

PROGRESS TOWARD DURABLE SOLUTIONS IN IRAQ

A PILOT PROJECT IN NINEWA GOVERNORATE

AUGUST 2023



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ACRONYMS

CCCA Central Committee for Compensating the Affected

CSI Coping Strategy Index

DS Durable Solutions

DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix

EGRIS Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons

HH Household

HLP Housing Land and Property

HoH Head of Household

IASC Inter Agency Standing Committee

IRIS International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics

ID Identity Document

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IOM International Organization for Migration

MoMD Ministry of Migration and Displacement

DEFINITIONS

Durable Solution – A durable solution is achieved when displaced people no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through three processes – return, local integration, or relocation (Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) framework¹) with the end goal of all three being (re)integration.

Internal Displaced Person (IDP) – Person or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. The International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix unit (DTM) in Iraq considers IDPs all Iraqi nationals who were forced to flee from 1 January 2014 onwards.

Returnee – IDPs who have returned to their place of habitual residence, the place where they used to live at the time of the displacement-causing event. IOM DTM Iraq considers as returnees all those displaced since January 2014 who have returned to their location of origin, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or another shelter type. The definition of returnees is not related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy for ensuring durable solutions.

Stayee – The population who was not forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence due to the 2014 crisis. This group is used as a baseline for comparison with IDPs and returnees to assess displacement-related vulnerabilities against a population group which has not been displaced. This comparison forms the basis for assessing progress along the solutions pathway, in line with the International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS).²

Location – An area that corresponds either to a village for rural areas or a neighbourhood for urban areas (i.e. fourth official administrative division).

Critical shelters – Tents/caravans/makeshift shelters/mud or brick houses, unfinished/abandoned buildings, public buildings or collective shelters, religious buildings, school buildings, and uninhabitable residences located, for IDPs, at the location of displacement and, for returnees, at that of origin.

Household – Group of people who regularly share meals, income and expenditures together. Members must acknowledge the authority of one person as head of household and that person must actually live with the rest of the household members. In polygamous households, each wife is treated as a distinct household when the wives live in different houses, cook separately and take decisions independently.

Female-headed household – Households that are headed by a female member.

Economically inactive – A person or members of the household who are pre-school children, students, retired persons, doing housework or not employed and not actively looking for a job.

Dependency ratio – The number of children (aged 0–17 years) and older persons (aged 60 years or over) in relation to the working-age population (aged 18–59 years).

Stable income sources – Regular income generated from salaried work (public or private sector), pensions, owned business or from rented property that is not fluctuating significantly on a month-to-month basis.

Essential identity documents – The documents considered to be essential are proof of nationality, national ID, residency card and birth certificate. All others are not considered to be essential for the purpose of this study.³

Unified Card – A card that serves as proof of an individual's Iraqi identity and is a substitute for the Iraqi nationality certificate, civil status identity and residence card.

Housing, Land and Property – An area of humanitarian practice that examines and seeks to address issues related to rights over immovable property, in the context of emergency response.

CONTEXT AND DISPLACEMENT TRENDS

With the end of the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in December 2017, protracted displacement has come to characterize the post-conflict environment in Iraq. Around 1.16 million people remain internally displaced, nearly all of whom fled their areas of origin more than five years ago. In many cases, displacement is not only prolonged but also unstable, in the sense that severe living conditions push households to resettle more than once.

Returns are far from being complete and the pace of new returns has slowed considerably over the past five years. Although almost 5 million returns have been recorded across the country, which corresponds to four fifths of the population displaced since January 2014, the rate of return across districts is extremely variable, with only two in five affected people returned in Al-Ba'aj and Sinjar districts in Ninewa Governorate.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Located in northwestern Iraq and bordering the Syrian Arab Republic, Ninewa Governorate is one of the largest governorate in the country. While the majority of its population is Sunni Arab, it is home to numerous religious and ethnic minorities including Christian, Yazidis, Shabak and Turkmen.⁴ The capital of Ninewa Governorate, Mosul, has a Sunni-Arab majority and has witnessed relative political stability during the Ba'ath regime. The surrounding districts have a more diverse ethno-religious composition. Unlike Mosul, these areas were neglected even during the Ba'ath regime. Christians and Yazidis in particular, have been subject to persecution and genocide throughout history.⁵ The majority of residents in Tel-Kaif and Al-Hamdaniya districts are Christian, with the Shabak (mainly Shia) representing an important minority group. Nearby Sinjar District was heavily impacted by

1 The IASC is the longest-standing and highest-level humanitarian coordination forum of the United Nations system. It brings together the executive heads of 18 organizations and consortia to formulate policy, set strategic priorities and mobilize resources in response to humanitarian crises.

2 Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (EGRIS), *International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS)*, European Commission and United Nations (Luxemburg, 2020).


3 This definition of essential documentation used for this study includes all those considered critical in the Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (as defined by the Protection Cluster) but also considers additional documentation that is considered necessary to be able to obtain a durable solution to displacement. Additionally, the questionnaire allowed space for the respondent to list another document if missing and considered essential. Protection Cluster Iraq, *Protection Analysis Report: Right to Identity and Civil Documentation* (2021).

4 European Union Agency for Asylum (EUA), *Ninewa: Common analysis*, January 2021.

5 Yousif Kalian, *The Nineveh Plains and the future of minorities in Iraq*, *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 7 February 2017.

the policy of 'Arabization,' which resulted in the forced displacement of Kurdish and Yazidis families and their replacement by Sunni Arab families.⁶ The impact of Arabization is still felt today, with many Kurdish and Yazidi families unable to claim the lands they owned during the Ba'ath regime, an issue further exacerbated by their displacement during the 2014-2017 conflict.⁷ Neighbouring Telafar District, on the other hand, is primarily populated by Sunni Turkmen.

Map 1: Districts in Ninewa Governorate



While Sunni Arabs had political support under the Ba'ath regime, the 2003 intervention led by the United States of America resulted in the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and a broader political transition which gave more power to Shia Arabs. Sunni Arabs faced marginalization, attributable in part to disengagement from key political processes (viewed by some as illegitimate), de-Ba'athification policies, targeting of political figures, splintering of leadership and suppression of protests.⁸ The shifting balance of power, political vacuum and growing sectarianism contributed to the rise of Sunni extremist groups in areas like Mosul. Out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq grew the Islamic State in Iraq, later renamed the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in April 2013.⁹

In parallel, the federal Iraq government and Kurdistan Regional Governorate have competed for control over certain parts of Ninewa and other governorates.¹⁰ While there is no clear delineation of the disputed territories,¹¹ Kurdish claims in Ninewa include parts of Sinjar, Telafar, Tilkaf, Al-Shikhan and Al-Hamdaniya, along with the subdistricts of Al-Qahtaniya in Al-Ba'aj District and Baashiqa in Mosul District.¹² Stakes in these territories hinge on the diverse ethnic composition of residents, past Arabization policies which changed these demographics, the strategic position of these territories and the resources found within these areas, including

oil and gas.^{13, 14, 15} Over the past twenty years, control of these territories has shifted between Kurdish regional authorities and the central government.¹⁶ These competing claims have fuelled social and political tensions and complicated security arrangements, which ISIL was able to exploit.¹⁷

DISPLACEMENT FROM NINEWA GOVERNORATE DURING THE 2014-2017 CRISIS

Displacement in Ninewa Governorate during the 2014-2017 crisis primarily reflects discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, initial offensives by ISIL in 2014 and subsequent efforts to reclaim these areas. As early as 2013, growing sectarianism in Ninewa Governorate triggered harassment, violence and discriminatory treatment towards ethnic and religious minorities such as Christian, Yazidis, Shabaks and Turkmen. In response, Shabak families left Mosul for surrounding villages, while Turkmen relocated to Kerbala and Najaf. Between June and August 2014, ISIL launched lightning offensive on Mosul and Sinjar districts, primarily targeting non-Sunni groups. Two thirds of IDPs from Ninewa Governorate fled during these initial offensives, especially from Al-Ba'aj, Mosul, Sinjar and, to a lesser extent, Telafar districts. As in 2013, Turkmen tended to displace towards the central and southern regions of the country, whereas Yazidis and Christians typically relocated to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In the remaining years of the conflict, operations to reclaim territory from ISIL resulted in both displacement and returns. In 2015, clashes between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization Fronts (PMFs) on the one hand and ISIL on the other contributed to new displacement, albeit at lower levels compared to 2014. However, the retaking of areas formerly held by ISIL also spurred a small number of returns to Ninewa Governorate, largely by households living in critical shelters. In 2016, military operations continued to trigger new displacement and returns. The launch of the campaign to retake Mosul on 17 October 2016 resulted in the displacement of 300,000 people along the Mosul corridor by year end.¹⁸

Displacement figures spiked 2017, especially in connection with military efforts to retake western Mosul. Around one fifth of IDPs from Ninewa were displaced in 2017, especially from Mosul, Al-Ba'aj and Hatra districts towards camps in the south of the governorate. Nevertheless, these operations also facilitated a significant increase in returns, particularly following the ISF's formal victory over ISIL in Mosul in July 2017.¹⁹ Around half (51%) of returnees in Ninewa came back in 2017. This was followed by a second influx in 2018, with roughly a quarter (26%) of returnees in Ninewa arriving that year. The number of new returns continues to fall each year, although select districts such as Al-Qahtaniya, Markaz Hatra, Markaz Sinjar and Qaeyrrawan received returnees as late as 2020. This means that at the time of the assessment, most returnees (77%) had arrived in their current location between three and five years ago (Figure 1).

6 Nancy Ezzeddine and Alba Di Pietrantonio Pellise, *Trapped in a Vicious Cycle: Factors of Instability in Nineveh Plains*, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Hague, 2021).

7 United Nations Habitat, *Supporting Yazidis' land rights in Iraq*. Presentation by Muslim Qazimi to the Returns Working Group, January 2023.

8 Renad Mansour, *The Sunni Predicament in Iraq*, Carnegie Middle East Center (Washington D.C., 2016).

9 Britannica, *Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant*, 6 July 2023.

10 Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI), *Ninewa: NCCI Governorate Profile* (2010).

11 Erwin van Vaeen and Hamzeh al-Shadeedi, *In the eye of the storm? (In)stability in Western Iraqi Kurdistan*, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Hague, 2018).

12 Sean Kane, *Iraq's Disputed Territories: A View of the Political Horizon and Implications for U.S. Policy*, United States Institute of Peace (Washington D.C., 2011).

13 Emirates Policy Center, *Disputed territories in Iraq: Security dilemma and geopolitics* (Abu Dhabi, 2021).

14 International Crisis Group, *Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq's Disputed Internal Boundaries* (Brussels, 2018).

15 Sean Kane, *Iraq's Disputed Territories: A View of the Political Horizon and Implications for U.S. Policy*, United States Institute of Peace (Washington D.C., 2011).


16 International Crisis Group, *Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq's Disputed Internal Boundaries* (Brussels, 2018).

17 Emirates Policy Center, *Disputed territories in Iraq: Security dilemma and geopolitics* (Abu Dhabi, 2021).

18 IOM, *Iraq Displacement Crisis: 2014-2017* (Baghdad, 2018).

19 Ibid.

Figure 1: Percentage of households by year of first displacement and year of return



CURRENT DISPLACEMENT AND RETURNS TRENDS


Many of those originally displaced from Ninewa Governorate have since returned. However, the rate of return varies considerably by district and the number of new returns has slowed over the years.²⁰ These factors suggest that persistent and formidable challenges are preventing returns to select areas and for select groups. To this point, Ninewa also hosts a substantial number of IDPs living in protracted displacement. Significant shares of both IDPs and returnees are living in severe conditions. These unique dynamics – prolonged displacement, stagnating returns and severe living conditions – warrant focus on Ninewa to understand whether IDPs and returnees have met their preferred solution and what displacement-related vulnerabilities remain. As of December 2022, by the time data collection was finished, Ninewa Governorate alone hosted the second largest IDP population in Iraq (248,039 individuals, corresponding to 21% of the total caseload), nearly all of whom had been displaced for more than five years and three fifths of whom had been displaced more than once.²¹ Markaz Mosul subdistrict hosts the largest portion of IDPs (36%).²² Other subdistricts with a substantial portion of the IDP population are Markaz Al-Shikhan (8%), Markaz Sinjar (7%), Al-Shamal (7%) and Ba'adre (6%).²³ Furthermore, 18 per cent of the Ninewa IDP caseload is still in camps.²⁴

According to the Displacement Index Round 5 (October – December 2022),²⁵ Ninewa Governorate also hosts the third highest number of IDPs living in severe conditions. Markaz Sinjar is one of the main 'hotspots',²⁶ with its most critical domain being safety and security. Severe conditions were also reported in the two subdistricts of Al-Qayara (12 locations) and Markaz Al-Ba'aj (9 locations).


As of December 2022, Ninewa Governorate hosted the largest returnee population in Iraq (1,941,342 individuals, corresponding to 39% of the total caseload) with two in five of them residing in Markaz Mosul subdistrict.²⁷ Additionally, a substantial percentage of returnees live in Markaz Telafar (9%) and Baashiqra (7%).²⁸

Returns are far from being complete. As of December 2022, almost 2 million returns have been recorded across the governorate, which corresponds to three quarters of the population displaced since January 2014. However, the rate of return across districts is extremely variable, with only two in five affected people have returned in Al-Ba'aj and Sinjar districts, and the pace of new returns has slowed considerably.

Map 2: Subdistricts of displacement of current IDP population in Ninewa



Map 3: Subdistricts of return of current returnee population in Ninewa



20 The rate of return is used to estimate the proportion of returns and is computed as the ratio of returnees to a geographical area (governorate, district or subdistrict) to the total number of returnees and IDPs originally from the same area. For main trends, refer to: IOM, DTM Overview of Return in Iraq: Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) VII (Baghdad, 2023).

21 Based on figures from Master List 128. IOM, DTM Iraq Master List Report 128 (October – December 2022) (Baghdad, 2023).

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


25 IOM, DTM Iraq Displacement Index Findings: Round Five (Baghdad, 2023).

26 Ibid. A subdistrict is classified as a 'hotspot' if it scores highly in terms of overall severity and has at least 1,000 IDPs residents. The list also includes subdistricts with medium overall severity and high score at least on one of the five domains. Security issues in Sinjar are mostly related to concerns on violence from or caused by a tension among security forces or armed groups, concerns related to the revenge attacks, ISIL attacks and presence of other security actors (PMU, TMU or other groups apart from the Iraqi army, the local police and the federal police).

27 Based on figures from Master List 128. IOM, DTM Iraq Master List Report 128 (October – December 2022) (Baghdad, 2023).

28 Ibid.

Figure 2: Rate of return in districts in Ninewa Governorate²⁹



According to Return Index Round 17 (October – December 2022),³⁰ Ninewa is also the governorate hosting the highest number of returnees living in severe conditions: out of the 978 return locations assessed, 288 present severe conditions, with over 540,000 individuals living in 'hotspots'.³¹ Critical aspects include poor security conditions, including harassment at checkpoints, concerns about violence and the need for community reconciliation. Additionally, recovery in the agricultural sector remains weak, in part due to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation, which are reducing yields and herds and causing some to abandon these livelihoods.³² Further challenges include slow recovery of businesses and a lack of government

service provision. These severe living conditions, in turn, hinder the ability of returnees to remain in their area of origin and increase the chances these families will displace, thus undermining the sustainability of returns.

In light of the above, it is essential to assess progress towards durable solutions to displacement in Iraq to inform targeted interventions in key areas of concern. Identifying locations or groups which face similar challenges will support a more efficient and effective programmatic responses. These activities, in turn, will enable IDPs to voluntarily take steps towards their preferred durable solutions and make returns more viable in the long run.

KEY FINDINGS

Across all of Iraq, Ninewa Governorate host **the largest returnee population** and **the second largest IDP population**. Two in five returnees in Iraq reside in Ninewa, along with one in five IDPs, which comes to 364,107 households in total. Within Ninewa, 11 per cent of affected people are still at the location of displacement (IDPs) and 89 per cent have returned to the place where they used to reside when the 2014 crisis forced them to flee (returnees).

In Ninewa, **people were mainly displaced during two distinct periods**. Two-thirds of people who fled in 2014 did so right at the beginning of the crisis, particularly from Al Ba'aj, Mosul, Sinjar districts and, to a lesser extent, Telafar District. Another notable wave of people (19%) was displaced during coalition operations against ISIL in 2017, mainly affecting Mosul District and, to a lesser extent, Al Ba'aj and Hatra. Importantly, three in five IDPs reported that they had experienced displacement multiple times, while this was about half as common as for returnees.

When asked about their **preferable solution**, nearly all returnee households said they prefer to stay at their current location. In contrast, **only three in five IDP households prefer to stay** and **one third prefer to return**. IDPs reported that the most common reasons for not returning to their place of origin were **housing destruction (70%)**, and a **lack of livelihood opportunities (65%)**. This indicates that housing reconstruction and livelihoods-related programming would improve conditions to support sustainable returns.

COMPARING LIVING CONDITIONS

This study compares living conditions for IDP, returnee and stayee households across five criteria: (1) safety and security, (2) adequate standard of living, (3) access to livelihood, (4) restoration of HLP and compensation, and (5) documentation and participation.

Generally, **returnees tend to report living conditions that are on par with stayees**. This shows significant progress toward durable solutions, with important exceptions for housing, land and property (HLP) and compensation, where returnees reported a worse situation than stayees. However, **IDPs had significantly worse living conditions than other groups**, with some exceptions.

HLP and compensation was a crucial distinguishing factor for IDPs, returnees and stayees. IDPs appear to face the worst conditions of any group, although returnees also underperform relative to stayees. For both IDP and returnee households, key drivers of this limited progress included a fear of eviction and entitlement to compensation for home destruction. For IDP households in particular, a lack of ownership documents or formal rental agreements further aggravated housing-related challenges.

Obtaining an adequate standard of living is also more challenging for IDPs. Only four in ten IDP households – compared to seven in ten returnee households – live in a house or apartment in good conditions with improved sanitation facilities, can access health services and facilities when needed and are not facing severe food insecurity. Urban areas such as Mosul generally offer better living conditions. The further households are located from Mosul, the more likely they are to be experiencing challenges related to living conditions.

Access to livelihoods is difficult for all three groups. Even families who were not forced to flee due to the 2014 conflict are experiencing severe vulnerabilities in terms of livelihoods. The displaced population faces significant economic insecurity. Only 23 per cent of IDP households and 38 per cent of returnee households rely on a stable source of income. Additionally, only 14 per cent of IDP households and 22 per cent of returnee households reported they would be able to afford an unexpected expense.

²⁹ Based on figures from Master List 128. IOM, *DTM Iraq Master List Report 128 (October – December 2022)* (Baghdad, 2023).

³⁰ IOM, *DTM Return Index Findings Round Seventeen – Iraq* (October – December 2022) (Baghdad, 2023).

³¹ Ibid. A subdistrict is classified as a 'hotspot' if it scores highly in terms of severity on at least one of the two scales (either livelihoods and basic services or safety and social cohesion) or if it scores medium in terms of severity but also host relatively large numbers of returnees (at least 60,000 returnees). Al-Qahtaniya, Al-Shamal, Ayadiya, Hamam al Aleel, Markaz Al-Ba'aj, Markaz Sinjar, Markaz Telafar, Qaeyrrawan and Zummar are all hotspots in Ninewa Governorate.

³² International Organization for Migration, *DTM Iraq – Integrated Location Assessment VII Factsheet: The Impact of Climate Change on the Environment in IDP and Returnee Locations* (Baghdad, 2022).

MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARD DURABLE SOLUTIONS


To measure the overall progress toward solutions, households were rated according to the number of criteria met. Those who met only one criterion, or none are categorized as low progress, while those who met two or three criteria are classified as medium progress and those who met four or all five criteria as high progress.

Figure 3: Number of criteria met per progress group



Nearly three quarters of IDP households fall in the medium progress group. A further 16 per cent are classified as the high progress group and 10 per cent of as the low progress group. The situation is better for the returnee households – almost half is in the high progress group, half in the medium progress group and only a small portion (3%) in the low progress group.

Figure 4: Percentage of IDP and returnee households by progress groups



FACTORS ENABLING AND PREVENTING PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTIONS

This study provides fresh and unique evidence on what promotes or prevents durable solutions, how IDP and returnee households compare to those who never displaced and the characteristics of the most vulnerable households.

In the low progress group, both IDP and returnee households share important characteristics. In particular, the low progress group had a higher share of households with:

- a female head of household (HoH),
- a high dependency ratio, i.e. proportion of children and elderly to working-age members, and
- members from the Yazidi community.

The findings also demonstrate that instability during displacement often hinders progress towards solutions. Households in the low progress group more often reported multiple displacements, failed attempts to return and fewer years in the same place. Instability is also shown in the housing situation, as fear of being evicted and lack of tenure security are much more common in the low progress group. Only a few households in the low progress group have formal rental agreements or own their housing with documents. Most households in this group live either for free or with an informal rental agreement or no agreement at all.

The condition of housing has some of profound differences between progress groups. Unlike other groups, most households in the low progress group live in critical shelters such as destroyed houses in bad condition, formal camps, mud or block structures and tents. Most often those shelters are not adequate in terms of the number of people per room, access to drinking water, and improved sanitation facilities.

An unstable livelihood situation is another obstacle impeding progress. Both low and medium progress groups have similar conditions within this domain. Although many households have at least one employed member, they have failed to achieve stability. Most households rely on irregular earnings or subsistence agriculture. Reliance on coping strategies to contend with food insecurity is widespread and nearly all households are not able to cover unexpected expenses. Only the high progress group shows livelihood conditions that, even if not ideal, are very much aligned with those of stayees. Within this group, food insecurity is rare and a substantial portion can cover unexpected expenses, indicating that in addition to meeting their basic needs, they have acquired some sort of resilience to withstand shocks.

Issues related to whether households feel safe, are comfortable getting help from authorities and have freedom of movement are common for the low progress group only; these factors did not affect the medium and high groups. Along with other factors, this is linked to 'low progress' households living in insecure shelters and the widespread lack of documents reported in as many as 77 per cent of IDP and 70 per cent of low progress returnee households.

There is a clear relationship between intentions to stay and level of progress, with lower progress groups citing lower intentions to stay. Only a quarter of households in the low progress group prefer to stay in their current location, in contrast to the three in five IDP households at the governorate level who wish to stay. This suggests that the most vulnerable households are struggling to integrate and require targeted programming to improve their progress towards durable solutions. The majority of the low progress group prefer either to return (55%), move abroad (9%) or cannot decide (9%). On the other hand, four in five households in the high progress group prefer to stay, with a minority stating an intention to return (16%) or move abroad (7%).

INTRODUCTION

This pilot project aims at assessing progress towards durable solutions³³ to displacement for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees in Ninewa Governorate of Iraq in order to understand where they stand five years after the end of the 2014-2017 crisis and in which aspects they are still struggling compared to the population who never left their location of origin ('stayees'). In this respect this project contributes to a broader discussion and Action Agenda around measuring progress towards solutions – and determining the end of displacement – which aims at operationalizing the eight criteria of the Framework for Durable Solutions produced by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and informing targeted interventions in key areas of concern.³⁴

The analysis of this project builds on the information and knowledge gained by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) about the 2014-2017 crisis. IOM Iraq has been tracking and monitoring IDP stock figures as early as December 2013 through the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM).³⁵ The collection of returnee stock figures began in April 2015, although returnee stock figures have been retroactively reported since October 2014. IOM Iraq also uses the Displacement Index³⁶ and Return Index³⁷ as tools to monitor the living conditions of the IDP

and returnee populations at the location level across key sectors, such as livelihoods, housing, services, safety, social cohesion and inclusiveness. Since 2015, IOM Iraq and Georgetown University implemented a longitudinal study, 'Access to Durable Solutions in Iraq', to understand how IDPs take steps to build lasting durable solutions. The study has regularly surveyed the non-camp IDP families since their displacement in 2014-2015, including some families who managed to return to their area of origin since 2017.³⁸ Since 2019, IOM Iraq has been monitoring protracted³⁹ and urban displacement⁴⁰ in the main districts of origin and displacement to provide a contextualized categorization and inform planning and development of durable solutions strategies.

The analytical framework for this pilot was developed according to the IASC Framework for Durable Solutions and the recommendations provided by the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS)/UN Statistics Division (UNSD) on IDP statistics and composite measures for progress towards durable solutions and overcoming key displacement-related vulnerabilities. All indicators selected for the composite measure were selected from the Interagency Indicator Library and, as such, they align with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

METHODOLOGY

SAMPLING DESIGN

Two sources of data were utilized as sampling frames to obtain the estimated base number of IDP, returnee and stayee households in each subdistrict in Ninewa Governorate. DTM Master List Round 127 data, collected between July and September 2022, was used as a sample frame for IDP and returnee households, while the source for stayee households was Statistical Population data 2021 from Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Planning the Republic of Iraq.⁴¹

A two-stage sampling procedure was used. In the first stage, locations in each subdistrict were selected with a probability proportional to the population size⁴² and then in the second stage, IDP and returnee households were selected proportionally to the total number of households in the location. All locations where IDPs and returnees were present according to DTM Master List Round 127 were included in the frame.⁴³ For stayees, the procedure was slightly different and based on 2021 Iraqi Central Statistical Office population estimates at the subdistrict level, which are available at request. Only locations selected for IDPs and returnees were included in the frame and the number of households was based on the total number of stayees in the

subdistrict. In cases where no stayees or few stayees were present at the selected location, households were replaced within the subdistrict. Due to access issues, not all camps were included in the survey. Ninewa Governorate has eight IDP camps and interviews were conducted at four of them.

Data collection for this report took place in November 2022 across 9 districts and 36 subdistricts in the Ninewa Governorate of Iraq. Data was collected through IOM's Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs), composed of over 73 staff members (40% of enumerators are female). They collected data through structured face-to-face interviews with a sample size of 8,042 households equally split between three groups: IDP, returnee and stayee households. This sample size and design allow for comparison between the three groups as well as generalization of the findings per population group at the subdistrict level. Overall, surveyed households represent 41,697 IDP households, 322,410 returnee households and 284,917 stayee households. The margin of error ranged from 7.5–7.7 per cent for IDP estimates, 9 per cent for returnee estimates and 10.5–10.7 per cent for stayee estimates.

33 A durable solution is achieved when displaced people no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through return, integration or resettlement. IASC, *IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons*, The Brookings Institute & University of Bern (Washington D.C., 2010).

34 In 2015, an interagency process, composed by a group of development, humanitarian and peacebuilding actors under the leadership of the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, was established. The group started work on developing and testing indicators and guidance for comprehensive durable solutions analysis in internal displacement situations, resulting in a library of standardized indicators and operational guidance. For more information, refer to: IASC, *Inter-Agency Durable Solutions Indicator Library*, Joint IDP Profiling Service (2020).

35 For more information, refer to: IOM, *DTM Iraq Master List*.

36 For more information, refer to: IOM, *DTM Iraq Displacement Index*.

37 For more information, refer to: IOM, *DTM Iraq Return Index*.

38 For more information on the study, its methodology and main findings, refer to: IOM and Georgetown University, *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq, Part One* (2017). IOM and Georgetown University, *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Three Years in Displacement* (Baghdad, 2019). IOM and Georgetown University, *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Four Years in Displacement* (Baghdad, 2019). IOM and Georgetown University, *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Five Years in Displacement* (Baghdad, 2020). IOM and Georgetown University, *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Six Years in Displacement* (Baghdad, 2022).

39 For more information, refer to: IOM, *Progress Towards Solutions*.

40 IOM, *DTM – An Analysis of Urban Displacement in Iraq* (Baghdad, 2021).

41 Statistical population data of Ninewa Governorate issued by Central Statistical Office through formal request and not available in online sources.

42 Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) is a sampling technique where each element (in this case locations) has some chance to be selected. The chance is defined by the population size, i.e. locations with a larger population have a higher chance of being selected.


43 The IDP and Returnee Master List provides data on the number of IDPs and returnees at the governorate, district, subdistrict and location levels. In 2022, figures were reported every three months based on IOM's RARTs continuous data collection through interviews with key informants and cross checking with government registration data and partner agencies. Master List 127 refers to July-September 2022 and is available at: <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/MasterList>

SELECTION OF INDICATORS

Indicators to assess the advancement toward durable solutions stemmed from the IASC Framework. The framework defines three 'durable solutions' — sustainable return, sustainable integration or sustainable resettlement — each of which depends on the fulfillment of eight criteria: (1) long-term safety and security; (2)

adequate standard of living; (3) access to livelihood and employment; (4) access to effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property; (5) access to personal and other documentation; (6) family reunification; (7) participation in public affairs and (8) access to effective remedies and justice (Figure 5).


Figure 5: IASC Durable Solution Framework's criteria to measure the progress toward achieving durable solutions



Upon consultation with partners and following the International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS), indicators across those criteria were developed and organized into a questionnaire, which was then administered to the sample of 2,679 IDP households, 2,675 returnee households and 2,688 stayee households across 36 subdistricts and 9 districts of Ninewa Governorate. Afterwards, indicators

were tested and analysed across the three population groups and those that differentiated groups better and were consistent across domains were selected for analysis. Overall, 16 indicators were selected and grouped into five domains to have at least three indicators per domain (Figure 6).

Figure 6: IASC Durable Solution Framework's criteria, sub-criteria and indicators used in this project



All indicators were coded as binary variables, with 1 representing when a displacement-related or return-related vulnerability was overcome and 0 when the vulnerability remained for a specific household. For example, 'feeling safe' or 'not reporting movement restrictions' is coded as a 1 as this is positive progress towards solutions. Recording of missing data was performed in the following way. Missing data by design, due to skipping patterns and non-applicability were interpreted as the absence of vulnerability. For instance, families who did not need health care were coded as 'not vulnerable' in the health sub-criterion. Missing data due to non-response were interpreted as the presence of vulnerability. For instance,

families answering 'Do not know' or 'Prefer not to answer' on whether they feel safe were coded as vulnerable, i.e., 'not feeling safe'. Employment indicators were assessed at the household level and coded as the absence of vulnerability if at least one individual scored a pass in that indicator; i.e., at least one member aged 15-60 years old is employed in the household and the head of household has a stable source of income (public or private employment, self-employment or retired). The absence of vulnerability related to personal documentation was applied where all household members owned essential documents.

44 Food security was assessed by the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) from the World Food Programme, the de facto standard for measuring food security in humanitarian settings. It is based on five core questions that were administered to households and then weighted with universally standardized weights to allow comparability across contexts. In this analysis, the threshold for the absence of vulnerability was set at 18 and includes the first two classes (Minimal/None (0-3) and Stressed (4-18)) that correspond to a situation of less severe food insecurity. World Food Programme, *The Coping Strategy Index: Field Methods Manual (Second Edition)* (2008).

COMPOSITE MEASURE

The composite measure to assess the progress towards solutions was built in several steps. First, the average number of indicators met per domain was calculated. For instance, the safety and security domain include three indicators; thus,

the maximum possible value is three when all indicators are met and the minimum possible value is zero, when none of the indicators are met. This allows us to conduct a comparison between groups and define the most problematic domain.

Table 1. The average number of indicators met per domain and population group

DOMAIN	IDPs	RETURNEES	STAYEES	MAX
Safety and Security	2.94	2.95	2.97	3
Adequate Standard of Living	3.16	3.50	3.52	4
Access to Livelihoods	1.25	1.53	1.54	3
Restoration of HLP and Compensation	0.95	1.93	2.16	3
Personal Documentation and Participation	2.85	2.93	2.94	3

Second, the average number of criteria met was calculated. To do so, domain scores also were coded as binary variables, with 1 when IDP or returnee household met on average the same or higher number of indicators per domain as

stayee household and 0 when the IDP or returnee household met on average lower number of indicators.

Table 2. The score coding per domain based on the average number of indicators met

DOMAIN	0	1	THRESHOLD (Average number of indicators met by stayee households)
Safety and Security	< 2.97	= or >2.97	2.97
Adequate Standards of Living	< 3.52	= or >3.52	3.52
Access to Livelihoods	< 1.54	= or >1.54	1.54
Restoration of HLP and Compensation	< 2.16	= or >2.16	2.16
Personal Documentation and Participation	< 2.94	= or >2.94	2.94

Thus, the maximum possible value is five when all criteria are met and the minimum possible value is 0, when none of the criteria are met. This allows us to conduct an overall comparison between groups.

Figure 7: Number of criteria met per progress group

Table 3. The average number of criteria met by population group

	IDPs	RETURNEES	STAYEES	Max
All five domains	2.58	3.00	3.21	5

In addition, to assess the progress towards solutions, households were then rated according to the number of criteria met. Those who met only one criterion or none are categorized as achieved low progress, those who met two or three criteria as medium progress and those who met four or all five criteria as high progress.



LIMITATIONS

The IASC Framework sets out eight criteria for assessing progress towards durable solutions. The seventh criteria 'family reunification' was excluded from this report due to an error during implementation of the survey. As previously noted, some subdistricts had no or few stayees. As a result, the sample was met using other locations in the district. This means that for the stayee population, findings can be generalized at the district, not subdistrict level. Additionally, access constraints for camps resulted in only four out of eight camps being assessed for the project.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION

This section presents the overview of the main socio-demographic characteristics of the displaced population in Ninewa Governorate. This population is composed of two main groups: households who are still at the location of displacement (IDPs) and households who have returned to the place where they used to reside when the 2014 crisis forced them to move elsewhere (returnees).


SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Generally, the demographic structure of the displaced population is balanced.⁴⁵ Half are female, and half are males. Around half are young adults or middle-aged (18–59

years old), nearly half are children (under 18 years old), and only a small portion are older adults (over 60 years old). The average household size is nearly 7.5 members and returnee households are more often larger with more economically active members, the dependency ratio is slightly lower.

Around one in five returnee households is headed by a female (17% of returnees versus 13% of IDPs) or an elderly member (22% of returnees versus 13% of IDPs). In many IDP households, the Head of Household (HoH) is illiterate⁴⁶ (58% of IDPs versus 38% of returnees) or has no stable source of income (77% of IDPs versus 62% of returnees).⁴⁷ In one per cent of IDP households, the HoH is absent (dead, imprisoned or elsewhere).

Figure 8: Characteristics of households



45 For detailed figures, refer to Table 2 in the Annex.


46 'Illiterate' here refers to an individual who did not receive any education or did not complete primary school.

47 A stable occupation means that the HoH is regularly employed in the public or private sector, self-employed or retired.

Displacement in Ninewa is mainly protracted and multiple: nearly all IDP households had been displaced for more than 5 years (99%) and three fifths had undergone more than one displacement (58% of IDPs versus 30% of returnees). Around one in four households have attempted but failed to return to the location of origin. Failed returns were most commonly reported to Al-Qahtaniya and

Markaz Al-Ba'aj in Al-Ba'aj District and Markaz Mosul, Mosul District. Findings from Return Index suggests that challenges related to livelihoods, safety and security and access to essential services are contributing to severe living conditions in Al-Qahtaniya and Markaz Al-Ba'aj.⁴⁸

Figure 9: Number of displacements and failed returns




PREFERRED DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND OBSTACLES

Most returnee households (95%) prefer to stay at the location of return in the next 12 months, while only three fifths of IDP households prefer to stay and one third prefer to return. A small portion of IDP households (7%) reported that moving abroad would be the preferred solution for their household.

Home destruction remains the most common reason for not having returned to the place of habitual residence (70%), followed closely by the lack of livelihood opportunities at origin (65%). Around one third of IDP households reported security concerns. Additionally, around one tenth of IDP households are blocked from returning or are unable to obtain a security clearance.

Figure 10: Preferred solutions and main barriers to return



48 IOM, DTM Iraq Return Index Round 17 Dashboard (Baghdad, 2022).

II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS PER CRITERIA


This section compares progress for IDP, returnee and stayee households across five criteria: (1) safety and security, (2) adequate standard of living, (3) access to livelihood, (4) restoration of HLP and compensation and (5) documentation and participation.

Livelihoods and HLP restoration and compensation are the most challenging domains. With respect to livelihoods, all three groups performed poorly. In particular, low shares of IDP, returnee and stayee households have a stable source of income and are able to face unexpected expenses. On the other hand, the greatest gap between IDP, returnee and stayee households was observed in the HLP restoration and compensation domain. Higher shares of IDP and returnee households reported property damage and entitlement to compensation. Additionally, IDP households appear to be at heightened risk of eviction.

IDP and returnee households achieved slightly more progress regarding standards of living, although IDP households slightly underperform returnee and stayee households. Nevertheless, lower shares of IDP and returnee household reside in housing in good conditions. Additionally, IDP households face greater challenges meeting basic food needs, as reflected by their reliance on coping strategies.


In contrast, IDP and returnee appear to face limited challenges regarding safety and security, personal documentation and participation in public affairs. All three groups received close to the maximum score and there was little gap between the three groups.

SAFETY AND SECURITY

 The safety and security domain considers whether households feel safe, are comfortable getting help from authorities and have freedom of movement in and out of their location of residence.


Safety and security was the least problematic criterion with IDP and returnee households reporting on average similar scores to stayee households. Specifically, most IDP households (95%) and returnee households (96%) passed all three indicators for this criterion (feeling safe in their current location, enjoying the freedom of movement at all times and being comfortable reporting their safety and security issues to relevant authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanism).

Figure 11: The average number of indicators met per safety and security domain




However, in selected subdistricts, IDP and returnee households faced greater challenges surrounding safety and security. In particular, IDP households in four subdistricts, namely Al-Qahtaniya (69%), Rubiya (70%), Al-Qayara (71%), and Al-Namroud (72%), had noticeably lower portions meeting these three indicators. For returnees, Al-Qahtaniya District (53%) had the smallest portion of households passing the safety and security criteria.⁴⁹

Map 4: Percentage of IDP households meeting all safety and security indicators per subdistrict




Map 5: Percentage of returnee households meeting all safety and security indicators per subdistrict




49 For detailed figures per criteria at by subdistrict level, refer to Table 6 (for IDPs) and Table 8 (for returnees) in Annexes

ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING

 The assessment measured adequate standards of living based on whether households have access to health care if needed or improved sanitation facilities. Additionally, this domain considered whether IDP and returnees' housing is in good condition. Finally, it examined levels of food security based on households' scores on the Coping Strategy Index.


IDP and returnee households faced more challenges related to standards of living than safety and security. Only 40 per cent of IDP households and 66 per cent of returnee households who live in a house or apartment in good conditions with improved sanitation facilities, are able to access health services and facilities when needed and are not facing severe food insecurity.

Figure 12: The average number of indicators met per adequate standard of living domain




Urban areas such as Mosul generally offer better standards of living, particularly with respect to access to health facilities and housing in good conditions. The further households located from Mosul, the more likely they are to be experiencing challenges in this domain.


Map 6: Percentage of IDP households meeting all standard of living indicators per subdistrict



Map 7: Percentage of returnee households meeting all standard of living indicators per subdistrict



ACCESS TO LIVELIHOODS

 The livelihoods domain assessed whether at least one member of the household (ages 15-60) is employed, whether the head of household has a stable source of income and whether households are able to face unexpected expenses of up to 440,000 IQD.

Employment and economic security appear to be the most critical problem for all three groups, including stayees. Overall, only 4 per cent of IDPs and 12 per cent of returnees met all three livelihood indicators. Additionally, just 30 per cent of IDPs and 45 per cent of returnees reported livelihoods conditions on par with stayees.

Figure 13: The average number of indicators met per access to livelihoods domain




Economic security is extremely volatile. Among IDP households, less than a quarter (23%) say the head of household has a stable source of income. Among returnee households, the share is slightly higher at 38 per cent. This unpredictable income, in turn, affects the ability of households to weather economic shocks. Only 14 per cent of IDP households and 22 per cent of returnee households can face unexpected expenses.

The fact that the average value is so low for stayees as well (1.54 out of 3) indicates that even non-displaced families are struggling to access stable livelihoods

and facing economic insecurity. Only a small proportion of stayees (4%) can meet basic needs and build savings for more expensive but necessary purchases.

Moreover, nearly two in five stayee households (38%) must limit their expenses even for food, while a further third (33%) have enough money for food only.

Figure 14: Financial status of households



Given that most households are unable to save money, many (79%) are unable to pay for unexpected costs such as emergency medical treatment or vehicle repairs. Despite the considerable economic challenges faced by all groups, only a small minority (5%) received assistance from the Government or other factors in the last three months.


compensation, only a handful of subdistricts performed above governorate level. This includes Markaz Mosul for both IDPs and returnees. Among IDP households, the best-performing areas tend to be found in the northeastern quarter in subdistricts like Bardarash, Hamam al Aleel, Kalak and Markaz Akre. For returnees, only two subdistricts, Al Qayara and Al-Shura, performed above the governorate level. These findings demonstrate the importance of programmatic interventions related to HLP across the governorate.

RESTORATION OF HLP AND COMPENSATION

With respect to property restoration and compensation, the assessment considered whether households have legally recognized documentation for their housing and are not at risk of eviction. Additionally, households were asked whether their property was damaged and if they are entitled to compensation.

The greatest difference between IDP and returnee households compared to stayee households was in the domain of property restoration and compensation. This gap is largely driven by the large share of IDP and returnee households who report that their property was destroyed and they are entitled to compensation mechanisms (91% and 66%, respectively). In other words, property destruction related to the conflict appears to affect a greater share of IDP and returnee households. Additionally, more than half of IDP households (58%) are afraid of being evicted in the next 12 months.

Figure 15: The average number of indicators met per restoration of HLP and compensation domain



When it comes to geographic trends, it is worth flagging that for IDPs, home destruction most likely occurred in their location of origin, not their current location. Given the widespread challenges related to HLP restoration and

DOCUMENTATION AND PARTICIPATION

With respect to personal documentation, households were asked whether all members of their household have a national or unified ID and a birth certificate. Additionally, regarding participation in public affairs, the assessment considered whether all eligible members of the household voted in the 2021 parliamentary elections.

In contrast to HLP and livelihoods, personal documentation and participation in public affairs was one of the strongest performing indicators, both in terms of average score per group as well as the gap between IDP, returnee and stayee households. Overall, 87 per cent of IDPs and 93 per cent of returnees met all three documentation and participation criteria. In rare instances where households did not meet all three criteria, most tended to meet at least two out of three criteria.

Figure 16: The average number of indicators met per personal documentation and participation domain



IDP hotspots appear to be located on the outskirts of the Governorate. The sub-district of Al-Shamal, Sinjar district, is a hotspot of vulnerability, with figures for both IDPs and returnees significantly below the governorate level (35% and 50%, respectively).

III. PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTION

OVERALL PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS

To measure the overall progress toward solutions, all five criteria discussed in the previous section were summed to obtain a composite measure. Stayee households meet on average 3.21 out of 5 criteria, while IDP and returnee households meet 2.58 and 3.00, respectively.

Households were then rated according to the number of criteria met. Those who met only one criterion or none are categorized as low progress, while those who

met two or three criteria are classified as medium progress and those who met four or all five criteria as high progress.

Table 4: The average number of criteria met per population group

	IDPs	RETURNEES	STAYEES
Average	2.58	3.00	3.21

Table 5: Number and percentage of households by number of criteria met and progress group

		Number of criteria that are met						Total
		Low progress		Medium progress		High progress		
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
IDPs	No. of HHs	408	3,674	16,757	13,960	6,320	578	41,698
	Percentage of HHs	1%	9%	40%	34%	15%	1%	100%
Returnees	No. of HHs	380	9,734	68,980	95,582	108,809	38,924	322,410
	Percentage of HHs	0%	3%	21%	30%	34%	12%	100%

The majority of IDP households (74%) fall in the medium progress category. However, 10 per cent are classified as low progress, with a higher concentration in Sinjar, Mosul and Telefar districts. The remaining 16 per cent can be found in the high progress group. Returnee household have achieved greater progress

than IDP households. Around half of these households (51%) are considered medium progress, with a further 46 per cent falling in the high progress group. Only 3 per cent of returnee households were ranked as low progress. These households are concentrated in Sinjar and Ba'aj districts.

KEY FACTORS LINKED TO PROGRESS

This section presents an overview of the main characteristics of IDP and returnee households by their level of progress towards solutions. It highlights the main factors enabling or preventing households from achieving durable solutions. These include the particular subdistrict in which IDPs or returnees reside, their demographic characteristics, displacement history, housing conditions, livelihood opportunities, safety and security, participation, documentation, movement intentions and, in the case of IDPs, barriers to return. As discussed further in this section, **housing, livelihoods and displacement history** appear to have the strongest connection with progress towards durable solutions.

Among IDP households, **housing** is an important distinguishing factor between the three progress groups, especially when it comes to housing conditions, number of people per room, tenure security and fear of eviction. Low progress IDP households are more likely to live in critical shelters for free or through informal agreements. By contrast, high progress households typically rent or own good condition housing through formal means. **Access to livelihoods** also had a notable relationship with progress. High progress households generally have more stable employment than medium progress households and have a higher share able to meet unexpected expenses. Furthermore, **displacement history** played a role in distinguishing low and medium progress households, with the former group more likely to report failed attempts at return. Other criteria, such as freedom of movement, possession of essential personal documentation and voting in the 2021 parliamentary elections, separated low and medium progress households. As might be expected, progress for IDPs is linked to their preferred

solution. The more progress IDP households have made towards durable solutions, the more likely they will want to remain in their current location. This suggests that helping IDP and returnee households meet their preferred solutions will support progress outcomes. At the same time, enabling households to make progress can also shape their preferred solutions.

Among returnee **households**, housing similarly played a critical role in determining progress, particularly with respect to housing conditions, adequacy of shelter and tenure security. In contrast to IDP households, entitlement to compensation for housing destruction and other conflict-related impacts was linked to progress among returnees, with greater portions of the low progress group eligible for compensation. As with IDPs, however, low progress returnee households were less likely to own housing with legal documents and subsequently had greater fears of eviction. Additionally, **livelihood opportunities** also influenced progress for returnees, with a smaller share of low progress returnees having stable livelihoods and able to meet unexpected expenses.

Certain criteria related to **displacement history** also had an impact on progress, including the year of displacement and number of displacements experienced. Low progress returnees were more likely to be displaced in 2014 and larger portions of the low and medium progress groups were displaced more than once. Other factors, such as possession of essential personal documentation, participation in the community and, to a lesser extent, safety and security, distinguished low progress households from those in the medium and high groups.


LOW PROGRESS – IDP HOUSEHOLDS

4,082 Households

10% of all IDP caseload

The low progress group includes IDPs who have made progress on only one criterion or fewer. Overall, one in ten IDP households fall in this category, including 9 per cent who have met one criterion and 1 per cent who have met none. IDPs in the low progress group are mainly concentrated in four subdistricts: 1) Al-Shamal in Sinjar district, 2) Markaz Mosul and 3) Al-Qayara in Mosul district and 4) Rubiya in Telefar district.


Figure 17: Percentage of households in the low progress group per subdistrict



DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

With respect to demographics characteristics, the share of female-headed households is significantly higher in the low progress group (24%) compared to the medium and high progress groups (12% and 11%, respectively). Most of these households did not meet any of the progress criteria. Additionally, households in the low progress group tend to be larger with a higher dependency ratio. Finally, nearly half are Yazidis (47%), although they make up less than a quarter (26%) of all IDP households across the governorate. This implies that the Yazidi community is facing particular challenges in achieving durable solutions.

Figure 18: Dependency ratio of households in the low progress group




DISPLACEMENT HISTORY

An IDP household's history of displacement also appears to influence their progress towards solutions. While the majority of IDP households fled in 2014 (71%), just over half arrived at the current location less than five years ago (58%), often after a failed attempt to return to the location of origin (48%) or after displacing multiple times (67%).

IDP households in the low progress group tend to have resided in their current location for fewer years than those in the medium and high categories. Additionally, multiple displacements were more common among low progress IDP households than low progress returnee households (67% vs. 41%). In other words, stability during displacement – as measured by the length of time residing in the current locations and history of failed returns and multiple displacements – appear to be linked to IDPs' progress.


Figure 19: Number of years since arrival at current location and failed returns



HOUSING

Nearly two in three IDP households in the low progress group live in critical shelters or camps. The portion of households living in good conditions is significantly smaller compared to the medium and high progress groups (56% and 96%, respectively). Less than half of these households (47%) have adequate shelter, as measured by the number of people per room, access to drinking water and improved sanitation. This is considerably lower than in the medium and high progress groups (63% and 84%, respectively).


Figure 20: Adequacy of shelter of households in the low progress group



IDPs in the low progress group tend to lack secure housing arrangements. Around four in five households (79%) are afraid of being evicted, far higher than that reported by medium or high progress households or by low progress returnee households (61% and 30%, respectively). This is likely related to the fact that almost no households in the low progress group have a formal rental agreement (6%) or own the property with documents (3%) or without documents (4%). Most households live for free (53%) or with informal rental agreement or no agreement at all (34%). The households in the low progress group more frequently live for free than households in the medium and high progress groups (29% and 8%, respectively).

Nearly three in five households (59%) reported being entitled for compensation. This portion is noticeably larger compared to the medium and high progress groups (41% and 44%, respectively).


Figure 21: Security of tenure of households in the low progress group



LIVELIHOODS

As with shelter, the livelihood situations of low progress IDPs tends to be unstable. In around one third of households, no one is working (30%) which is a significantly larger portion than in medium and high progress groups (13% and 1%, respectively). Even when household members work, the arrangements tend to be irregular or informal. In nearly all households (95%), the head of household either works for daily wages or relies on subsistence agriculture. As a result, most households adopted coping strategies, with two thirds classified as ‘stressed. Additionally, only a small portion of the households (6%) can face unexpected expenses.


Figure 22: Food and financial security of households in the low progress group



SAFETY AND SECURITY AND PARTICIPATION

Most households did not report issues related to security (87%), freedom of movement (82%), and discrimination (89%). However, greater portions in the low progress group faced safety and security issues compared to those in the medium and high progress groups. In particular, 13 per cent of IDP households in the low progress group felt unsafe or uncomfortable getting help from authorities compared to only 1 per cent and none in the medium and high progress groups, respectively. Similarly, 18 per cent of low progress households felt constrained in their freedom of movement, in contrast to 1 per cent and none in the medium and high progress groups, respectively. Additionally, around one in ten households (11%) faced discrimination or unfair treatment versus 1 per cent in both the medium and high progress groups.


Figure 23: Percentage of households in the low progress group met safety and security indicators



DOCUMENTATION

Less than a quarter (23%) of low progress IDP households have all essential documents, including a national or unified ID, Iraqi nationality and birth certificate. A birth certificate was the most common document possessed by this group, while national or unified ID was the least common, owned by only three in ten households. The main challenges to obtaining the missing documents are a lack of money and the length of the process.

Figure 24: Ownership of documents of households in the low progress group




PREFERRED SOLUTION

Just over one in two (55%) IDP households in the low progress group prefer to return home, a considerably larger portion than those in the medium or high progress groups (31% and 16%, respectively).

Around four in ten low progress IDP households originate from Al-Ba'aj, followed by a quarter from Mosul. This group more frequently reported home destruction (83%) as the main obstacle to return compared to the medium and high progress groups (73% and 50%, respectively). This signals the importance of HLP-related programming for Al-Ba'aj and Mosul districts. Other key obstacles to return are inadequate services or infrastructure at origin (53%) and lack of livelihoods opportunities (46%). In addition, a minority of households (15%) mentioned a failure to obtain security clearance among the main obstacles to return, although this portion was higher than among the medium and high progress groups (6% and 3%, respectively). An inability to obtain security clearance may be linked to a lack of documents or perceived affiliation of the household.

Figure 25: Reasons for not returning at origin for households in the low progress group




LOW PROGRESS – RETURNEE HOUSEHOLDS

10,115 Households

3% of all returnee caseload

Figure 26: Percentage of households in the low progress group per subdistrict




A smaller share of returnee households fell in the low progress group (3%, 10,114 households) compared to IDP households. Around two in five of these households live in Al-Shamal subdistrict, Sinjar district, while a further 8 per cent reside in Markaz Al-Ba'aj subdistrict, Ba'aj district. No returnee households in Markaz Mosul subdistrict fell in the low progress group.

DEMOGRAPHICS

Around one in five (21%) low progress returnee households have a female head of household. These families also tend to be larger in size and have a higher dependency ratio than those in the medium and high progress groups. Like IDPs in low progress group, nearly one in two households are Yazidis (49%), whereas the presence of Arab Sunnis and Shias is relatively smaller compared to the other two groups (33% and 13%, respectively). In other words, Yazidis are overrepresented in the low progress group relative to their portion among all returnee households in Ninewa (5%), while Arab Sunnis and, to a lesser extent, Shias are underrepresented compared to the full returnee group (62% and 21%, respectively).


Figure 27: Dependency ratio of households in the low progress group



DISPLACEMENT HISTORY

Just over three in four households fled in 2014 (78%) and around half returned less than five years ago. These households are the most likely to have undergone multiple displacements (41%). However, only 5 per cent moved abroad for longer than one month.


Figure 28: Number of years since arrival at current location



HOUSING


Around three quarters (75%) of low progress returnee households live in critical shelters. Only 24 per cent live in housing in good condition which is significantly lower compared to the medium and high progress groups (64% and 99%, respectively), as well as IDPs in low progress group (38%). Only one in two households (54%) live in adequate shelters, as measured by the number of people per room and access to drinking water and improved sanitation, against 61 per cent in medium and 87 per cent in high progress groups.

Figure 29: Adequacy of shelter of households in the low progress group



In addition, one in five households are afraid of being evicted as many (63%) own their housing without any documentation. This is a noticeably higher portion relative to the medium and high progress groups (45% and 22%, respectively). Moreover, four in five households (84%) are entitled to compensation, a significantly higher portion than that observed among the medium and high progress groups (50% and 29%, respectively) and among low progress IDP households (59%).


Figure 30: Security of tenure of households in the low progress group



LIVELIHOODS

Many low progress returnee households are engaged in precarious forms of work. Although most households (86%) have at least one employed member, almost all households (97%) rely on irregular earnings or subsistence agriculture or are unemployed or inactive. In response, around two thirds (65%) of low progress returnee households have adopted coping strategies, with half (49%) classified as 'stressed' and a further 16 per cent as 'crisis.' Relatedly, almost none (1%) of these households can face unexpected expenses.

Figure 31: Food and financial security of households in the low progress group




SAFETY, SECURITY AND PARTICIPATION

Like the IDPs in the low progress group, most low progress returnee households did not report issues related to security (84%), freedom of movement (88%) or discrimination (97%). Nevertheless, the portion of households reporting those issues is greater than those in the medium and high progress groups. Specifically, 17 per cent of households are not comfortable asking for help from public authorities (versus 4% and 0% of the 'medium' and 'high' groups, respectively). Furthermore, 16 per cent of low progress returnee households do not feel safe (against 1% and 0% of the medium and high progress groups, respectively). Finally, 12 per cent of these households faced issues related to their freedom of movement (compared to 2% and 0% of the medium and high progress groups, respectively).

The higher portion of low progress returnee households reporting safety and security issues may be linked to inadequate shelter conditions, as well as a widespread lack of documents, as discussed in greater detail below. While not explored in this study, limited capacities among local authorities and challenges related to perceived affiliation, especially among those lacking security clearances, may also contribute to the problems reported.


Figure 32: Percentage of households in the low progress group met safety and security indicators



DOCUMENTATION

Only three in ten (30%) low progress returnee households have all essential personal documentation. While nearly all households (99%) have a birth certificate, less than two in five have a national or unified ID.


Figure 33: Ownership of documents of households in the low progress group



PREFERRED SOLUTION

Despite the challenges faced by the low progress returnee households, almost all (95%) prefer to stay in their current location. Only 3 per cent of households wished to resettle elsewhere in Iraq, while 2 per cent were undecided. This highlights the importance of taking into account displaced households' preferred solution when developing programming to promote progress towards durable solutions.

Figure 34: Preferred solution of households in the low progress group in the next 12 months




MEDIUM PROGRESS – IDP HOUSEHOLDS

30,717 Households

74% of all IDP caseload

Around three in four IDP households (74% or 30,717 households) fall in the medium progress group, meaning that households have met two (40%) or three (33%) progress criteria. Compared to households who have achieved 'low progress', households in this category are more likely to be found in the subdistricts of Markaz Mosul (44%), Markaz Al-Shikhan (9%), Ba'adre (8%), Markaz Sinjar (7%) and Markaz Akre (6%).


Figure 35: Percentage of households in the medium progress group per subdistrict



DEMOGRAPHICS

Most households are headed by a man (88%). Additionally, households tend to have at least six members, a significant portion of whom are children or older people (38% have a dependency ratio of 200 or more). This category has a larger portion of Arab Sunnis (51%), Kurd Sunnis (15%) and other Sunnis (6%), with smaller portion of Yazidis (26%).


Figure 36: Dependency ratio of households in the medium progress group



DISPLACEMENT HISTORY

Around two thirds of households (68%) fled in 2014. Compared to low progress IDPs, a greater portion of medium progress IDPs arrived in their current locations at least five years ago (42% for low progress group and 60% for medium progress group). Additionally, a slightly lower portion of medium progress IDP households were displaced more than once, relative to low progress IDP households (56% for medium progress group and 67% for low progress group). Similarly, a smaller portion of the medium group have tried and failed to return previously compared to the low progress group (24% for medium progress group and 48% for low progress group). In this sense, the displacement history of the medium progress group tends to show more stable characteristics, in terms of length of time in current location and number of displacements. These circumstances may have allowed these households to progress more towards the achievement of a durable solution compared to those in low progress group.

Figure 37: Number of years since arrival at current location and failed returns




HOUSING

More than half of households live in good conditions (56%). Housing arrangements tend to be adequate in terms of the number of people per room and access to water and improved sanitation (63%). Among these factors, overcrowded housing is the most acute problem, as reported by 31 per cent of medium progress IDP households.


However, 44 per cent of households reside in critical shelters, including camps (13%), mud structures (13%) and destroyed housing or housing in bad condition (12%).

Figure 38: Adequacy of shelter of households in the medium progress group



In addition, three in five households (61%) are afraid of being evicted, although this portion is smaller than that in the low progress group (79%). This may be related to the small portion (23%) of households with a formal rental agreement. Most households live either for free (29%) or with an informal rental agreement or no agreement at all (30%).


Figure 39: Security of tenure of households in the medium progress group



LIVELIHOODS

Although most households (87%) have at least one employed member, they are largely engaged in precarious forms of work. Most of the households (85%) rely on irregular earnings or subsistence agriculture or are unemployed or inactive. Adoption of coping strategies remain widespread in the medium progress group, as reported by three in four households, including 46 per cent classified as 'stressed' and 28 per cent classified as 'crisis.' Moreover, only a small portion of households (9%) can face unexpected expenses.


Figure 40: Food and financial security of households in the medium progress group



SAFETY, SECURITY AND PARTICIPATION

Medium progress IDP households did not report concerns related to safety, security and participation. Nearly all feel safe (99%), are comfortable with authorities (99%), free to move (99%) and receive fair treatment (99%). Additionally, almost all (97%) voted in the 2021 parliamentary elections, which suggests they are willing and able to participate in community life in their location of displacement.


Figure 41: Percentage of households in the medium progress group met safety and security



DOCUMENTATION

Most IDPs (91%) in the medium progress group have all essential documentation. All households reported having a birth certificate, while most also have a national or unified ID and Iraqi nationality.


Figure 42: Ownership of documents of households in the medium progress group



PREFERRED SOLUTION

Slightly more than half (58%) of IDP households prefer to stay in their current location in the next 12 months, while around one in three (31%) wish to return to their location of origin. These households are more likely to originate from Mosul (33%), Sinjar (23%), Al-Ba'aj (21%), Telafar (11%) or Al-Hamdaniya (5%). The top barrier to return for this group is home destruction, although the portion reporting this is smaller than for the low progress group (73% vs. 83%, respectively). The second most cited reason is a lack of livelihoods opportunities (65%), followed by inadequate services or infrastructure at origin (38%). Around one third still have security concerns (33%) and 6 per cent of households failed to obtain security clearance.

Figure 43: Reasons for not returning at origin for households in the medium progress group




MEDIUM PROGRESS – RETURNEE HOUSEHOLDS

164,562 Households

51% of all returnee caseload

Around half of returnees (51% or 164,562 households) fall in the medium progress group, meaning households are able to meet two (21%) or three (30%) criteria. Compared to the low progress group, these households are more likely to be found in the subdistricts of Markaz Mosul (29%) and Baashiqa (5%) in Mosul district and Markaz Telefar (10%) and Zummar (7%) in Telefar district.


Figure 44: Percentage of households in the medium progress group per subdistrict



DEMOGRAPHICS

One in five households are headed by a woman (20%). Generally, households are large, with children and elderly people often outweighing active members (21% have 10 or more members and 30% have a dependency ratio of 200 or more). The share of Arab Sunnis (63%), Shias (21%) and Kurd Sunnis (5%) is relatively large compared to the low progress group (33%, 13% and 0%, respectively). This suggests a relationship between ethnoreligious identity and progress towards durable solutions.


Figure 45: Dependency ratio of households in the medium progress group



DISPLACEMENT HISTORY

Around half of households fled in 2014 (49%), while 23 per cent fled in 2016 and 25 per cent in 2017, possibly during re-taking operations. A majority (60%) returned five or more years ago, which may have given households more time to re-adjust compared to those in the low progress group. Additionally, a slightly lower share of households reported being displaced multiple times compared to those in the low progress group (38% vs 41%, respectively).


Figure 46: Number of years since return to current location



HOUSING

Around two in three households (64%) live in good conditions and have adequate housing arrangements in terms of the number of people per room and access to water and improved sanitation (61%). However, this leaves around one in three households (36%) who live in critical shelters or short term rental. In addition, three in ten households are afraid of being evicted. This is likely linked to the low share of households who have a formal rental agreement (11%) or who own their housing with documents (24%).

Figure 47: Security of tenure of households in the medium progress group



LIVELIHOODS

Like those in the low progress group, returnee households in the medium progress group continue to face livelihood-related challenges. Although most households (90%) have at least one employed member, four in five households (80%) rely on irregular earnings or subsistence agriculture or are unemployed or inactive. As a result, 61 per cent of households rely on coping strategies, with 44 per cent classified as 'stressed' and a further 16 per cent as in 'crisis.' Relatedly, only a small portion of households (11%) can face unexpected expenses.

HIGH PROGRESS – IDP HOUSEHOLDS

6,898 Households

16% of all IDP caseload

Around one in six IDP households (6,898) fall in the high progress group, meaning they have met four (15%) or all five (1%) criteria and therefore have similar living conditions to stayees. Households in this category are more likely to be found in the subdistricts of Markaz Mosul (51%), Markaz Sinjar (10%), Markaz Al-Shikhan (7%) and Kalak (4%).

Figure 49: Percentage of households in the high progress group per subdistrict





Figure 48: Food and financial security of households in the medium progress group



SAFETY, SECURITY AND PARTICIPATION

Medium progress returnee households reported high levels of safety and security. In particular, almost all households feel safe (99%), are comfortable with authorities (96%) and are free to move in and out of their current location of residence (98%). Additionally, this group showed a high degree of participation in public affairs. Nearly all households (96%) indicated that all eligible members voted in the 2021 parliamentary elections.

DOCUMENTATION

Most medium progress returnee households (92%) have all essential personal documentation. All households (100%) reported having a birth certificate, while nearly all (97%) had Iraqi nationality and a national or unified ID (96%).


PREFERRED SOLUTION

Consistent with the low and high progress returnee households, medium progress households largely prefer to stay in their current location. A small minority (4%) would like to resettle elsewhere in the country.

DEMOGRAPHICS

Most households (89%) are headed by men. Compared to the other two groups, the size of households is slightly smaller and there are relatively fewer children and elderly people.


Figure 50: Dependency ratio of households in the high progress group



DISPLACEMENT HISTORY

More than half of households fled in 2014 (61%) and arrived at the current location at least five years ago (55%). Nearly three in five displaced more than once (58%) and one in five tried to return and failed (22%). Similar to households in the medium progress group, their displacement history tends to be more stable, which may have facilitated progress towards the achievement of a durable solution.


Figure 51: Number of years since arrival at current location



HOUSING

Almost all households (96%) live in good conditions and these housing arrangements are largely adequate in terms of the number of people and access to water and improved sanitation (84%). Still, three in ten households are afraid of being evicted, although to a much lesser extent than in the low and medium progress groups (79% and 61%, respectively). Additionally, a noticeably larger portion has a formal rental agreement (32%), compared to the low and medium progress groups (6% and 23%, respectively). Moreover, a greater portion of the high progress group own their accommodation with legal documents (23% compared to 3% in the low progress group and 6% in the medium progress group, respectively). Nevertheless, the portions who live with informal rental agreements or no agreement (21%) and own accommodation without legal documents (16%) are relatively large.


Figure 52: Security of tenure of households in the high progress group



LIVELIHOODS

Compared to the other two progress groups, these households seem to have achieved relative parity with stayees in terms of livelihoods. In nearly all households, at least one member is working (99%) and in most households, the HoH has a stable source of earnings (70%). Food insecurity is less common and 40 per cent can sustain unexpected expenses, the highest portion compared to the low and medium progress groups (6% and 9%, respectively). This shows that in addition to coping with daily living needs, they have built enough savings to withstand economic shocks.

Figure 53: Food and financial security of households in high progress group



SAFETY, SECURITY AND PARTICIPATION

All high progress IDP households (100%) met the safety and security criteria: they feel safe, are comfortable with authorities and are free to move in and out of their location of residence. Regarding participation in public affairs, all households (100%) had eligible members vote in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Additionally, almost all households (99%) receive fair treatment.

DOCUMENTATION

Most high progress IDP households (93%) have all essential personal documentation. All reported having birth certificates and national or unified IDs. Additionally, most have Iraqi nationality (94%).


PREFERRED SOLUTION

Around three in four high progress IDP households prefer to remain in their current location in the next 12 months. This is a significantly higher portion compared to the low and medium progress groups (25% and 58%, respectively). Relatedly, the portion who wish to return is notably lower in the high progress (16%) relative to the low or medium progress groups (55% and 31%, respectively). This suggests that preferred solutions are linked to progress across criteria. On the one hand, better living conditions may encourage IDP households to remain.

Like households in the medium progress group, high progress IDP households are more often coming from Mosul (44%), Sinjar (22%), Ba'aj (11%) or Al-Hamdaniya (9%).

Unlike the low and medium progress groups, a lack of livelihood opportunities, cited by three quarters of households, is the main barrier to return. In contrast, home destruction, which was the top obstacle to return for low and medium progress groups, was indicated by a smaller share of the high progress group (50%). A further third of households flagged inadequate services or infrastructure in the location of origin.

Figure 54: Reasons for not returning at origin for households in the high progress group




HIGH PROGRESS – RETURNEE HOUSEHOLDS

147,733 Households

46% of all returnee caseload

Around half of returnees (46% or 147,733 households) fall into the high progress group, which means that households can meet four (34%) or all five (12%) criteria. Like the medium progress group, households in this category are more likely to be found in the subdistricts of Markaz Mosul (50%), Baashiqa (10%) and Markaz Telafar (8%).


Figure 55: Percentage of households in the high progress group per subdistrict



DEMOGRAPHICS

The portion of female headed households is slightly lower compared to the other groups (14%) as well as portion of large households (10+ members) where children and elderly people outweigh active members.

Figure 56: Dependency ratio of households in the high progress group




DISPLACEMENT HISTORY

The portion of people who fled in 2014 is lower, though still substantial (41%), while the second largest group is made by households who fled in 2017 (32%, possibly during re-taking operations) or in 2016 (20%). Most people returned relatively quickly to their location of origin and have been back for five years or more (62%). This is confirmed by the low share of households witnessing multiple displacement (19%).

HOUSING

Almost all households (99%) live in good conditions and housing arrangements are adequate in terms of the number of people per room and access to water and improved sanitation (87%). Only 4 per cent are afraid of being evicted as many households own their accommodation with legal documents (67%). Informal rental agreements (1%) and living for free (1%) are extremely rare among this group, although a fifth (22%) own their housing without legal documents.


Figure 57: Security of tenure of households in the high progress group



LIVELIHOODS

Compared to the low and medium progress groups, high progress returnee households seem to have achieved livelihood conditions that are in line with and, in some cases, even outperform stayees. In nearly all households (96%), at least one member is working and in most households (62%), the HoH has a stable source of earnings. Food insecurity is rare and 36 per cent can sustain unexpected expenses, the highest portion compared to the low and medium progress groups (1% and 11%, respectively). Comparatively speaking, this shows that they have built some resilience to withstand economic shocks.

Figure 58: Food and financial security of households in high progress group



SAFETY, SECURITY AND PARTICIPATION

High progress returnee households achieved all safety and security criteria. All households indicated they feel safe, comfortable with authorities and free to move. This group also reports a high degree of participation in public affairs and inclusion in their location of residence. All households reported that eligible members voted in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Additionally, all stated that they receive fair treatment.

DOCUMENTATION

All high progress returnee households possess all the essential personal documentation assessed. Specifically, all households have a national or unified ID, Iraqi nationality and a birth certificate.

PREFERRED SOLUTION

As with the low and medium progress groups, almost all high progress returnee households (97%) prefer to stay in their current location. Only 3 per cent of households wish to resettle elsewhere in Iraq or abroad.

CONCLUSION


This pilot project in Ninewa Governorate provides unique evidence to assess progress towards achievement of durable solutions for the Iraqi IDP and returnee population eight years since the start of the 2014-2017 crisis.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the returnee population has made considerably more progress towards durable solutions compared to the IDP population. Almost half of the returnee households met four or all five durable solutions criteria measured – a significant achievement to recognize. However, just 16 per cent of IDPs have attained that same level of progress. Instead, the bulk of the IDP population remains in the medium progress group, with three quarters of households having achieved two or three criteria out of five. The remaining half of returnee households largely fall in the medium progress group as well. **Nearly no progress was made by 10 per cent of IDP households and 3 per cent of returnee households, who only met one criterion or no criteria.**

In this pilot, the living conditions of stayees were set as a relative benchmark rather than target to reach. The fact that stayee households met on average 3.21 out of 5 criteria highlights that **even families who were not forced to flee due to the 2014-2017 crisis would not pass all the vulnerability criteria.** This reflects the impacts of the conflict beyond displacement, such as those related to the provision of basic services and infrastructure. Additionally, all three groups face challenges that predate the 2014-2017 conflict, including issues related to housing documentation and livelihoods. These needs call for more development-related programming, in addition to assistance for displacement vulnerabilities, in order to support progress towards durable solutions.

Based on durable solutions criteria alone, only 1 per cent of IDP households and 12 per cent of returnee households met all five criteria measured and can be considered as having overcome displacement or return-related vulnerabilities. However, if stayee living conditions are treated as the baseline, 16 per cent of IDP households and 46 per cent of returnee have achieved high progress towards durable solutions.

Figure 59: Percentage of households by number of criteria met



Sectors for programming

Findings show that: a) there is a smaller cohort of significantly more vulnerable people, who share some common characteristics and have not made significant progress towards solutions, and b) there are key thematic areas that drive vulnerabilities for a broad swath of IDPs, returnees and stayees in Ninewa. These insights can support the development of programmatic interventions to target critical thematic and geographic areas.

- Across domains, IDP households face the greatest challenges around **restoration of HLP and compensation**, particularly regarding a lack of legally recognized documentation, risk of eviction and entitlement to compensation for home destruction. The gap between IDPs and stayees was also the

largest in this domain, especially surrounding home destruction and the risk of eviction. Returnees also performed poorly, albeit to a lesser extent than IDPs, and had the largest gap with stayees in this domain.

- **Access to livelihoods** was problematic for all three groups but especially IDP households. While households largely have at least one member employed, these jobs do not provide a stable source of income or enable families to face unexpected expenses. In some areas, stayees are even less able to withstand an economic shock than returnees.
- Furthermore, IDP households appear to have lower **standards of living** than both returnee and stayee households, specifically with respect to food insecurity, poor conditions for housing and lack of access to sanitation facilities and health care.
- On the other hand, **security concerns, lack of essential documents, freedom of movement, and discrimination** are widespread among the low progress group only.

Some problems are interrelated and can impede progress toward achieving solutions. **A lack of personal documentation impacts other spheres**, such as personal safety and the ability to exercise property, compensation or even political rights. Households without documentation may feel less safe in their area and less comfortable getting help from authorities. Additionally, not having documentation can prevent households from voting, and accessing social welfare and education. Most importantly, a lack of documents appears to hinder IDPs' ability to return. As many as half of households in the low progress group would return to the location of origin if they could but roughly 15 per cent are unable to obtain security clearance.

Certain population groups and geographic areas appear to have made less progress towards durable solutions. **Yazidi and female-headed households** are overrepresented in the low progress group. Additionally, low progress groups tended to have a **higher dependency ratio** (that is, the share of children and elderly people compared to working age members).

Area-based programming

In terms of geographic trends, IDP and returnee households in **Western Ninewa** tend to have lower progress scores. At the subdistrict level, IDP figures are significantly below average in **Al-Namroud**, Al-Hamdaniya District; **Al-Qayara**, Mosul District; **Al-Shamal**, Sinjar District; **Markaz Al-Ba'aj**, Al-Ba'aj District; and **Rubiya**, Telefar District. This is also the case with returnees in **Al-Qahtaniya** and **Markaz Al-Ba'aj** in Al-Ba'aj Districts and **Al-Shamal** in Sinjar District. In contrast, households in the North-East, especially those close to the border with Erbil Government, typically had living conditions in line with stayees.

Progress towards durable solutions not only means that households can meet essential needs but also that they can choose their preferred solution, whether that involves remaining in their current location, returning to their location of origin or resettling in a third location. In order for this to be possible, however, locations of preferred settlement must be targeted with programmatic interventions to create the necessary conditions for sustainable integration, returns and resettlement. The high share of IDPs reporting property destruction, especially in **Al-Qahtaniya**, Al-Ba'aj District; **Markaz Sinjar**, Sinjar District; and **Zummar**, Telefar District, underscores the critical and persistent challenges these groups face in achieving durable solutions to displacement.

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