporary, not durable, and adopted as stop-gap measures that will tide them over until they can return home, which is the stated resettlement preference of the majority in the long term. Furthermore, while conditions appear to improve significantly in the one year between the first and second year of displacement, they subsequently plateau.

Reported findings are drawn from survey and interview data collected from 3071 IDP and mover households—collectively referred to as IDPs in displacement throughout this report—who participated in all three rounds of the IOM-GU study. IOM enumerators fielded Round 1 in March-April 2016, Round 2 in February-April 2017, and Round 3 in July-September 2017. Findings on IDPs and movers are weighted. They generalize to the population of IDPs displaced by ISIL between January 2014 and December 2015 from one of the seven governorates of origin to Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, or Sulaymaniyah, the four governorates where the study was fielded.<sup>11</sup> The margin of error for all findings pertaining to IDPs and movers is 1.8 per cent at the 95 per cent confidence level.

The discussion of returnees in section 3.8 of Chapter 3 draws findings from 408 households who had returned to their districts of origin in Round 2 and remained there through Round 3. Findings on returnees are unweighted and represent trends only among the sampled households.<sup>12</sup> The margin of error at the 95 per cent confidence level is 5 per cent for all findings that pertain to returnees. A full description of the study methodology can be found in Appendix A. Findings and trends specifically referenced in the text discussion throughout this report have been tested for significance at the 95 per cent confidence level.<sup>13</sup>


The report proceeds as follows. Section 2: Snapshot Findings on IDPs in Displacement presents data visualizations that summarize the key findings for each of the IASC's eight criteria that define a durable solution. A fuller discussion of the longitudinal trends appears in Section 3. Where applicable, the report notes the salient differences that vary according to the governorate to which IDPs were displaced. The report concludes with summaries of key findings and policy recommendations that would help IDPs reach durable solutions.

*11 These four governorates of displacement were home to 34 per cent of all IDPs displaced by ISIL between 2014 and 2015.*


*12 When conceived in December 2015, the study sample was never designed to be representative of the prospective returnee population. See Appendix A: Methodology for more information on weighting.*

*13 Some tables and graphs present the full battery of responses to survey questions, but not all differences across rounds are significant. Confidence intervals at the 95 per cent level can be constructed using the 1.8 per cent margin of error for findings pertaining to IDPs and movers and using the 5 per cent margin of error for findings pertaining to returnees.*

Map 1: Depiction of the Sample Composition (Where IDPs were in Round 1 when the study began.)



Map 2: Location in Round 3 by the Status of the Household (IDP, Mover, Returnee)




## 2. SNAPSHOT FINDINGS ON IDPS IN DISPLACEMENT



### CRITERIA 1: SAFETY AND SECURITY


- IDPs' feelings of safety and security significantly increased after displacement and remain high and stable between 2016 and 2017.

*Do you and your family feel safe in this community?*




- The majority reports feeling accepted by the host community, and the share of those who feel accepted increases over time.

*Do you and your family feel accepted as members of this community?*



- Throughout their time in displacement, only small minorities have faced any security threats or impediments to their freedom of movement.

*Have you or members of your family faced any security issue in the past 6 months in this community?*






**CRITERIA 2: STANDARD OF LIVING**


- Over time, IDPs in displacement have found ways of providing for their basic needs, defined as the ability to access housing, health care, education, and food and water.

*Has your family been able to provide for your basic needs in the past three months?*




- But to be able to do so, they have significantly lowered their standard of living and have had to borrow or receive money and reduce food and other expenses.

*What is the first main strategy your family has adopted to overcome the above challenges in providing for your basic living needs?*



- The majority in Round 3 still report their standard of living as worse than prior to displacement, but over time, an increasing share of IDPs describe their standard of living as the same as it was prior to displacement.

*How would you rate your standard of living now in comparison to your situation on 1 January 2014?*








**CRITERIA 3: LIVELIHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT**

- IDPs who report their primary source of income is from the informal sector—one known for its low wages, poor labor protections, and inconsistency of work availability—significantly increases after displacement. The share working in the agricultural sector significantly decreases.


*Do you and your family feel safe in this community?*



- A majority in Round 3 report earning money from a different type of job than they held prior to displacement.


- While IDPs' need to borrow money increases over time, their ability to do so does not. In absolute terms, a greater number of households who need money are not able to access it.

*Work in same sector before and after displacement?*




- A majority in Round 3 reported facing limitations in or exclusion from accessing employment.

*Face limitation in accessing employment?*




*If you needed money, were you able to borrow it?*



**CRITERIA 4: HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY**


- Prior to displacement, the vast majority of IDPs lived in homes they owned. In displacement, the majority have to rent accommodations. Rent constitutes a significant new expense the non-camp population must bear, and over 90 per cent of IDPs report paying the rent themselves.

*Shelter Type Over Time*




- While in displacement, four in 10 households face limitations in accessing housing.
- When asked about their properties in their areas of origin, most who owned and retained ownership of their homes in Round 3 report both damage to their homes and an inability to access them. Despite high reports of damage, only 5 per cent have applied for compensation. Housing thus presents a challenge to IDPs both while in displacement and for returning home.


*Face limitation in accessing housing?*



*Access property in area of origin?*




*Condition of property in area of origin?*



**CRITERIA 5: PERSONAL AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION**


- Less than 15 per cent of IDPs in the non-camp population have lost documents due to displacement.

*Have you or any member of your family lost documents? Shares reporting "No"*



- By Round 3, among those who have lost documents, however, less than half have been able to replace them.


*If you or a member of the family have lost personal documentation, have you been able to replace it?*



**CRITERIA 6: FAMILY SEPARATION AND REUNIFICATION**


- Very small shares of non-camp IDPs in displacement report that members of their households have been separated for more than three months.

*Were usual members of the family separated at any point?*



- Of those who have experienced family separation, the majority were reunited in Round 2. In Round 3, one third of households suggest that their separated family members either have no plans to reunite or that family members come and go. This change from Round 2 to Round 3 appears to be tied to adult children moving because of marriage or to continue education.


*If members of the family were separated, is your family reunited now?*




**CRITERIA 7: PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

- Participation in both civic groups and local reconciliation initiatives increases throughout IDPs' time in displacement, but overall participation remains very low.

*Participated in associational life?*





*Participated in local reconciliation initiatives?*



● PARTICIPATED ● DID NOT PARTICIPATE

- Most IDPs in both Rounds 2 and 3 feel that they lack the ability to affect change in their host communities.

*How much influence do you think people like yourself have in making this community a better place to live?*




● A LOT OR SOME INFLUENCE ● LITTLE OR NO INFLUENCE OR DON'T KNOW

**CRITERIA 8: ACCESS TO JUSTICE**


- IDPs consistently cite the prosecution of criminals as the most important aspect of achieving justice. Over time, there is a significant increase in the share believing that reparations and compensation are key to achieving justice.

*What is the most important aspect of achieving justice for your family?*



- IDPs overall retain a high level of confidence in the ability of traditional state enforcement institutions to pursue and achieve justice. For war crimes, IDPs have more trust in the international community than other actors to pursue justice.

*Who do you trust most to achieve?*



## 3. NINE KEY FINDINGS ON PROLONGED DISPLACEMENT


### 3.1 TEMPORARY, NOT DURABLE, SOLUTIONS FOR PROVISION OF BASIC NEEDS, LIVELIHOODS AND HOUSING

Meeting basic needs is central to IDPs' well-being. Simply asking IDPs if they can provide for their basic needs provides encouraging results; the share that reports they can has increased over time. A more complex picture emerges, however, when considering how IDPs have managed to do so.

After three years in displacement, the share of IDPs who report being able to provide for their basic needs—defined as accessing food and water, housing, health care, and education—rises from 61 per cent in Round 1 to 72 per cent in Round 3, but it falls short of approaching the share reporting being able to meet these needs before displacement (95%).

While the majority of those displaced to Baghdad have been able to provide for their needs consistently, less than half of IDPs in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah and less than one third of those in Basrah were able to do so in Round 1 (early 2016). By Round 2, majorities across governorates were able to meet their needs, a trend that holds though Round 3.

**Has your family been able to provide for your basic needs in the past 3 months?**  
Shares of those who answered "YES" in each governorate of displacement over time.



\* These other governorates are ones to which movers relocated and that were not in the original sample frame of the study. In Round 2, these include: Dahuk, Erbil, Anbar, Babylon, Diyala, Kerbala, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Najaf, and additionally, one family in Round 2 and six families in Round 3 moved outside the country.

But these increases mask problematic trends. In order to meet these needs, families have resorted to using exhaustible and/or unsustainable strategies. More than half report borrowing or receiving money, the most commonly reported strategy in both Rounds 1 and 3. The share reporting reducing food intake and cutting back on other expenses also rises significantly over time. Very few, however, withdraw children from school or sent children to work (less than 1%) and equally small shares (less than 3%) reported limiting medical care.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT		
Coping Strategies to Provide for Basic Needs		
	ROUND 1 %	ROUND 3 %
Borrow or receive money	44.1	54.6
Consume savings	11.9	6.5
Share house	11.5	6.4
Limit medical care	5.4	2.2
Reduce food and other expenses	18.6	27.5
Other*	8.4	2.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Includes sending children to work, withdrawing children from school, selling assets, and selling property.

The necessity to adopt such temporary strategies is unsurprising in light of the shifts in livelihood sources, where the dislocative effects of displacement are most pronounced. Notably, the share working in informal commerce or inconsistent daily labor—a sector known for its low wages, poor labor protections, and inconsistent availability of work—increased from 17 per cent pre-displacement to 44 per cent in Round 3. In Baghdad and Kirkuk, the share working in this sector nearly doubles from pre-displacement levels, and in

Sulaymaniyah and Basrah, it nearly triples. Simultaneously, the agricultural and farming sectors have suffered with no signs of recovery: while 25 per cent worked in agriculture prior to displacement, the share remains below 2 per cent in Rounds 1 through 3. Compared to pre-displacement levels, the share of IDPs working in agriculture drops by 91 per cent in Kirkuk, by 92 per cent in Baghdad, by 96 per cent in Basrah, and by 98 per cent in Sulaymaniyah.

## IOM PROGRAMMING

IOM Iraq runs several linked data systems that provide information on population movements, socioeconomic conditions in areas of return and displacement and conflict dynamics. These data inform responsive programming, policy and advocacy, baseline analysis and monitoring

and evaluation. For example, the DTM / Research team at IOM Iraq created a set of tools that can track and report specific needs and conditions in return areas to help identify priority locations and measure the increase or decline in quality of returns.

## IDP VOICES OVER TIME

A Kurdish IDP father from Sinjar in Ninewa displaced to the Bazyan district of Sulaymaniyah details the economic hardships confronting his family and the changes they have made over time to be able to provide for the family's basic needs.

## JANUARY 2017

*“ I'm working as a laborer here. In the beginning I was earning money daily, but now it is difficult since the economic crisis has affected all sectors in the region and reduced the job opportunities. We all work on daily wages. Everyone is trying to get a job, my children now are looking for a job, but they cannot get it since they didn't graduate. The one who has a university degree might have a better job opportunity.*

## SEPTEMBER 2017

*“ Now my children work, and depending on the circumstances, we try to provide basic needs for the family. If I didn't have enough money then God would help, but we try to reduce our expenses on food and clothing. My elder children work in Duhok and the younger ones here don't work. We are specialized in painting and are continuing this profession. For those who were able to get a job, it was because of their relations with the community. For those who didn't, it was because job opportunities are limited, therefore it was hard to get a job.*

## IOM PROGRAMMING

IOM takes an area-based approach to livelihoods and job creation programming to alleviate poverty and the impact of displacement. IOM invests in livelihood support for individuals and communities through income generation and skills-development activities such as business support packages, vocational trainings, job placements, business enhancement packages, business development services, cash-for-work, farming training, and on-the-job

trainings. In 2019-2020, IOM is scaling-up support to stimulate larger-scale economic revitalization and fill a critical gap in access to finance through an innovative grant funding mechanism to drive large-scale job creation through public and private sector recovery. IOM seeks to strengthen female engagement in business and local economic activity through livelihood interventions, where possible and appropriate for families.



By the summer of 2017, only three sources of income reflect pre-displacement levels: those living off of pensions have returned to pre-displacement levels, and the 14 per cent working in business in Round 3 are steadily approaching the pre-displacement level of 18 per cent. The share working in the public sector reaches the pre-displacement level of 20 per cent in Round 3 but with a caveat; among those reporting having a public job in Round 3, 46 per cent are new to the sector and secured their livelihood from a different source prior to displacement.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT		
First Most Important Source of Money or Income Over Time		
	PRE-DISPLACEMENT %	ROUND 3 %
Public job	20.6	19.3
Private job	5.2	1.9
Agriculture	25.8	1.9
Business	18.4	14.8
Informal Commerce	17.8	44.6
Money from family and friends	1.8	3.4
Pension	9.0	9.6
Other*	0.6	2.6
No income source	0.7	1.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Includes sending children to work, withdrawing children from school, selling assets, and selling property.

In each governorate of displacement, more than 70 per cent of IDP households in Round 3 earned their livelihoods in one of three sectors: informal commerce, public jobs, and business. Those displaced to Basrah were particularly impacted. While the plurality worked in public jobs prior to displacement, by Round 3 the share that held public jobs or worked in business decreased by 29 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively. This decline in the share working in the public sector in particular was partially due to the fact IDPs did not have residency cards in Basrah, a requirement for public sector jobs in that governorate. In Sulaymaniyah,

while there is a 60 per cent decrease in the share working in business, the share working in the public sector more than triples. In Sulaymaniyah, which is part of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and under the Kurdistan Regional Government, non-Kurds cannot work in the public sector unless it is for the institutions of the Iraqi central government. Some IDPs were able to transfer their employment to these bodies and get their salaries from the central government in Baghdad, and others were hired because of their Arabic language capacities in the largely Kurdish-speaking KRI.

### IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT

#### Over Time Comparison of Employment Sector Differences by Governorate of Displacement

	AGRICULTURE		PUBLIC JOB		INFORMAL COMMERCE		BUSINESS		OTHER SECTOR	
	PD %	R3 %	PD %	R3 %	PD %	R3 %	PD %	R3 %	PD %	R3 %
Baghdad	25.0	1.9	16.3	13.5	19.7	47.7	17.7	15.4	21.3	21.5
Basrah	5.8	0.2	37.8	26.7	13.5	36.0	25.8	16.7	17.1	20.4
Kirkuk	30.5	2.5	27.1	33.9	16.9	33.1	13.4	14.1	12.1	16.4
Sulaymaniyah	21.0	0.4	6.7	22.6	12.8	35.6	35.2	12.3	24.3	29.1
Other*	NA	1.4	NA	12.9	NA	57.7	NA	13.2	NA	14.8


\* These other governorates are ones to which movers relocated and that were not in the original sample frame of the study. In Round 3, these include: Dahuk, Erbil, Anbar, Diyala, Kerbala, Salah al-Din, Najaf, and Thi-Qar. Additionally, six families in Round 3 moved outside the country.

PD Pre-Displacement R3 Round 3

(In)stability in sources of livelihood and (in)ability to provide for basic needs go hand-in-hand. Among those who work in informal commerce, 63 per cent can provide

for their basic needs, as compared to 81 per cent who live off of pensions, 82 per cent who have a public job and 88 per cent who work in business.

#### Round 3: Ability to Provide for Basic Needs by First Most Important Source of Income



\* Includes savings, loans, house and land rent income, and cash grants or aid from national or international institutions.

● YES ● NO

## IDP VOICES OVER TIME

Upon being displaced to the city centre of Basrah, a woman who was previously a housewife in Salah al-Din must enter the workforce, where she faces harassment and discrimination on account of her gender and IDP status. Her numerous low-paying jobs provide insufficient income, forcing her to accrue debt which she cannot pay off. She also resorts to changing her residential registration to Basrah in response to the interrogation by local officials because of her IDP status.

## DECEMBER 2016

*“Prior to displacement, I was a housewife and I had never worked in my life. I lived in luxury to a certain degree, but after displacement I needed to work. So I found work in a hotel as a cleaning supervisor. At present, I am not working because they decreased the salary so much that I couldn't cover my needs or those of my children. The experience was very painful for me. To be more accurate, a lot of experiences were painful because of what happened. After displacement, my husband left me and married another woman because he went to Baghdad and I was here in Basrah. He got married there and took my children to live with him... In addition to the period where I worked in the hotel, I faced a lot of constraints and harassment, which caused me to leave my work on more than one occasion. I worked in a cafe and in a store and I left them both for the same reasons—harassment and constraints—because I am a woman and I am divorced.*

## AUGUST 2017

*“I can't keep up! I can't provide anything because I am always in debt, which became the routine in my life. I borrow the money I need and start paying it back gradually and before I even finished paying all of it back I borrow another amount which adds another burden on me. For sure, I learned a new skill, in fact new skills, because before I was not a supervisor of a hotel and I did not work as a cashier in a café or a waitress in a restaurant. All these professions I learned here in Basrah. I did not learn only one profession, but many others. It is possible to call it “the profession of dealing with others and handling their moods.” My dream now is to have my own women's beauty salon. I faced difficulties working for others. In my work at the café, the business owner wanted to take advantage of me being an IDP and have his way with me, lawfully or not, but I could only think of my job. The harassment continued more than once, and when he gave up because he knew he would not get anything out of me, he fired me in a degrading way and wanted to hit me with the ashtray. He fired me in front of customers. The harassment is constant because I am a beautiful woman and an IDP.*

“ Because I am an IDP, I had to go sign monthly in the intelligence group’s record, because I am an IDP, and they would come every once and a while to my house and ask about why I did not go to sign. That is why I made the decision to change my ID and move the registration from Salah al-Din to Basrah like it was before so I can get rid of this discomfort, harassment, and the constant chase from those who are weak-willed and immoral. I was able to do this by getting official approvals from the Department of Nationality in Basrah.

## IOM PROGRAMMING

Discrimination and gender-based violence (GBV) in Iraq is identified as a major risk for women and girls and as an impediment to reducing the drivers of conflict and irregular migration. Along with other UN agencies and international and national NGOs, IOM runs programming supporting the health and mental health and psychosocial needs of women, girls, men, and boys affected by GBV. IOM develops protection programming in coordination with the Protection and Health Clusters and the GBV Sub-Cluster part of the UN Cluster Coordination structure. For example, IOM supports women’s access to peace and security mechanisms in northern Diyala by helping to

create a Community Policing Forum (CPF) that establishes safe spaces to discuss local security concerns and rebuild trust between communities and law enforcement. Further initiatives include awareness raising campaigns; advocacy campaigns to increase participation of women and youth in decision-making; creating safe spaces for women and youth to discuss social cohesion, Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services (MHPSS) and security issues affecting them; and building capacity of services providing health, protection and legal services to support women and youth who have suffered from violence and discrimination.

In comparison to other services, IDPs in displacement frequently cite limitations or exclusion from accessing employment. While some report limitations in accessing education (19%) or health services (23%), a majority (55%) faces obstacles in accessing employment. This share is significantly higher in Baghdad, where 69 per cent of households report that they are often or sometimes excluded from accessing employment, and in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, more than one third of households report the same.

While not as frequently reported as employment, 39 per cent of IDPs also report facing exclusion from accessing housing. In Baghdad, the share reaches almost half (49%) and in Kirkuk it is almost one quarter (24%). Basrah, the governorate with the highest level of poverty, is also the place where IDPs face the fewest exclusions or limitations in housing (3%) and employment (5%).

### IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3

Did you or any member of your family ever face exclusion from services or limitation in accessing HOUSING or EMPLOYMENT?

Shares of those answering “YES, often or sometimes” in Each Governorate of Displacement

	HOUSING %	EMPLOYMENT %
Baghdad	49.1	69.4
Basrah	2.9	5.3
Kirkuk	24.2	34.8
Sulaymaniyah	14.2	35.5
Other*	24	33.5

\* These other governorates are ones to which movers relocated and that were not in the original sample frame of the study. In Round 3, these include: Dahuk, Erbil, Anbar, Diyala, Kerbala, Salah al-Din, Najaf, and Thi-Qar. Additionally, six families in Round 3 moved outside the country.

Exclusion represents just one obstacle related to housing. Unique to the non-camp population of IDPs, paying rent is a new expense incurred as a consequence of displacement. Although 81 per cent of IDPs owned homes either alone or jointly with extended family prior to displacement, in contrast 75 per cent of them rented accommodations at the onset of displacement in Round 1. By Round 3, this share remains high and stable (79%), and among households who rent accommodations, 96 per cent report that they pay for the rent themselves rather than having relatives, the government, or religious or aid organizations pay.


IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT				
Shelter Type Over Time				
	PRE-DISPLACEMENT %	ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Owned Home – Alone	69.0	1.3	1.7	1.6
Owned Home – Shared	12.6	1.7	2.6	2.9
Rented Home – Alone	14.8	50.3	62.1	59.7
Rented Home – Shared	1.3	25.3	16.0	19.8
Hosted by Friends/Family	1.2	7.7	6.2	8.4
Other*	1.2	13.6	11.4	7.5
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Includes unfinished building, informal settlements (such as tents, caravans, shops, or factories), religious building/institution, school or other government housing, camp, hotel/motel/guesthouse, and other.

Shelter type varies by governorate of displacement. Nearly equal shares rent alone (33%) and rent with others (38%) in Basrah, while the majority in Baghdad and the plurality in Kirkuk rent alone. In Sulaymaniyah, the share of IDPs who rent alone is higher than that of any governorate.

Legal barriers in Sulaymaniyah prevent non-Kurds from buying property and registering it in their own names. Instead, potential property buyers need a Kurdish sponsor to facilitate the process of obtaining residency and buying property. Recently, after the economic crisis, the Kurdistan Regional Government has facilitated the process for non-Kurds to buy property, particularly in newly built compounds in Sulaymaniyah.

### Shelter Type Round 3 by Governorate of Displacement



\* These other governorates are ones to which movers relocated and that were not in the original sample frame of the study. In Round 2, these include: Dahuk, Erbil, Anbar, Babylon, Diyala, Kerbala, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Najaf, and Thi-Qar. In Round 3, these include: Dahuk, Erbil, Anbar, Diyala, Kerbala, Salah al-Din, Najaf, and Thi-Qar. Additionally, one family in Round 2 and six families in Round 3 moved outside the country.

### 3.1 CONCLUSION

IDPs have been able to provide for their basic needs, but they have done so by borrowing money and reducing food and other expenses. They have found employment, but primarily in the informal sector, which provides low wages and lower

job security. Finally, they have found housing, but it is often shared, and rent is a new expense they incur. Collectively these are not durable solutions as much as they are survival strategies for displacement.

#### IDP VOICES OVER TIME

Three different accounts from three different governorates sheds light on the roles that IDPs and host communities play in how IDPs find solutions to housing needs:

##### BASRAH

In December 2016, the father of a family displaced to Basrah highlighted the difficulties of procuring acceptable housing for his family and described his current living situation:

“My current home has two bedrooms and bathrooms. The roof is in very poor condition; the previous rains really affected us. The electricity is really bad when it rains. The walls become electrified and the floors become very damp.

He also bemoaned the expense of the home, adding that, “the rent is breaking my back.” In August 2017, when he was interviewed again, he reported that he and his family were living in the same location, but they had made some improvements: “We remodeled the roof of the house and the floor and put plastic to stop the leaking of rain water, because the house is below street level and was very humid.”

##### SULAYMANIYAH

The account of a family that fled to Sulaymaniyah illustrates the crucial role of local groups in providing aid, particularly shelter, to IDPs.

“When we arrived into Sulaymaniyah, while fleeing, we stayed in Mar Yousef church in Sulaymaniyah. The place was very small and only curtains divided one family from another. When we heard that a compound will be allocated for us in Sitk, I was very happy.

A year-and-a-half later, when we spoke with them again, they were still living in housing provided by the church, and they reported that, “the housing situation is good for IDPs living in this place. Most of them are living...without paying rent.”

## KIRKUK

In December 2016, the father of a family displaced within Kirkuk governorate described his housing situation:

“After displacement, we lived in the Sheikh’s house in the village for one week. Later, the people of the region and the village helped us to build two rooms where we could live. One of the organizations provided a bathroom, a travel restroom. The place is very small, whereas I have many family members.


In July 2017, he further detailed how the host community had helped his family build a shelter and the impact it had on him: “After several days, the people of the area offered me a house to live in, brought me food and non-food items, and collected money so that I could manage my affairs. I will never forget this incident because they helped me at a time where I needed help the most and I was newly displaced and I only left with the clothes on my back. This incident left a great and positive impact on my life and I felt afterwards that there is still goodness in this life and there are people who are good and who like to help others.”

### 3.2 NEED TO BORROW MONEY INCREASES WHILE ACCESS TO AID DECREASES OVER TIME


With the plurality of IDPs employed in the informal sector, many households have needed to supplement their household income. In line with the earlier reported finding that borrowing or receiving money from relatives or friends was the first most cited strategy to provide for basic needs, IDPs’ need to borrow money has risen over time. Yet, their ability to do so has not risen commensurately: The share of those who needed to borrow money rose from 85 to 95 per cent but the share of those able to borrow money stayed the same (approximately half). At the onset of displacement,

the share reporting the need to borrow money was lowest among those displaced to Kirkuk (73.4%), compared to the remaining three governorates, where the need to borrow was between 89 and 90 per cent. By Round 3, while the need to borrow increased in Kirkuk (89.7%), it remained lower than the need reported in Baghdad (97.5%), Basrah (94.9%), and Sulaymaniyah (96.4%). Only about half of those who needed to borrow money in Baghdad and Kirkuk were able to do so, compared to nearly 70 per cent of those in Basrah and Sulaymaniyah.


*IDPs: If you needed money, were you able to borrow it?*



*If you needed money, were you able to borrow it?  
Round 3 by governorate of displacement.*



*If you did borrow money, from whom did you borrow it?  
Round 3 by governorate of displacement.*



\* These other governorates are ones to which movers relocated and that were not in the original sample frame of the study. In Round 2, these include: Dahuk, Erbil, Anbar, Babylon, Diyala, Kerbala, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Najaf, and Thi-Qar. In Round 3, these include: Dahuk, Erbil, Anbar, Diyala, Kerbala, Salah al-Din, Najaf, and Thi-Qar. Additionally, one family in Round 2 and six families in Round 3 moved outside the country.

The majority of IDPs report borrowing money from family, and the share reaches 78 per cent in Sulaymaniyah and 63 per cent in Baghdad. Borrowing money is not the only time IDPs look to their immediate networks for help while in displacement. A plurality of those in Baghdad (43%) and significant majorities of those in Basrah (81%), Sulaymaniyah (75%), and Kirkuk (63%) rely on relatives and friends to access jobs. These findings suggest that the burden of displacement continues to fall primarily on the extended family networks of those displaced.

Aid and assistance have supplemented the IDP-driven solutions to fulfill livelihood needs. Over time, however, this aid has declined, and by Round 3, 87 per cent of households report receiving no assistance, while well over 90 per cent did report receiving assistance in both Rounds 1 and 2. Although high shares of IDPs received money in these two rounds, the type of aid received changed. Increasing shares reported receiving assistance in the form of cash, the number one reported form of aid in both Rounds 1 and 2 was cash. Meanwhile, the share receiving food and water decreased from 22 per cent to 15 per cent, and the share receiving other non-food items dropped to 5 per cent in the spring of 2017 from 25 per cent in 2016. There were also significant shifts in providers of aid over time. In Round 1, the central government, aid organizations, and the local government were the top three sources of assistance. By Round 2, the central government assumed the majority share of aid provision (58%), and assistance from aid organizations dropped by half to 14 per cent.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT		
Type of Assistance Received Over Time		
	ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %
Cash	47.7	60.6
Housing assistance	1.4	0.6
Food and water	22.4	15.4
Fuel	2.8	7.2
Non-food items	25.4	5.5
Other	0.3	10.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT		
Providers of Assistance Over Time		
	ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %
Person	13.0	3.1
Religious organization	2.5	3.0
Central government	33.2	58.6
Local government	15.9	8.4
Aid Organization	32.1	14.8
Other	0.2	7.5
Do not know	7.4	4.6
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>



## IDP VOICES OVER TIME

A father from Salah al-Din displaced to Sulaymaniyah recounts the consequences of the decrease in aid that his family received over time.

JANUARY 2017

“ The ability to get assistance from organizations was better a year ago. We were receiving food items every month before, but now this has been decreased to every 3 months. The assistance played a great role in covering our basic needs. We received oil from the Ministry of Migration and Displacement, received food items from ACTED many times, and received food items from REACH once, and so on.

SEPTEMBER 2017

“ There was monthly food assistance. But now we suffer because they cut the assistance from us two months ago and it has been moved to the IDPs in camps. The government also decreased our salaries as employees. We only receive our salaries every 3 or 4 months. If we don't have enough money, we reduce our expenses, such as on clothing and expensive food in order to provide enough food for the family.

### 3.2 CONCLUSION

Borrowing money and receiving aid helped IDPs make ends meet in the first years of displacement. Over time, however, these resources have dwindled such that, in absolute terms, the number of IDP households who needed to borrow

money but could not has increased, and the share reporting receiving aid and assistance drastically decreases to just 13 per cent in Round 3 from over 90 per cent in Rounds 1 and 2.


### 3.3 HIGH PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY, IN DISPLACEMENT, STILL KEY IN (RE)LOCATION CONSIDERATIONS

Findings in Round 1 of this study suggested that displacement effectively treated households' lack of safety: while 71 per cent reported feeling completely or moderately safe in their pre-displacement locations, the figure was nearly 95 per cent in Round 1 and has remained at this level in Rounds 2 and 3. This finding holds across the individual governorates of displacement: in Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah, over 93 per cent in each governorate reporting feeling safe in Round 1, a pattern that holds for Rounds 2 and 3. When asked what factors contribute to

feelings of safety, 62 per cent in Round 3 suggest it is the welcoming nature of the host community in an area where there were no conflicts among people. Another third (36%) said that such feelings are due to the fact that the security forces and police were in control of the area. As such, rather than mentioning housing, jobs, or family ties in the area, households point primarily to non-material factors as the main influences on perceptions of safety: acceptance and state policing presence.

Throughout their time in displacement, very few IDPs (7% or less in each round) have faced security issues, defined as petty crime or theft, discrimination, generalized or targeted violence, kidnapping, eviction or unauthorized detention or interrogation by security forces. Among the small shares who did face an issue, the most cited threats are petty crime or discrimination on the basis of political affiliation, socio-economic status, ethnicity, or IDP status. Of the 7 per cent who experience a security issue in Round 3, 67 per cent were in Baghdad and 28 per cent in Kirkuk. Furthermore, majority shares have consistently reported being able to move freely (81 per cent in Round 1, which increased to 95 per cent in Round 3).

### Round 1: Reason for Choosing Displacement Location



## IDP VOICES OVER TIME

An IDP father and furniture maker from Anbar now living in Basrah recounts how differences in resolving security between his place of origin as compared to his place of displacement.

DECEMBER 2016

“ A problem once arose with a member of the police there in the governorate of Anbar. We filed a complaint against him in the police headquarters. The law did justice and our rights were respected. Here in Basrah, I got into an accident with a car which I borrowed from a friend. The person who caused the accident resolved the issues via a tribal solution (between my friend and the person who caused the accident). Problems in the future should be solved in accordance with the law and putting the appropriate person in the appropriate place--getting as far as possible from tribal solutions, which is widespread in Basrah.

Between 2016 and 2017, safety and security remained a key concern and factor in (re)-location decisions of IDPs in displacement, though its importance has waned slightly. In Round 1, a plurality of households (45%) initially cited safety as the main reason for choosing the location to which they were displaced. In Round 3, respondents were asked to list the three most important things that would make them want to stay in their current location. Overall, 39 per cent cite a good security situation as the first most important reason for

staying. This finding holds across all governorates of displacement: For the second most important reason, familiarity and family support is the factor that receives the largest share of responses in all governorates, save Sulaymaniyah, where 30 per cent say it is freedom of movement that make them stay. Notably, neither finance-related factors nor housing received the largest share of responses across the first, second, or third most important factors making IDPs want to stay in their current locations.

## IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3

“List the three most important things that make you want to stay in your current location”<sup>a</sup>

GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT	FIRST MOST IMPORTANT IS...	SECOND MOST IMPORTANT IS...	THIRD MOST IMPORTANT IS...
Baghdad	Familiarity and family support (35.0%)	Familiarity and family support (23.5%)	Affordable cost of living (29.3%)
Basrah	Good security situation (70.1%)	Familiarity and family support (36.1%)	Familiarity and family support (18.1%)
Kirkuk	Good security situation (44.9%)	Familiarity and family support (36.4%)	No other place to go (26.2%)
Sulaymaniyah	Good security situation (67.4%)	Freedom of movement (30.0%)	No other place to go (35.9%)
Other <sup>b</sup>	Good security situation (52.1%)	Familiarity and family support (24.7%)	Affordable cost of living (19.2%)
ALL	Good security situation (39.9%)	Familiarity and family support (25.4%)	No other place to go (26.5%)

a. Respondents were also asked to select a first, second, and third most important requirement to stay from the following options: A job/money or financial resources, a house, accurate information, availability of schools, availability of health services, freedom of religious practice, freedom of speech, or some other option.

b. These other governorates are ones to which movers relocated and that were not in the original sample frame of the study. In Round 3, these include: Dahuk, Erbil, Anbar, Diyala, Kerbala, Salah al-Din, Najaf, and Thi-Qar. Additionally, six families in Round 3 moved outside the country.

If displacement was initially a way to respond to lack of safety, safety is also a key reason for which IDPs stay in displacement. A majority of IDPs (61%) cite a good security situation as the first most important requirement for return, and while safety and security alone might not be sufficient to have them return, it is enough to keep them to stay where they are.

### IOM PROGRAMMING

In coordination with the Ministry of Interior, IOM supports the Community Policing (CP) model in Iraq. The CP model is central to paving the way for cooperation between citizens and police, while aiming to rebuild trust between communities and law enforcement actors. The CP effort is oriented at restoring the accountability of institutions and the legitimacy of the police as a security provider able to communicate with a wide range of stakeholders. Community Policing Forums (CPF) are a critical component of the model. CPFs are open and inclusive platforms where discussions on security-related issues affecting the community take place to encourage joint problem solving and prevent disputes from escalating into violence. Civil society actors participating in the CPF are key to the CPF success as they can bridge the gap between community and government.

## IDP VOICES OVER TIME

The father of the family from Diyala now living in Sulaymaniyah replied the following in December 2016 when asked about safety and security.

JANUARY 2017

*“ It is not safe where I am from due to the presence of militias killing people based on their identity card. If you are Sunni, they may take you to an unknown destination that nobody knows about it and they would kill or arrest you for a long time, depending on the person responsible for the militia. For example, there are regions that I can't enter such as Kholes, all the checkpoints there belong to militias and this is what pushed me to leave my place.*

*If it was safe, the IDPs would not have come to Kurdistan territory. There are governmental issues, killing, sectarianism, armed militias, and no one takes control over our regions. It is completely safe here. If it wasn't safe here, IDPs would not have headed here. Thankfully, my family and I feel completely safe here because there is one power here, which is the Asaysh (police). They are very disciplined and don't discriminate against anyone. In our regions, there are many armed entities and you can't differentiate between the regular formal forces and militias.*

When asked if he wants to return to Diyala, he responded:

SEPTEMBER 2017

*“ Yes, I would like to go back but the security situation is deteriorating, and we are not allowed to go back. We need security and stability in our areas and to live like other people who have safety and freedom. I don't need anything except safety, and if you could provide me that, I would go back and sleep on the street even if I did not have a home. I was greatly effected when we moved away from our family and relatives and did not know news of them.*

### 3.4 HOUSING AND LACK OF COMPENSATION REPRESENT KEY OBSTACLES FOR RETURN


Access to housing not only poses a challenge to families while in displacement, but also, it presents an impediment for return. When asked about the three most important requirements needed for return to their place of origin in Round 3, the plurality of IDP and mover households suggested housing is the second most important requirement for return after only security.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3			
"List the three most important requirements you would need to return to where you were living on 1 January 2014."*			
FOR THE...	LARGEST SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS SAY...	SECOND LARGEST SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS SAY...	THIRD LARGEST SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS SAY...
First Most Important Requirement for Return	Good security situation (61.6%)	A job / money or financial resources (23.1%)	Housing / ability to repair house (9%)
Second Most Important Requirement for Return	Housing / ability to repair house (35.5%)	A job / money or financial resources (20.4%)	Good security situation (16.9%)
Third Most Important Requirement for Return	A job / money or financial resources (28.2%)	Good security situation (16.0%)	Housing / ability to repair house (13.2%)

\* Respondents were also asked to select a first, second, and third most important requirement for return from the following options: A job/source of livelihood, familiarity with the area and the support of friends and family, freedom of movement, accurate information, availability of schools, availability of health services, freedom of religious practice, freedom of speech, affordable cost of living, no other place to go, or some other option.

Access to and the condition of homes, however, make housing as a necessity for return difficult to attain. In Round 3, 71 per cent of households reported owning property prior to displacement, and among them, almost all (97%) maintain their ownership of it through Round 3. The vast majority of these home-owning households report not being able to access their properties for various reasons: of the 88 per cent who cannot access their homes, 43 per cent cite lack of authorization by security forces or local authorities. Even when property is accessible, its physical condition precludes the possibility of taking up residence there. Among the small share (5%) of households who can access their properties, 81 per cent report partial or heavy damage to it, and only 17 per cent report it is in good condition. Among the majority who cannot access their properties, 73 per cent report partial or heavy damage and an additional 21 per cent do not know the condition of the property.

#### IDPs and Movers – Round 3: Reasons for Lack of Access to Property




IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3				
Condition of Property by Access to Property				
	Access to Property?			CONDITION OF PROPERTY MARGINALS
	YES	NO	DO NOT KNOW	
Good condition	17.9	5.4	3.1	6.0
Partially damaged	44.9	33.3	22.1	33.3
Heavily damaged or destroyed	36.4	39.7	3.6	37.5
Do not know	0.8	21.4	71.2	22.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
<i>Access Property Marginals</i>	<i>5.7%</i>	<i>88.8%</i>	<i>5.5%</i>	

With the exception of those originally from Anbar and Baghdad, pluralities across the other five governorates of origin report heavy damage or destruction to their properties. The shares reporting this level are highest in among

those originally living in Diyala (48%), Babylon (44%), and Kirkuk (42%). Among those from Anbar and Baghdad, pluralities report partial damage (42% and 45%, respectively).

**IDPs in Displacement – Round 3: Condition of House by Governorate of Origin**



The Iraqi government instituted compensation mechanisms via the Central Committee for Compensating the Affected (CCCA) and has reported billions of Iraqi dinars distributed to families of dead and injured as well as the creation of a database and compensation for property damage according to the First Amendment of the Law No. 20 of 2009.<sup>14</sup> As of Round 3, very few households have accessed these mechanisms. Among households who said their properties were partially damaged or heavily damaged or destroyed, only 5 per cent have applied for compensation. Among those who have applied, only 13 per cent have had their claims resolved, and of those 18 per cent have their claims enforced. In summary, only 2 per cent of homeowners who experienced property damage and applied for compensation received it. However, these findings were from mid-2017, and it may be that CCCA implementation was not yet widely available. Round 4 will provide more data on the subject.

### 3.4 CONCLUSION

While rent expenses constitute an obstacle to meeting housing needs in displacement, housing in the place of origin presents a tri-pronged challenge for the durable solution of return. The first challenge is situational. Local security dynamics in an area determine physical access to the property. The second challenge is physical. Even where access to property is possible, various degrees of damage make it difficult if not entirely

### 3.5 SOCIAL INTEGRATION: Feelings of belonging & acceptance rise but participation & perceptions of influence remain low and disparities persist in living standards compared with host community

Over time in the communities of displacement, IDPs self-reported feelings of belonging and acceptance increase. By Round 3, 90 per cent report feeling accepted by their host communities, up from 69 per cent in Round 1. Full integration, however, depends not only on feelings of acceptance, but also on feelings of belonging. In Round 2, feelings of belonging lagged significantly behind feelings of acceptance. While 86 per cent said they felt accepted by host community, 68 per cent reported feeling that they strongly or somewhat belonged. By Round 3, the gap between feelings of acceptance and belonging closed significantly, with at least 82 per cent of reporting feeling both accepted and that they belong. These upward trends in feelings or belonging complement previously discussed findings that the plurality of IDPs suggested that familiarity with the area and familial support was the second most important reason for staying in their particular displacement locations.

<sup>14</sup> Iraqi Council of Ministers. 2017. *Central Committee for Compensating the Affected [Arabic]*. <http://cccv.gov-iq.net/ind2/firstpage.aspx>, Accessed 1 November 2017

### IOM PROGRAMMING

In coordination with the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), IOM takes a participatory approach to the housing and shelter needs of beneficiaries. Activities include providing emergency shelter kits and repairs of critical shelters, rental subsidies, and the rehabilitation of war damaged houses for returnees in their places of origin. This support aims at improving IDPs and returnees' living conditions and at guaranteeing their safety, privacy and dignity. Other forms of support include providing economic opportunities through cash for work schemes that allow people to renovate their homes.

impossible to resume residence in the house or apartment building that the displaced households previously occupied. The third challenge is financial. Households lack funds to repair their homes in their places of origin, but almost no households have been able to access needed compensation to alleviate the financial strains of securing housing.

For the most part, IDPs' feelings that they are accepted increases with time across all governorates of displacement save one: Sulaymaniyah, where the share of those feeling accepted starts out highest among governorates but ultimately decreases over time. Further, Sulaymaniyah is the only governorate where feelings of belonging remain stable between Rounds 2 and 3. This may be due to repeated


IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT			
Do you and your family members feel accepted as members of this community?			
	ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Yes	69.8	86.1	90.9
No	30.2	4.1	0.8
Neither	NA*	9.8	8.2

\* Response option not given in Round 1.


statements made by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in the months leading up to the referendum for independence in mid-September 2017. KRG officials communicated that when Mosul was recaptured, IDPs should return home. The exact opposite trend is seen in Baghdad, which in Round 1 was home to the lowest reported share of those feeling accepted in Round 1 (63%) but by Round 3 was home to the highest share (95%). Baghdad is also the governorate where there were the largest upward shifts in feelings of belonging between Rounds 2 and 3.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT			
Rate your feeling of belonging to this community			
	ROUND 1	ROUND 2	ROUND 3
	%	%	%
Strongly or somewhat feel we belong	68.6	82.5	90.9
Strongly or somewhat feel we don't belong	10.4	4.8	0.8
Neither feel we belong nor don't belong	21.1	12.7	8.2

*IDPs in Displacement: Feelings of Acceptance By Governorate of Displacement Over Time*



*IDPs in Displacement: Feelings of Belonging By Governorate of Displacement Over Time*





## IOM PROGRAMMING

IOM works alongside the Ministry of Youth and Sports and Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in Community Centers and mobile teams in Ninewa, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Babel. These Community Centers offer spaces where returnees, IDPs, and host community members can come together to build or rebuild relationships through activities shaped around three principles and phases: acceptance, cooperation, and trust. Programs and activities give particular attention to diversity and the inclusion of different vulnerable groups, be them women and children, disabled people,

or victims of violence, and the awareness around their right to participate, volunteer, lead and decide the future with the support of local authorities and parents. Examples of women-focused activities are women's leadership courses and MHPSS, critical for survivors of domestic violence and of ISIL abuses. Through the various activities offered at the centers, IOM actively seeks participation of heterogeneous groups of residents and displaced, and of groups with different needs or abilities, to promote peaceful coexistence, understanding and acceptance of diversity.

While feelings of acceptance and belonging are high throughout displacement and increase over time, these feelings have not translated to participation in associational life. Many groups have championed the reconstruction of Iraqi civil society in the past 15 years, but political parties, militias, and sectarian actors have threatened groups outside of their control. In addition, civil society suffered systematic suppression under Ba`athist rule or existed only as government-run clubs, societies, unions, and other organizations. The legacy of non-participation and fear of participation persists and is evident among the Iraqi IDP population displaced during the country's latest wave of displacement. Participation in civic groups remains low throughout their time in displacement but increases slightly over time. In Round 2, only 10 per cent of IDP and mover households reported participating in one or more groups, organizations, associations, or networks, a figure up slightly from 4 per cent in Round 1.

Lack of information about the existence of these groups might be one reason that participation is low. In Round 3, respondents were asked about their awareness of the existence of 10 different types of groups ranging from traders' associations and business groups to charities, religious associations, and women's groups. At most, approximately 24 per cent indicated they were aware of charities and sports clubs, while only 12 per cent indicated they were aware of farmers' or fishermen's groups or cooperatives. Shares

that indicated they were aware of the other seven groups fall within this range. Of the 10 types of groups listed, 13.7 per cent of households reporting participating in at least one group. These low shares of reported participation hold across governorates of displacement. Interestingly, however, the share of those who participated in a civic group rises in Baghdad from just over 1 per cent in Round 1 to 14 per cent in Round 3, while in Sulaymaniyah the share decreases from just over 14 per cent in Round 1 to 7 per cent in Round 3.

### IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT

#### Participation in Groups, Organizations, or Associations

	ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Participate	4.0	10.9	13.7
Did not participate	96.0	89.1	86.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

Although participation is low, it appears to affect the degree of influence IDPs report they have in making their communities a better place to live. A higher share of those who participate (63%) report having a lot or some influence, compared to only 36 per cent of those who do not participate.

This finding is notable in light of how little influence IDPs feel that both they themselves and host community members have in making the community a better place to live. In both Rounds 2 and 3, less than 41 per cent of IDPs report feeling they have a lot or some influence, but notably, they do not perceive that host community members' influence is disproportionately higher.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3		
Perception of Influence by Participation in Civic Groups		
	PARTICIPATE %	DO NOT PARTICIPATE %
A lot or some influence	63.3	36.5
Little or no influence or don't know	36.7	63.5
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3				
How much influence do you think people like yourself and host community members have in making this community a better place to live?				
	ROUND 2		ROUND 3	
	People like yourself %	Host community members %	People like yourself %	Host community members %
A lot or some influence	38.4	40.2	40.2	31.8
Little or no influence or don't know	61.6	59.8	59.8	68.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

As feelings of belonging and acceptance have improved over time, so too have IDPs' perceptions of their own standard of living as compared to that of the host community. But disparities remain. While there is a significant drop in the share of IDPs who say their standard of living is worse, in Round 3 only about half of IDPs say their standard of living is about the same as that of the host community.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT		
Perceived Standard of Living Compared to Host Community		
	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Better	1.3	1.3
Same	28.0	51.9
Worse	70.7	46.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

Furthermore, this finding differs significantly by governorate of displacement. Between Rounds 2 and 3, the shares of those perceiving their standard of living as the same as that of the host community increased in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. But only in Baghdad did this share surpass a majority. In Kirkuk and in Sulaymaniyah, majorities still reported feeling that their living standards were worse off

than the host community. In Basrah, trends suggest that there is increasing stratification. While the share of those who perceived their standard of living was the same as the host community decreases by half between Rounds 2 and 3, the shares indicating their living standards were either better or worse both increased.

*IDPs in Displacement: Standard of Living Compared to Host Community by Governorate of Displacement Over Time*



## IDP VOICES OVER TIME

The story of a family from Ramadi in Anbar and now living in Basra city illustrates how connections can be used to create labor opportunities. When interviewed in December of 2016, the father, a former farmer and construction worker, described his family's lives in the following ways.

## DECEMBER 2016

*“ Our life has changed. Each of us used to live in a house and our financial situation was great. As you can see, my brother and I now live in a single house and we share the bathroom and the kitchen. The family's problems have multiplied but it is out of our hands . In truth, there is practically no point here; our daily circumstances are the routines of eating, drinking, and sleeping. Sometimes, my brother and I work but it's not sufficient for our expenses. Our condition has changed a lot. I have knowledge of construction, but work has currently come to a standstill because of the country's situation. Folks here go to the people from the region in order to learn to practice vocations. There are a lot of daily needs and my work is only a limited number of days. It is not enough to cover my family's needs. We depend upon assistance from some friends and some financial grants. At the beginning, I worked in order to cover my family's livelihood. I didn't send my children to school. In addition, if anyone from my family got sick, I couldn't afford to send them to the doctor. I have fallen short for my family, but I don't have any means.*

When this family was interviewed eight months later, the family situation had changed because of connections and work.


## AUGUST 2017

*“ My situation improved a lot in the past five months because I became known in the area for being a professional carpenter, and people started to come to me for service. This supported my family's income. Therefore, thank God in these times I am blessed with enough income to provide my basic needs and more. If the situation wasn't as it is now, I would have given up everything in order to provide for my needs as I did before, when there were no new clothes, no education, and sometimes no healthcare. When we arrived here and didn't have anything, one of the neighbours came to us after finding out we were carpenters and told us we should work with him to get more customers and make a good reputation and not just stay in the house. I told him we didn't have enough wood! He said, I will give you wood and call you if there is any work. And then he helped us buy our own wood! I will never forget that man for that situation. He is the one who saved us from poverty and need and helped us make an income for our family.*


### 3.6 FEW INCIDENTS OF LOST DOCUMENTATION, FAMILY SEPARATION AMONG NON-CAMP IDPS

In comparison to findings of other studies looking exclusively at camp-based populations, this study reveals two key differences among the non-camp IDP population: very few reported having lost personal or other documentation and very few reported that usual members of the family have been separated for more than three months. Round 1 featured the highest share of those having reported lost documents (8%), which drops to 4 per cent in Round 2 and 3% in Round 3. Furthermore, loss of documentation is not more prevalent in one governorate of displacement than another but does appear to be related to the timing of displacement—whether before, after, or during the arrival of ISIS in the IDPs' places of origin. In Round 1, the largest share (61%) of those who lost documents fled when ISIS arrived, compared with only 9 per cent who fled before and 29 per cent who fled after. Of the small shares who have lost documents, however, less than half (47%) reported being able to replace them in Round 3. The most frequently reported reasons for the inability to replace lost documents are lack of money and information, refusal of the authorities or lack of supporting documents to make new documents, and distance to the replacement office.

*IDPs in Displacement: Lost Documents?*



*IDPs in Displacement: Family Reunification Among Families Separated For 3+ Months*



- NO (WITHOUT PLAN TO REUNITE)
- NO (WITH PLAN TO REUNITE)
- NOT ALWAYS
- YES

Less than 4 per cent of IDP and mover households have had usual members of the family separated for more than three months between 2016 and 2017: 2 per cent in Round 1, 3 per cent in Round 2, and 3.7 per cent in Round 3. But unlike those who reported losing documents, the highest share of those who experienced family separation were those households who left after the arrival of ISIS (57%) compared with those who left before (5%) or during (38%). Of those who experienced family separation in Round 3, 62 per cent are from one of four governorates of origin displaced to one of two governorates of displacement: those displaced from Anbar (18%) and Ninewa (15%) to Baghdad, and those displaced from Kirkuk (14%) and Salah al-Din (15%) to Kirkuk.

Though the share of families that remained together initially increases between Rounds 1 and 2, by Round 3, just over one-third of families (37%) said they were not reunified and had no plans to live together while another third suggested that separated members of the family come and go.

## IDP VOICES OVER TIME

A university professor from Mosul displaced to Basrah reported in 2016 that his family brought all of their documents with them and, “didn’t lose a thing.” But a year later, he recounts the difficulty of trying to procure new passports for his sons.

## AUGUST 2017

“An incident happened to me at the passport office in Basrah when I had passports issued for my sons. One of the national security officers found out I was an IDP from Mosul. He called on me and stopped the procedures of issuing passports for my sons. He claimed that my name was similar to one who is affiliated with terrorist operations. I was held in custody for 3 days and they questioned me, even though they had nothing against me or even similarity in names. Despite my explaining to him that my mother is from Basrah and that we lived here during the Iran-Iraq war, but had to escape to Mosul, he did not respond. I had to call one of my relatives from Basrah who was a general and he had to interfere and got me out. He opened an investigation with the officer and it turned out that they had nothing against me. He only wanted to know if I had information on terrorists or ISIL members. I cannot forget this incident.

The ease of procuring or replacing documents, however, appears to vary from one governorate to another. Unlike the professor in Basrah, a former government employee from Salah al-Din displaced to Sulaymaniyah recalls:

## JANUARY 2017

“I had lost some personal documents that I could not bring with us. Four months ago, I replaced them. The steps to replace were easy because I had the copy of the lost documents. I just had to obtain a support paper from the Mukhtar [local leader of community] and visit the official office, and then after four days it was completed.

## IOM PROGRAMMING

The Returns Working Group (RWG), chaired by IOM and co-chaired by the Danish Refugee Council, is an operational and multi-stake-holder platform on returns. The RWG was established in line with Strategic Objective 3 of the 2016 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan “to support voluntary, safe and dignified return” of IDPs; to monitor and report on conditions in return areas; and determine to what extent durable solutions have been achieved – or progress made – for returnees. The RWG builds the technical capacities

of relevant government ministries such as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Migration and Displacement to promote sustainable return, part of which includes overcoming challenges to documentation. The RWG platform co-ordinates evidence-based advocacy and to develop guidance, policies and operational recommendations for Iraqi governorates affected by returns. IOM’s refers cases of family separation to relevant government or INGO entities, such as the ICRC.

### 3.7 FUTURE INTENTIONS OF IDPS

Preferences for return, integration, or resettlement among non-camp IDPs mirror those of their counterparts in camps: majorities prefer to stay in their current locations in the short term but return home in the long term. In the short term, 74 per cent intend to remain, compared to only 20 per cent who intend to return in their origin. This trend is reversed in long-term preferences, though a sizable share (17%) suggest not knowing their intention.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3		
Resettlement Intentions in the Short and Long Term		
	SHORT-TERM INTENTION %	LONG-TERM INTENTION %
Stay in Location	74.8	23.3
Return to Origin	19.5	55.8
Other*	1.7	4.0
Don't Know	4.0	17.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\* Includes those who would move to a different place in Iraq or move abroad.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3		
Short-Term Resettlement Intentions by Ability to Provide for Basic Needs		
Short-Term Resettlement Intention	Able to Provide for Basic Needs?	
	YES %	NO %
Stay in Location	81.9	56.5
Return to Origin	15.7	29.3
Other*	0.5	4.7
Don't Know	1.9	9.5
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Includes those who would move to a different place in Iraq or move abroad.

Short-term intentions to stay are higher among those who are able to meet basic needs and whose standards of living are comparable to or better than those experienced prior to displacement. For example, 82 per cent of those who can provide for basic needs compared with 56 per cent who cannot meet their basic needs report their intention to stay in the short term. Among those who express a desire to return, 29 per cent of those who cannot provide for basic needs want to return home, compared to 15 per cent who can provide for basic needs. Similar trends emerge in considering a second indicator of economic well-being: IDPs' reports of their standard of living compared to January 1, 2014. Most report intentions to stay in the short term if they assessed their standard of living as better than, or the same as, that in January 2014. Conversely, 26 per cent of those reporting a worse standard of living compared to 22 per cent of those reporting a better standard of living and 11 per cent of those reporting the same intend to return in the short-run.

While these trends hold across indicators for each of the eight criteria, economic well-being, documentation, and social integration factors amplify differences particularly in the short term. Notably, housing does not appear to influence the decision to return home or stay, in either the short or long term. This aligns with the finding discussed earlier that housing presents an obstacle for IDPs both while in displacement and upon return home, because rent expenses and repair or reconstruction costs pose financial burdens, whether people stay in displacement or return home.

IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3			
Short-Term Resettlement Intentions by Standard of Living Compared to 1 January 2014			
	BETTER %	SAME %	WORSE %
Stay in Location	77.8	86.1	65.2
Return to Origin	21.8	11.1	26.3
Other*	0.3	0.6	2.7
Don't Know	0.2	2.2	5.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Includes those who would move to a different place in Iraq or move abroad.

A third indicator of economic well-being that appears to influence IDPs' relocation intentions in the short term is their most important source of income. The resettlement intentions of those working in the agricultural sector stand out: only 59 per cent intend on staying in their current location. This share is much lower than shares among IDPs whose most important source of income derives from public or private jobs, business, informal commerce, pensions. At the same

time, those relying on agricultural revenue have the highest share (75%) reporting intentions to return, followed by those working in informal commerce (60%). The finding is commensurate with the earlier reported trends in livelihood sources: agriculture was among the sectors most adversely affected by displacement, and less than 2 per cent of IDPs reporting earning money from it in Round 3, down from 25 per cent prior to displacement.

## IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3

## Short-Term Resettlement Intentions by First Most Important Source of Money / Income

SHORT-TERM RESETTLEMENT INTENTION	SOURCE OF MONEY / INCOME								
	Public job %	Private job %	Agriculture %	Business %	Informal Commerce %	Receive Money %	Pension %	Other <sup>a</sup> %	No source %
Stay in Location	69.4	73.1	59	77.2	74.4	78	86.3	72.8	75.3
Return to Origin	24.7	9.8	33.5	21.4	19	13.8	11.2	16	20.2
Other <sup>b</sup>	3.2	10.9	7.5	0.2	0.7	3.6	0.0	7.3	2.9
Don't Know	2.7	6.2	0.0	1.2	6.0	4.6	2.6	4.0	1.6
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

a. Includes savings, loans, house and land rent income, and cash grants or aid from national or international institutions

b. Includes those who would move to a different place in Iraq or move abroad.

Loss of documents as a result of displacement is also related to resettlement intentions: a smaller share (60%) of those who lost documents intend to remain in their host communities, compared to 75 per cent of those who had not lost documents. Moreover, among those who lost documents, 31 per cent intend to return versus 19 per cent who did not lose documents.



In the short-term, social integration factors alongside economic ones also appear to influence short-term decisions to stay. Approximately 79 per cent of those who feel accepted and 75 per cent of those who feel they belonged in their new communities would stay in the short-term, compared with 62 per cent of those who report feeling rejected and only 45 per cent of those who reported feeling as though they did not belong. Similarly, much higher shares of those who report participating

in at least one civic or community group (85%) intend to stay in their present locations, compared to 73 per cent who did not participate. Feelings of acceptance also affect long-term preferences. Although most IDPs report a long-term intention to return, this is especially true among those feeling rejected in their current communities of residence. Just 11 per cent of those who felt rejected intend to stay in the long term and almost 70 per cent plan to return.

### IDPs IN DISPLACEMENT – ROUND 3

#### Short-Term Resettlement Intentions by Feelings of Acceptance and Belonging

SHORT-TERM RESETTLEMENT INTENTION	FEELINGS OF ACCEPTANCE			FEELINGS OF BELONGING		
	Accepted %	Rejected %	Neither %	Belong %	Don't Belong %	Neither %
Stay in Location	75.3	62.3	70.2	79.1	45.8	57.5
Return to Origin	19.2	20.4	22.9	15.8	42.3	35.2
Other*	1.3	0.1	6	1.2	1.7	5.1
Don't Know	4.2	17.1	0.9	3.9	10.2	2.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Includes those who would move to a different place in Iraq or move abroad.

### 3.8 MOVERS vs. IDPs: SHORT-TERM DIFFICULTIES, LONG-TERM GAINS


When access to durable solutions is not attainable in a given location, or when prospects for doing so are better elsewhere, some IDP households choose to move. This study tracked these movers, defined as IDPs who were displaced to one district in Round 1 but subsequently moved to another that is not their origin district. Movers accounted for 9.2 per cent of IDPs in Round 2 and 8.8 per cent in Round 3. Of movers in Round 2, 80 per cent continued being movers in Round 3 while 20 per cent moved back to the districts to which they were first displaced in Round 1, thereby making them IDPs once more.<sup>15</sup> Of movers in Round 3, 29 per cent had newly moved while the remaining 71 per cent were already movers in Round 2. The fact that the overall share of movers decreases between Rounds 2 and 3 is because

more households moved back to the districts in which they were first displaced in Round 1 than households that moved away from the districts to which they were first displaced.

Longitudinal findings preliminarily suggest that moving again after initially being displaced hinders movers' abilities to access durable solutions in the short-term but helps in the long-term. That said, movers do not appear to be a homogenous group. Instead, they represent either the worse-off or the best-off in the non-camp IDP population. As such, the solutions they are finding are not necessarily any more durable than their counterparts who remained in the same location throughout displacement.

<sup>15</sup> The study defined movers in comparison to the district of displacement in Round 1. As such, households displaced to one district in Round 1; moved to a second district in Round 2; but returned to the initial Round 1 district of displacement in Round 3 are considered IDPs in Round 1; movers in Round 2; and IDPs in Round 3.

Movers vs. IDPs: Employment Sector Differences Over Time



Employment trends are those that most strongly suggest that movers are an economically diverse group and do better off in the long-run than in the short-run. Well over 70 per cent of IDPs and movers are employed in one of three areas, the public sector, informal commerce, or business. While in Round 2 more IDPs than movers worked in the public sector, by Round 3, the share more than doubles among movers. At the same time, while similar shares of movers and IDPs worked in informal commerce in Round 2, in Round 3 the share of movers surpassed IDPs and rose to half (52%). The public sector and informal commerce arguably represent two ends of the employment spectrum as pertaining to job stability and security. As such, that more movers than IDPs work in each of these sectors potentially suggests the socio-economic stratification within this one group.


These differences, moreover, appear to be related to how each group accesses employment. In Round 3, a much higher share of IDPs than movers rely on relatives or friends, while nearly double the share of movers compared to IDPs rely on pick-up sites or work wanted signs to find jobs.

MOVERS vs. IDPs – ROUND 3			
Ways of Accessing Jobs			
	IDPs %	MOVERS %	ALL %
Relatives / friends	54.8	34.2	53.0
Wasta (connections)	23.1	28.3	23.6
Pick-up sites or "workers wanted" signs	14.4	28.5	15.6
Other	7.6	9.0	7.8
Total	100%	100%	100%


Abilities to provide for basic needs mirror trends in employment. Again, IDPs initially lag behind movers, but by Round 3, though nearly 70 per cent of IDPs report being able to provide for basic needs in Round 3, they lag considerably behind movers, 92 per cent of whom reported being able to access housing, health care, education, food, and water. Commensurately, a significantly higher share of movers (56%) than IDPs (41%) reported in summer 2017 that their standard of living was the same as it had been on 1 January 2014, and in contrast, a much higher share of IDPs (53%) than movers (38%) reported their standard of living was worse than it was prior to displacement.

MOVERS vs. IDPs		
Has your family been able to provide for your basic needs in the past 3 months?		
Shares of those who answered "YES" Over Time		
	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
IDP	74.8	69.8
Mover	64.9	92.4
ALL	73.9	71.8

**Movers vs. IDPs: How would you rate your standard of living now compared to your situation on 1 January 2014?**



**Movers vs. IDPs: Do you think your standard of living is better, the same, or worse than the host community's?**



Perceptions of living standards in comparison to the host community also vary between the two groups and over time. Initially, more movers (78%) than IDPs (69%) reported that their standard of living was worse than that of the host community. By Round 3, however, more movers (68%) than IDPs (50%) report their standard of living is the same as that of the host community, and smaller shares of both groups—38 per cent of movers and 48 per cent of IDPs—report their standard of living is worse.

But to meet basic needs and attempt to regain the standards of living they enjoyed prior to displacement, movers have resorted to more severe coping mechanisms. Only 35 per cent of movers compared to 56 per cent of IDPs in Round 3 borrowed or received money to provide for their basic needs, while 44 per cent of movers report reducing food and other expenses, as opposed to only 26 per cent of IDPs.

Despite these different coping mechanisms, there are few differences in the types of aid that each group reported receiving, which suggests that movers do not move to receive

aid. In Round 2, majorities of both movers (59%) and IDPs (61%) reported receiving cash assistance, and small shares of both groups reported receiving assistance for housing, food and water, and fuel. A larger share of movers (12%) than IDPs (5%) did report receiving non-food items. Providers of aid, however, vary significantly between IDPs and movers. In Round 2, nearly twice as many IDPs (58%) as movers (23%) reported receiving assistance from the central government. Meanwhile, assistance from aid organizations drops by half to 14 per cent overall and to 10 per cent among movers. Rather than rely on these two sources, much higher shares of movers than IDPs report receiving money from a person (20%) and from the local government (23%) in Round 2. This difference in the source of aid is potentially linked to the fact that movers are not registered with the government and thus cannot receive aid immediately. By Round 3, 79 per cent of movers and 89 per cent of IDP report that they received no assistance at all.

### MOVERS vs. IDPs – ROUND 3

#### Provider of Assistance Over Time

	ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 ALL %	ROUND 2 IDP ONLY %	ROUND 2 MOVER ONLY %
Person	13.0	3.1	1.6	20.4
Religious organization	2.5	3.0	3.2	0.1
Central government	33.2	58.6	61.4	28.3
Local government	15.9	8.4	7.0	23.2
Aid organization	32.1	14.8	15.2	10.4
Other	0.2	7.5	7.5	7.1
Do not know	7.4	4.6	4.1	10.5
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

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## MOVERS vs. IDPs

### Feelings of Acceptance and Belonging Over Time

	ROUND 2			ROUND 3		
	IDPs %	MOVERS %	ALL %	IDPs %	MOVERS %	ALL %
Feel they are accepted	87.6	71.2	86.1	90.5	94.9	90.9
Feel they belong	70.0	54.6	68.6	82.8	79.1	82.5


These economic and social experiences perhaps account for variation between reason for continued presence in displacement. Over 90 per cent of movers and of IDPs indicate feeling completely or moderately safe in their host communities in both Rounds 2 and 3. Notably, while security remains the main impetus for continued presence in displacement among the plurality of IDPs (40%) in Round 3, the plurality of movers (36%) cite familiarity and family support instead. Ultimately, however, there are no differences between movers and IDPs with respect to their re-settlement preferences: nearly equal shares (78% of movers, 74% of IDPs) want to stay in their current locations in the short term, and nearly equal shares (57% of movers, 55% of IDPs) want to return to their origin locations in the long term.

### 3.9 RETURNEES: BACK HOME BUT NOT BACK TO “NORMAL”

Of the three durable solutions, return to the area of origin is most frequently cited as the long-term settlement preference of IDPs. Beginning in Round 2, sampled households in the study began returning home. In total, 408 households were determined to be returnees in both Rounds 2 and 3.<sup>16</sup>

For those whose dates of return are known, the largest share (36%) returned in October of 2016, and more than 68 per cent returned between September and November of that same year.

*Sampled Returnees: Date of Return to Area of Origin (n=355)\**



<sup>16</sup> Of the 454 households who were initially marked as “returnees” in Round 2, there are 51 whose status is being verified as of this writing. As such, these cases have been excluded from the analysis here.


More than three quarters (76%) of sampled returnees were households returning to the governorate of Anbar, followed by 13 per cent returning to Diyala and 7 per cent to Salah al-Din. The remaining 2 per cent (11 households) to Babylon, Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Ninewa. Most of the sampled

returnees (72%) had initially been displaced to either Kirkuk or Sulaymaniyah. That most returns were occurring during the fall of 2016 to Anbar is consistent with the timeline of Iraqi military operations to liberate the area from ISIL.

SAMPLED RETURNEES					
Displacement Governorate in Round 1 by Return Governorate in Rounds 2 and 3					
Return Governorate in Rounds 2 and 3					
Displacement Governorate in Round 1	ANBAR %	DIYALA %	SALAH AL-DIN %	OTHER* %	Displacement Governorate Marginals
Baghdad	11.2	22.2	38.7	9.1	14.7%
Basrah	15.7	1.9	3.2	27.3	13.2%
Kirkuk	38.1	51.9	16.1	36.4	38.2%
Sulaymaniyah	34.9	24.1	41.9	27.3	33.8%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	
Return Governorate Marginals	76.5%	13.2%	7.6%	2.6%	

\* Includes 11 households total: 1 returning to Babylon, 3 to Baghdad, 3 to other districts in Kirkuk, and 4 to Ninewa.

Map 3: Returnee movement (Where they were in Round 1 when they were IDPs and where they end up in Round 3 as returnees.)



Nearly 92 per cent of sampled returnees reported their return was voluntary, and among them 74 per cent reported returning because of the end in hostilities. Of the 33 households (8% of the sample) who said their return was forced, all had been originally displaced to Kirkuk. Among them, 28 households said the local authority in the place of displacement had forced them out. Almost all returnees (97%) report having returned to the neighbourhood where they were living prior to displacement, and the majority reported that almost all basic services were intact and mostly functioning with one key exception: roads.

SAMPLED RETURNEES	
Reason for Decision to Return Home (Round 3, n=408)	
	%
End of occupation/ hostilities/ fighting	74.9
Retake possession of properties/ business	13.9
Participate in physical reconstruction of the area	7.7
Family reunification	2.7
Participate in retaking of the area	0.5
Other	0.3



## SAMPLED RETURNEES

Is the service running in your location? (Round 3, n=408)

	Infrastructure intact and mostly functioning %	Infrastructure intact but mostly not functioning %	Infrastructure destroyed / was never available %	Total
Electricity	71.8	27.2	1.0	100%
Tap Water	67.4	31.4	1.2	100%
Roads	47.5	45.8	6.6	100%
Primary School	85.3	14.2	0.5	100%
Health Clinic	79.2	19.9	1.0	100%
Security	82.8	17.2	0.0	100%

Because the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions defines the end of displacement as rights-based rather than geography-based, these returned households provide key insights into the extent to which physically returning home addresses some of the challenges that households faced while displaced. Perhaps

what is most striking is that many of the trends discussed above with respect to IDPs who are still displaced are also present among returnees. Notably, however, because the study was not designed to generalize to the returnee population, the findings discussed here pertain only to sampled households.

## RETURNEE VOICES

When asked in Round 2 about the meaning of belonging to a community, the father of a family displaced to Kirkuk but since returned to Anbar answered:

*“It means that you are a person who lives in a certain place and is registered in that place...To be treated with love and respect so that I feel that I am already from that community. I will not choose another place and will stay...in Anbar if I received financial support and compensation for the lost or damaged properties from the central government.” A year-and-a-half later, when interviewed again about the same topic, he reflected: “I am currently part of this community in which I grew up and spent most of my life. It is something good and you feel safe and comfortable in your community when basic services such as water and electricity are available. But more often, when there are no services, work or money, I hate myself, my community and the country where I live.*

In May 2017, a returnee to Diyala who had been displaced to Sulaymaniyah reported on his housing situation after returning to Diyala:

*“We are living in rented housing right now, because when we returned we found that our property had been destroyed. Before displacement, we were living in a house we owned and we had a shop market to work in. In general, for people whose houses were not destroyed, they live in their previous homes. But for those whose houses were destroyed due to ISIL, they live in rented housing.” When interviewed again, he was in the process of rebuilding his house. He said, “I got rid of rent...now I spend money on renovating my house...Now it is better.*

Upon their return home, more than 90 per cent of sampled returnees reported feeling safe, up significantly from the share that reported the same prior to displacement.


SAMPLED RETURNEES				
Feelings of Safety (n=408)				
	Prior to Displacement (Before 1 Jan. 2014) %	While in Displacement (ROUND 1) %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Feel safe	54.2	97.3	91.9	92.9
Feel unsafe	29.4	1.2	2.9	2.0
Neither safe nor unsafe	16.4	1.5	5.1	5.1

In this respect, they are no different from IDPs who are still displaced. Yet, returnees differed from IDPs in their main stated reason for feeling safe: while IDPs cited a peaceful area with no conflicts among people, the majority of returnees pointed to the presence of security forces upon initially returning home in Round 2, and a plurality continued to give this reason in Round 3. Less than 8 per cent of returnees reported facing any security threats during their time at home, and more than 95 per cent reported being able to move freely while in their districts of origin. Interestingly, however, while still in displacement in Round 1, a lower share (72%) reported being able to move freely while in displacement than the share of IDPs who reported no restrictions on their freedom of movement and remained in displacement through Round 2.

SAMPLED RETURNEES		
Factors for Feeling Safe (n=408)		
	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Peaceful area with no conflicts among people	21.3	38.5
Presence of security forces	68.6	49.3
Other*	10.0	12.2

\* Includes house, money or a job, family ties, and other.

**Sampled Returnees: Move freely in this community? (n=408)**



Despite this difference, more than 92 per cent of sampled returnees reported feeling that they were accepted by their home communities in Rounds 2 and 3, and 95 per cent reported feeling they belonged to their home communities in both rounds. As such, in Round 3 equal shares of returnees listed two reasons for staying in their places of origin: nearly one third said security and one third said familiarity and family support, with the remainder variously citing having a house, a job, or something else.

The differences between sampled returnees and IDPs still in displacement are starker with respect to livelihoods and housing. In Round 2, one third (36%) of sampled returnees initially reported that the first most important reason for staying in their places of origin was a house.

As previously discussed, housing represents a significant new expense incurred as a consequence of displacement. When sampled returnees in Round 2 were in displacement in Round 1, 84 per cent rented accommodations either alone or with other families, and 95 per cent paid the rent by themselves. Return home relieved them of this expense. Upon return home, the share of those renting dropped to 25 per cent, and by Round 3, 59 per cent had returned to the homes they owned and lived in alone prior to displacement.

Still, not all sampled returnees returned to their homes, and not all those who have returned found their homes completely intact. In Round 3, 70 per cent of households reported owning property prior to displacement, and among them, 99 per cent maintained their ownership of it. Among the majority share (87%) that could access their property, only 10 per cent reported it to be in good condition while 78 per cent reported partial damage. In contrast, out of

SAMPLED RETURNEES		
What is the first most important thing that you have here that makes you stay in the current location? (n=408)		
	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Money	16.7	12.5
Family and familiarity	13.2	32.4
House	36.3	13.7
Good security situation	26.5	37.0
Other*	7.4	4.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Includes schools, health, affordable cost of living, and no other place to go.

the 34 households who could not access their property, 31 reported that it was destroyed or heavily damaged.

SAMPLED RETURNEES				
Condition of Property by Access to Property (n=285)*				
	YES %	NO %	DO NOT KNOW %	CONDITION OF PROPERTY MARGINALS %
Good condition	10.4	2.9	0.0	9.5
Partially damaged	78.8	8.8	0.0	70.5
Heavily damaged or destroyed	9.6	88.2	100.0	18.9
Other	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.1
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
<i>Access Property Marginals</i>	<i>87.7</i>	<i>11.9</i>	<i>0.4</i>	

\* The number of households who both owned property prior to displacement and retain ownership of it in Round 3.

Despite the prevalence of damage to property, the share of returnees who have applied for compensation was still low in Round 3. Of the 255 households who reported that their property was partially damaged, heavily damaged or destroyed, only 9 per cent (25 households) applied for compensation. Furthermore, out of the 25 households who applied for compensation, only 3 have seen their claims resolved, and none of those three households have seen their claims enforced. As such, housing challenges are bookends to the displacement experience, and these challenges are not simply overcome by return home: while the need to rent accommodations creates a new financial cost throughout the duration of displacement, upon IDPs' return home, the need to repair or rebuild homes is a new cost.

## IOM PROGRAMMING

To address IDPs' and returnees' difficulties in accessing information and mechanisms to resolve their housing, land, and property (HLP) disputes, IOM established HLP Assistance Centres in selected governorates such as in Anbar and Ninewa. The objective of the HLP Assistance Centres is to provide a service mechanism for community members to resolve peacefully HLP disputes that may escalate into violence or tension. The centres are run by one experienced lawyer and five local community staff members who are trained by IOM in HLP law,

alternative dispute resolution, case management, case referral, confidentiality, community outreach, and development of HLP rights educational materials. The types of support provided by the staff to beneficiaries include case analysis, case counseling, assistance in preparing information and filing documents to support claims, and mediation/negotiation assistance. If formal legal assistance representation is necessary, staff at the HLP offices refer matters to an organization or lawyer providing legal representation.

## SAMPLED RETURNEES

Degree of Damage to Property  
by Application for Compensation (n=285)\*

	YES %	NO %	Property Damage Marginals
Partially damaged	32.0	83.9	78.8
Heavily damaged or destroyed	68.0	16.1	21.2
Total	100%	100%	100%
Compensation Marginals	9.8	90.2	

\* The number of households who both owned property prior to displacement and retain ownership of it in Round 3.

## SAMPLED RETURNEES

First Most Important Source of Money  
or Income Over Time (n=408)

	Prior to displacement (Before 1 Jan. 2014) %	ROUND 3 %
Public job	22.3	20.3
Private job	6.1	0.5
Agriculture	13.7	2.7
Business	27.0	18.9
Informal commerce	21.1	44.1
Money from family & friends	0.7	2.2
Pension	7.4	9.1
Other	0.7	1.2
No income source	1.0	1.0

\* Includes savings, loans, house and land rent income, and cash grants or aid from national or international institutions.

Coupled with lack of compensation for property damage, enduring livelihood-related challenges make new housing expenses difficult to meet. Among sampled returnees, only 33 per cent in Round 3 worked in the same sector that they did prior to displacement. Like IDPs still in displacement, the plurality share of returnees continued to work in informal commerce upon their return home. This share (44%) in Round 3 was nearly double what it was prior to displacement. Notably, among the returnee sample, the share working in agriculture prior to displacement (13%) is much lower than the share of IDPs still in displacement who worked in this sector prior to displacement. Still, even among sampled returnees, only 11 households reported working in agriculture in Round 3.

Shares working in the public sector and in business appear to approach pre-displacement levels. In the public sector, the slight 2 percent drop is well within the margin of error, suggesting that there may not be any significant difference in the proportion of returnees who earned livelihoods from a public job before displacement as compared to Round 3. Furthermore, the majority of returnees (62%) working in the public sector in Round 3 also did so prior to displacement. The share of returnees who earned primary livelihoods from business is lower in Round 3 than it was prior to displacement,<sup>17</sup> but unlike those working in the public sector, only 32 per cent of those working in business in Round 3 had also done so previously. Among sampled returnee households earning livelihoods from business, 50 per cent suggested that the main problem they faced in Round 3 is the lack of currency.

<sup>17</sup> The margin of error is 4.9 per cent, such that the decrease in shares working in business before displacement and upon return home could be as low as 1.7 percentage points and as high as 12.9 percentage points. Share working in business prior to displacement: (27%, 95%CI: 22.1, 31.8); Share working in business in Round 3: (18.9%, 95%CI: 14, 23.8).

SAMPLED RETURNEES				
Provide for Basic Needs (n=408)				
	Prior to Displacement (Before 1 Jan. 2014) %	While in Displacement (ROUND 1) %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Yes	98.8	39.0	79.9	81.9
No	1.2	61.0	20.1	18.1

Notwithstanding the challenges that persist with respect to housing and livelihood, the share of returnees who report being able to provide for their basic needs nearly doubled between Round 1 when they were still in displacement and Round 2 when they returned home. With respect to provision of basic needs, the share of sampled returnees in Round 2 who could provide for their basic needs while still in displacement in Round 1 is notably low: 39 per cent. By Round 2, the share increases to 80 per cent a trend which mirrors but is much more pronounced than that observed among IDPs still in displacement.

But to provide for these basic needs, sampled returnees also have had to resort to the two main strategies reported by IDPs still in displacement: borrowing money and reducing food and other expenses. Furthermore, for those who have had to borrow money when needed, only about half were able to do so in Round 3, a significant drop from the majority share that was able to do so while in displacement in Round 1.

SAMPLED RETURNEES		
If you needed money, were you able to borrow it? (n=408)		
	While in displacement ROUND 1 %	ROUND 3 %
Yes	64.2	47.1
No	21.3	50.0
Did not need to borrow	14.5	2.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

SAMPLED RETURNEES		
Coping Strategies to Provide for Basic Needs (n=408)		
	While in displacement ROUND 1 %	ROUND 3 %
Borrow or receive money	52.0	52.7
Consume savings	11.3	4.2
Share house	7.6	5.4
Limit medical care	5.9	3.2
Reduce food and other expenses	14.5	32.1
Other*	8.8	2.5
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Includes sending children to work, withdrawing children from school, selling assets, and selling property.

Aid for returnees has also decreased: Among the 373 households who reported both the type and provider of aid, a plurality indicated they received cash assistance (42%) upon initially returning home, and 30 per cent reported receiving either food and water or fuel. By Round 3, 89 per cent of all sampled returnee households reported that they had not received aid. As such, while able to provide for their basic needs, the negative coping strategies they have had to employ coupled with enduring costs of housing and unstable livelihoods provide a rationale for the fact that about half of sampled returnees perceive their standard of living to be worse in Round 3 than what it was prior to displacement.

While sampled returnees continued to face challenges in their standards of living, livelihoods, and housing, very few reported having lost documents or having experienced family separation. Four out of the nine households in Round 2 and four out of eight households in Round 3 who reported having lost documents were able to replace all or some of them. The few households who were not able to replace documents cite lack of information and lack of money as reasons for their inability to replace them.

The share of households who experienced family separation is equally low, with only 15 households having reported family members were separated for more than three months in Round 3. As such, the stated reasons for continued separation are not linked to displacement but rather reasons that might occur naturally outside of the context of displacement.

SAMPLED RETURNEES		
Perception of Standard of Living Compared to 1 January 2014 (n=408)		
	While in displacement ROUND 1 %	ROUND 3 %
Better	0.1	8.3
Same	6.5	42.6
Worse	93.4	49.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

SAMPLED RETURNEES			
Lost Documents? (n=408)			
	While in displacement ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Yes	7.8	2.2	2.0
No	89.0	97.8	98.0
Unknown	3.2	NA*	NA*
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Response category not asked in this round.

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SAMPLED RETURNEES			
Experienced family separation? (n=408)			
	While in displacement ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3 %
Yes	2.9	5.4	3.7
No	97.1	94.6	96.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

Furthermore, economic challenges have not precluded sampled returnees from participating in their home communities. This is evident in the increase in households who participated in local reconciliation and confidence-building initiatives: in Round 3, 20 per cent took part such activities, up from just 1 per cent in Round 2. Equally on the rise is the share of those who participate in associational life, which reaches 16 per cent in Round 3. Despite their communal participation, the majority of sampled returnees feel unable to change their communities. The share reporting little or no influence in making their communities a better place to live in Round 3 (66%) mirrors the share who had reported the same prior to displacement (65%). Ironically, then, among the only factors that have returned to “normal” among sampled returnees is lack of self-efficacy.

SAMPLED RETURNEES			
Participated in civic groups, organizations or associations? (n=408)			
	While in displacement ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3* %
Yes	8.6	0.7	16.7
No	91.4	99.3	83.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

\* Answers to “yes” report number of households who indicated they participated in one or more of 10 listed types of groups.

SAMPLED RETURNEES				
How much influence do you think people like yourself have in making this community a better place to live? (n=408)				
	Prior to displacement (Before 1 Jan. 2014) %	While in displacement ROUND 1 %	ROUND 2 %	ROUND 3* %
A lot or some	35.0	22.8	48.8	33.3
Little or none or don't know	65.0	77.2	51.2	66.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

## 4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS BY CRITERIA



#### CRITERIA 1: SAFETY AND SECURITY

Displacement is a solution to the initial lack of safety and security experienced by IDPs. In each round, over 90 per cent report feeling safe in their host communities. The majority of IDPs reports feeling accepted by the host community, increasing over time from 71 per cent in Round 1 to 91 per cent in Round 3. Among the small share who did face a security or safety issue, petty crime or discrimination were the most common. The issues are also geographically based: of the 7 per cent who experience a security issue in Round 3, 67 per cent were in Baghdad and 28 per cent in Kirkuk. Over 90 per cent of sampled returnees reported feeling safe when they return (much higher level than prior to displacement likely due to the presence of security forces in areas of return who were not there in the same numbers or roles pre-ISIL takeover nor during ISIL).



#### CRITERIA 2: STANDARD OF LIVING

After three years in displacement, 52 per cent of IDPs still say that their standard of living is worse than what it was prior to displacement. IDPs in displacement have mostly found ways to meet their basic needs (housing, food and water, clothing, healthcare, and education), but they do so by lowering their standards of living, cutting back on food/clothing, or depending on others: by borrowing money and receiving aid or charity. Those reporting that they can meet their basic needs plateaus at around 70 per cent in Rounds 2 and 3 (as opposed to 95% before displacement). Furthermore, the number of IDP households who needed to borrow money rose to 95 per cent in Round 3 but the number who were able to borrow money remained at 50 per cent. For 55 per cent of families, borrowing or receiving money is their primary way to overcome challenges in providing for their basic living needs. Moving as an IDP (not returning) seems to be a successful strategy to improve standards of living. In Round 3, 92 per cent of movers reported being able to meet their basic needs and commensurately, a significantly higher share of movers (56%) than IDPs (41%) that their standard of living was the same as it had been on 1 January 2014. Almost all returnees (97%) report having returned to the neighbourhood where they were living prior to displacement, and the majority reported that almost all basic services were intact and mostly functioning with one key exception: roads. The share of returnees who report being able to provide for their basic needs nearly doubled between Round 1 (39%) when they were still in displacement and Round 2 when they returned home (80%).



#### CRITERIA 3: LIVELIHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT

While IDPs are able to find income sources that allow them to survive, a majority in Round 3 report facing limitations in or exclusion from accessing employment. There are a number of possible explanations for this, which include discrimination, lack of resources such as vehicles or tools, or unavailability of previous job sector. Thus, three years after displacement, a majority in Round 3 (71%) report earning money from a different type of job than they held prior to displacement. One example of the shift is the share working in the agricultural sector, which decreased from 26 per cent prior to displacement to 2 per cent in Round 3. The need for livelihoods manifests in a large labor shift consistent across each round to informal sector employment despite IDPs desire for more permanent employment. Known for its low wages, poor labor protections, and inconsistency of work availability, informal sector employment also spreads the burden of generating

livelihoods among multiple family members because of its inconsistency. Two sectors have been crucial to how IDPs report being able to meet their needs: those in business (88% of IDPs whose primary income is from business) and the government sector (81% of IDPs whose primary income is their pensions and 82% whose primary income is public sector jobs). IDPs now working in agriculture and informal commerce report much lower abilities at 63 per cent each. The share reporting receiving aid and assistance decreases to just 13 per cent in Round 3 from over 90 per cent in Rounds 1 and 2. Furthermore, findings from the study caution against assuming that geographic return home translates to people resuming their traditional occupations: The shares working in business and agriculture never rebound to pre-displacement levels, while the share working in informal sector is nearly twice as high upon return as it was prior to displacement.





#### CRITERIA 4: HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY

Prior to displacement, 71 per cent of IDPs lived in homes they owned. In displacement, the majority have to rent accommodations. Rent constitutes a significant new expense the non-camp population must bear, and over 90 per cent of IDPs report paying the rent themselves. While in displacement, four in 10 households face limitations in accessing housing, whether due to cost, lack of resources, or discrimination. Among sampled returnees, 59 per cent had returned to live in the homes they owned and lived in prior to displacement while the remaining 41 per cent needed to seek accommodation elsewhere. Furthermore, of the 255 households who reported that their property was partially damaged, heavily damaged or destroyed, only 9 per cent (25 households) had applied for compensation.



#### CRITERIA 5: PERSONAL AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION

Less than 15 per cent of IDPs in the non-camp population have lost documents due to displacement. By Round 3, among those who have lost documents, however, less than half have been able to replace them.



#### CRITERIA 6: FAMILY SEPARATION AND REUNIFICATION

Very small shares (2-3%) of non-camp IDPs in displacement report that members of their households have been separated for more than three months. Of those who have experienced family separation, the majority were reunited in Round 2. In Round 3, one third of households suggest that their separated family members either have no plans to reunite or that family members come and go. This change from Round 2 to Round 3 appears to be tied to adult children moving because of marriage or to continue education.



#### CRITERIA 7: PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Participation in both civic groups and local reconciliation initiatives (each around 4% in Round 1) increases throughout IDPs' time in displacement, but overall participation remains very low. Civic groups see more participation (14%) than local reconciliation efforts (11%). The plurality of IDPs still report feeling they have little to no ability to affect change in their host communities; however, there was a 17 per cent increase in the numbers who said they had some or a lot of influence. Among sampled returnees, participation in local reconciliation efforts increases with time, from 1 per cent in Round 2 to 20 per cent in Round 3. Equally on the rise is the share of those who participate in associational life, which reaches 16 per cent in Round 3. Despite their communal participation, the majority of sampled returnees feel unable to change their communities. The share reporting little or no influence in making their communities a better place to live in Round 3 (66%) mirrors the share who had reported the same prior to displacement (65%). Ironically, then, among the only factors that have returned to "normal" among sampled returnees is lack of self-efficacy.



#### CRITERIA 8: ACCESS TO JUSTICE

IDPs and returnees consistently cite the prosecution of criminals as the most important aspect of achieving justice. Over time, a significant increase in the share believes that reparations and compensation are key to achieving justice. IDPs overall retain a high level of confidence in the ability of traditional state enforcement institutions to pursue and achieve justice, rather than tribal or religious authorities.

*Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq* adds to understandings of protracted displacement in two ways: first, by tracking IDPs over time, the study sheds light on how the conditions of displacement change and how IDPs adopt different strategies to cope with those changing conditions; and second, by disaggregating IDPs to highlight how the displacement experience affects households differently based on the number of times they move and the places to which they move.

Protracted displacement and sustainable return are topics frequently discussed among humanitarian and developmental circles in Iraq. This joint study between IOM and Georgetown University offers key insights into the challenges and survival strategies of 31 per cent of the non-camp population of Iraqi IDPs first displaced by ISIL between January 2014 and December 2015.

The longitudinal study design coupled with the disaggregation of IDPs into three groups—IDPs, movers, and returnees—produced five key findings on protracted displacement:

1. After three years in displacement, IDPs do not reach durable solutions, only temporary ones. The initial period of profound loss is slightly mitigated by emergency aid. IDPs then find ways to provide for their basic needs by renting or sharing accommodations, finding employment in the informal sector, borrowing or receiving money, and reducing food and other expenses. One- to two years into displacement, initial gains plateau, and the “new normal” that sets in falls short of the IASC definition of a durable solution: IDPs’ needs are still linked to their displacement.
2. Finding solutions to displacement—if only temporary—requires the collaboration of IDPs, national governments, and aid and charitable organizations. IDPs engineer survival strategies like the ones listed above, but they cannot bear the burden of displacement without emergency aid and assistance in accessing housing and jobs. The nexus of IDP agency, governmental support, and emergency aid accounts for why IDPs can report on their experiences within the eight criteria over the past three years, rather than total catastrophic failure. But these three elements must stay in play to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate moving forward, particularly as new crises emerge.
3. Government compensation and access to cash are essential to helping IDPs reach sustainable solutions. The share of those who have accessed compensation is extremely low across all groups of IDPs. IDPs in displacement suggest that housing is key consideration in decisions to return home, and sampled returnees who return to find their homes damaged or destroyed cannot achieve a durable solution without assistance in repairing or rebuilding homes. Furthermore, over 95 per cent of IDPs suggest needing to borrow money and turn most frequently to family and friends. Cash is needed not only to help meet immediate needs but also to pay off debt accrued while in displacement.
4. Moving is a strategy IDPs adopt throughout their prolonged displacement. These secondary movements are rational, but the factors motivating them differ from the main factor—the pursuit of safety and security—that motivates initial displacement. The findings from the report generate initial hypotheses about why people move—jobs, standard of living, familiarity, and replacing lost documents—and the factors that do not contribute to such decisions—security, aid, and family reunification. To establish a causal explanation for secondary movement, these factors should be further investigated.
5. This study affirms one of the underlying premises of the IASC’s Framework: geographic return home is not in itself a sustainable solution. Sampled returnees continue to face challenges across the eight criteria. Jobs and housing in particular remain problematic. The share of households earning income from the informal sector remains high and nearly double what it was prior to displacement, while the shares working in agriculture and business remain significantly lower. Further, while the majority of households return to their original homes—relieving them from the burden of rent—most report damage to their homes and require funds to repair them. Very few have been able to access government compensation.

Crisis management often mandates navigating the tasks of helping displaced populations meet their immediate, existential needs through emergency aid while simultaneously implementing long-term programming that will mitigate IDPs' need to rely on such aid. The challenge of protracted displacement lies in identifying a timeline for when—and which—interventions would be most beneficial to IDPs.

As suggested by the findings of this study, the Iraqi case has demonstrated how temporary solutions may be achieved in the first three years of displacement. But stable circumstances should not be conflated with sustainable solutions: this stability is contingent upon all affected parties maintaining the status quo, which at best would leave IDPs surviving. In light of the findings of the study, the following interventions might help IDPs transition from temporary to durable solutions:

1. Prioritize lending schemes and microcredit programmes for IDPs. Those working in the agricultural and business sectors would particularly benefit. IOM has done valuable work in this sector; continuing such programming and encouraging others—local, national, and international organizations—to do the same will benefit not only individuals, but their families and communities.
2. Conduct labor needs assessments in places of return and develop schemes for returning IDPs so they may resume their prior jobs. Simultaneously institute vocational training programmes so those who cannot find jobs while in displacement or who have returned. Such programmes should be driven by the communities' needs and they should not stand in for already well-trained and experienced people who are only lacking the tools or resources to return to their previous work. (These people should be eligible for grants or loans, per point 1.)
3. Focus on housing for both IDPs in displacement and for returnees. There are two levers to pull: first, subsidize housing for those who cannot live in their original homes—either because they are still geographically displaced or because they have returned to their places of origin to find their homes damaged and unlivable; and second, scale up compensation mechanisms by disseminating information about the application procedures and streamline process of distributing funds.
4. Increase community-based activities. Those who participate not only feel more integrated into a community, but also feel like they are in a better position to affect change. Furthermore, feelings of acceptance and belonging contribute to IDPs' perceptions of safety in their locations.
5. Strengthen the role of the judicial system and the rule of law. IDPs report high levels of trust in governmental legal institutions. Capitalize on this by making sure it works fairly and justly for all Iraqis. Temper expectation of how the international community is likely to address war crimes.

## APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

*Access to Durable Solutions Among Iraqi IDPs* is an ongoing, mixed-method study conducted in partnership between the International Organization for Migration and Georgetown University. The purpose of the longitudinal study is to understand the challenges that Iraqi IDPs displaced by ISIL face in accessing one of three durable solutions—return, resettlement, or reintegration—defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as being, “achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.”<sup>18</sup>

The study consists of two core components, a randomly fielded quantitative survey and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with a subset of surveyed households and host community members. Both the survey and the qualitative interview questions asked households about each of the eight criteria that define a durable solution including: long-term safety and security; adequate standard of living; access to livelihood and employment; access to effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land, and property; access to personal and other documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; and access to effective remedies and justice. The study also asked questions related to migration history, social cohesion, and health.

To date, three rounds of data collection have been completed. IOM enumerators fielded Round 1 in March-April 2016, Round 2 in February-April 2017, and Round 3 in July-September 2017. Data collection for Round 4 was underway as of October 2018. In January 2016, survey enumerators enrolled 4000 randomly selected families in the study. Of them, 3852 households participated in Round 1. By Round 2, 96.7 per cent (or 3724 households) remained in the sample. At the conclusion of Round 3, which included 3718 households, 116 families had dropped out of the study permanently: 110 did so immediately after Round 1 while 24 did so after Round 2. (There were 18 households who, after participating in Round 1, dropped out of the study in Round 2 but rejoined in Round 3.) The overall retention rate between Rounds 1 and 3 is 96.5 per cent.

IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), a system used to monitor population movements, provided Iraqi IDP and returning IDP population statistics used in determining the sample frame. Participating IDP households were displaced by ISIL from one of seven governorates of origin (Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din) between January 2014 and December 2015. They relocated to one of four governorates of displacement where the study was fielded: Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. These four displacement governorates were home to 34 per cent (180,000 households) of the 522,000 IDP households in Iraq at the inception of the study in December 2016. The sample was stratified by both governorate of origin and governorate of displacement, yielding 28 strata, one of which was not populated (those displaced from Kirkuk to Sulaymaniyah). The disproportionate allocation to the 27 strata ensured the inclusion of families in four strata that had a low probability of selection: IDP households from Babylon displaced to Kirkuk or Basrah and IDP households from Baghdad or Diyala displaced to Basrah. The target and sample composition in each round of data collection appears below.

<sup>18</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, *Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons*, Walter Kälin: *Framework on Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons*, A/HRC/13/21/Add.4, (9 February 2010), p. 1. Available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/HRC/13/21/Add.4>

## SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY STRATUM, ROUNDS 1 – 3

Stratum (Displacement – Origin Governorate)	TARGET n	ROUND 1 n	ROUND 2 n	ROUND 3 n
Baghdad – Anbar	219	180	173	172
Baghdad – Babylon	247	76	75	75
Baghdad – Baghdad	185	363	358	355
Baghdad – Diyala	181	156	145	143
Baghdad – Kirkuk	20	19	17	17
Baghdad – Ninewa	187	118	116	114
Baghdad – Salah al-Din	162	140	137	136
<i>BAGHDAD TOTALS</i>	<i>1200 (30%)</i>	<i>1052 (27.31%)</i>	<i>1021 (27.42%)</i>	<i>1012 (27.22%)</i>
Basrah – Anbar	73	140	137	137
Basrah – Babylon	10	10	10	10
Basrah – Baghdad	21	20	20	20
Basrah – Diyala	33	15	14	14
Basrah – Kirkuk	62	52	52	52
Basrah – Ninewa	64	229	224	225
Basrah – Salah al-Din	137	134	131	131
<i>BASRAH TOTALS</i>	<i>400 (10%)</i>	<i>600 (15.58%)</i>	<i>588 (15.79%)</i>	<i>589 (15.84%)</i>
Kirkuk – Anbar	157	157	154	156
Kirkuk – Babylon	15	15	15	15
Kirkuk – Baghdad	132	50	45	44
Kirkuk – Diyala	129	140	140	139
Kirkuk – Kirkuk	518	521	509	512
Kirkuk – Ninewa	134	102	94	95
Kirkuk – Salah al-Din	116	131	127	127
<i>KIRKUK TOTALS</i>	<i>1200 (30%)</i>	<i>1116 (28.97%)</i>	<i>1084 (29.12%)</i>	<i>1088 (29.26%)</i>
Sulaymaniyah – Anbar	252	258	243	240
Sulaymaniyah – Babylon	128	131	126	127
Sulaymaniyah – Baghdad	212	92	88	86
Sulaymaniyah – Diyala	207	224	217	215
Sulaymaniyah – Kirkuk	-	-	-	-
Sulaymaniyah – Ninewa	215	161	152	152
Sulaymaniyah – Salah al-Din	186	218	205	209
<i>SULAYMANIYAH TOTALS</i>	<i>1200 (30%)</i>	<i>1084 (28.14%)</i>	<i>1031 (27.69%)</i>	<i>1029 (27.68%)</i>
OTHER (Out of Country)	-	-	2	7
<i>SAMPLE TOTAL</i>	<i>4000</i>	<i>3852</i>	<i>3724</i>	<i>3718</i>

IOM enumerators conducted the survey and qualitative interviews in Arabic or Kurdish with each head of household or adult representative. Each interview took between 30 and 60 minutes to complete, depending on family size. Data collection was completed in-person in Round 1 and both in-person and by phone in Rounds 2 and 3. Less than 5 per cent of surveys were conducted by phone in Round 3 and were reserved only for cases where security- and distance-related challenges precluded IOM enumerators from visiting households in person. Study enumerators instituted a monthly text-message-based system for following study participants' changes of residence over time. Those who participated in the study received cell phone credits to cover study-related expenses.

While tracking the movement of households that were IDPs at enrollment in the study, the study observed and defined three groups of households:

1. **IDPs:** Households that remained in the same district of displacement for the entire duration of the study.
2. **Movers:** IDP households who were first displaced to one district and subsequently moved to districts other than the one to which they were first displaced in Round 1.
3. **Returnees:** IDPs who returned to their districts of origin in Rounds 2 or 3.

Notably, these statuses are not internationally defined or recognized. All households included in all rounds of the survey are considered IDPs because the durable solutions framework definition of an IDP is rights-based rather than geography-based. The project differentiates "mover" and "returnee" from "IDPs" to consider intra-group variation and the extent to which it may inform the development of nuanced policies related to IDPs.

Although most of these households remained either in the governorate of displacement across the three rounds, in Round 2 12.2 per cent (or 454 households) reported returning back to their origins and 6.7 per cent (250 households) than the ones in which they were first displaced. By Round 3, the shares of returnees and movers increased to 16.4 per cent and 7.4 per cent, respectively. In addition, although they have remained in the study, several mover households in Rounds 2 and 3 relocated to other governorates outside of the four where the project's survey was initially fielded, and two families in Round 2 and seven families in Round 3 moved outside of Iraq entirely.

SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY STATUS  
IN ROUNDS 1 – 3

	ROUND 1 % (n)	ROUND 2 % (n)	ROUND 3 % (n)
IDPs	100 (3852)	81.1 (3020)	76.2 (2883)
Movers	NA	6.7 (250)	7.4 (275)
Returnees	NA	12.2 (454)	16.4 (610)
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i> <i>(3852)</i>	<i>100%</i> <i>(3724)</i>	<i>100%</i> <i>(3718)</i>

In this report, all findings pertaining to IDPs and movers (referred to collectively throughout the report as IDPs in displacement) have been weighted for the probability of selection according to the following scheme:

$$w_h = \frac{1}{\frac{n_h}{N_h}} = \frac{N_h}{n_h}$$

Where,

$w_h$  "is the weight for stratum  $h$

$n_h$  "is the sample size for stratum  $h$

$N_h$  is the population reported in the DTM for stratum  $h$

Movers who relocated abroad or to other governorates in Iraq that were not part of the sample frame no longer represent the population from which they were initially sampled and therefore have been assigned a weight of 1.

Findings on returnees are not weighted. When conceived in December 2015, the study sample was never designed to be representative of the prospective returnee population as this would be impossible. While the longitudinal nature of the study allows for the continued participation of returnee households through their return home, findings from this group may provide indicators of trends to more fully investigate but are not representative of all returnees.



IOM IRAQ


# ACCESS TO DURABLE SOLUTIONS AMONG IDPs IN IRAQ: THREE YEARS IN DISPLACEMENT

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The UN Migration Agency - Iraq Mission  
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
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