HUMANITARIAN TRANSITION OVERVIEW
IRAQ
Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, in an effort to ensuring the adoption and success of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus approach, this document is consolidated by OCHA on behalf of the Iraq Humanitarian Country Team and partners. It provides an overview on the humanitarian situation and the humanitarian transition in Iraq. It represents a shared understanding of the remaining humanitarian needs and identifies critical priorities for humanitarian response in 2023.

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PHOTO ON COVER
Iraq Humanitarian Fund with its implementing partner, COOPI, opening the Water Treatment Plant in Al-Rawashid-Balad after renovation, improving clean water access in the area, Balad, Salah Al-Din, 2023 © Hiwa Sadiq, UNOCHA

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https://data.humdata.org/group/irq
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Introduction

The international humanitarian system – UN, NGOs – launched operations in 2014 in response to the Government of Iraq requests for assistance to meet the overwhelming needs created by the violence of ISIL. It was a time of unprecedented crisis for the people and government in Iraq, which called for global support and solidarity.

Five years after the conclusion of large-scale military operations against ISIL in 2017, the humanitarian situation in Iraq has improved considerably, with the notable decline in the number of people requiring humanitarian assistance from a high of 11 million people in 2017 to 2.5 million in 2022. In addition, the successful conduct of democratic elections in October 2021 combined with the rebounding of state revenues by early 2022 have enabled the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Region Government (KRG) to have a substantially improved position to deliver basic services of quality, and protection to its own population, including displaced and returnee populations.

With the emergence of crises in other countries where more acute needs overwhelm local capacities, annual international funding for humanitarian assistance in Iraq started to decline and is only expected to continue decreasing in the coming years. After reaching a total of $1.8 billion in 2016 during the lead up to the GoI retaking Mosul, and four subsequent years of being the best-funded appeal globally with over 95 per cent of the funding requirements met, the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan for Iraq only received 63 per cent of the required funding, and the funding level for the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan barely reached 67 per cent by end of December 2022, after swinging around 60 per cent for most of the year.

By end of 2021, the Government of Iraq had issued a National Plan on Internal Displacement and had launched—in partnership with the UN—the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF).1 Both were welcome signals of Government’s ability to find durable solutions for those who remain in displacement, and its commitment to the future peace and prosperity of Iraq, in cooperation with stabilization and development actors. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) acknowledges that the root cause of many ongoing needs in Iraq is due to underdevelopment issues, and development strategies are more effective in addressing these issues. The UN has shifted its focus from a humanitarian-only response plan to a development-focused approach, as this will better serve the needs of all citizens in Iraq, not just those affected by the ISIL crisis. The Humanitarian Coordinator has communicated this shift to the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government through regular meetings and a formal letter. The passing of the Emergency Law for Food Security and Development in June 2022 has in particular, increased the government’s ability to respond to the needs of all citizens. The fiscal space of the government continues to grow, especially thanks to the high price of oil. As a result of decreasing humanitarian needs and the presence of a strong durable solutions architecture, the international humanitarian response in Iraq is being scaled down, and a government-led approach under the UNSDCF is being implemented.

As outlined in this document, the UN and its partners remain committed to continue working with the Government of Iraq (GoI), and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to hand over humanitarian operations and to support the Government in assuming the responsibility for the provision of lifesaving and life-sustaining services to conflict-affected populations in Iraq, including through its support under the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), in particular its Strategic Priority 5 (SP 5) on “achieving dignified, safe and voluntary durable solutions to displacement in Iraq”, complemented where necessary by humanitarian interventions by UN and civil society partners.

Objectives

In light of the transition and the scale-down of the international humanitarian response in Iraq in 2022, and in an effort to ensure continuity of support to the Government of Iraq (GoI), and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to respond to the remaining humanitarian needs during 2023, the Iraq Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) agreed to develop this transition overview, which describes the critical residual humanitarian needs that the government and development partners are not in a position to fully cover in 2023; and defines the HCT’s priorities for programming and fundraising. This overview will also help donors and agencies prioritize support in 2023.

This Humanitarian Transition Overview (HTO) has been developed by OCHA with the inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) between September 2022 and January 2023. The HTO will be shared with the GoI and KRG and will be a public document which serve as a guidance to inform partners and donors prioritization for humanitarian action in 2023.

The HTO is based on the findings of the 2022 Multi Cluster Needs Assessment (MCNA) and provides a light needs overview by population groups and locations and sets out the priorities for HCT action in 2023. However, the HTO does not include figures for people to be targeted nor financial requirements. The HTO will neither be monitored nor included in the Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO) for 2023.
Part 1

Overview of the Humanitarian Situation

The international humanitarian system launched operations in Iraq in 2014 in support to the Government efforts to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from ISIL, and the displacement its violence provoked. Between January 2014 and December 2021, the UN and its humanitarian partners provided life-saving assistance to nearly seven million Iraqi citizens, across nine governorates, in dozens of IDP camps and in thousands of other locations in multiple conflict-affected governorates across Iraq. International donors provided an estimated eight billion USD towards this emergency effort. In parallel, billions more in development, reconstruction and stabilization funding have assisted the Government of Iraq in restoring electricity and public water systems, rebuilding roads, and reconstructing schools, health facilities and housing.

During 2022, 991,000 acutely vulnerable people were targeted by the Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), including in-camp IDPs, out-of-camp IDPs, and returnees.

As of 31 December 2022, the humanitarian partners reached more than one hundred per cent of the 2022 HRP targets\(^1\) with at least one form of humanitarian assistance, including 180,000 of in-camp IDPs (100 per cent of the 180k targeted), 605,000 of out-of-camp IDPs (more than the original target of 234K) and 736,000 of returnees (more than the original target of 577K).

\(^1\) People Displaced in-camps:
- **180K** TARGETED
- **180K** REACHED

People Displaced Out-of-camps:
- **234K** TARGETED
- **605K** REACHED

Returnees:
- **577K** TARGETED
- **736K** REACHED

People Targeted: 991K
People Reached: 1.5M (154%)
## Key achievement by cluster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLUSTER / SECTOR</th>
<th>PEOPLE TARGETED</th>
<th>% TARGET REACHED</th>
<th>PEOPLE REACHED</th>
<th># PARTNERS (ACTIVE / TOTAL)</th>
<th>FUNDING (US$) REQUESTED</th>
<th>FUNDING (US$) RECEIVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>250 K</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>221 K</td>
<td>3 / 7</td>
<td>15.2 M</td>
<td>1.2 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>354 K</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>159 K</td>
<td>14 / 26</td>
<td>17.0 M</td>
<td>4.7 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMERGENCY LIVELIHOODS</td>
<td>49 K</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>23 K</td>
<td>8 / 35</td>
<td>10.6 M</td>
<td>7.5 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOD SECURITY</td>
<td>336 K</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>195 K</td>
<td>3 / 32</td>
<td>54.4 M</td>
<td>19.3 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEALTH</td>
<td>388 K</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>623 K</td>
<td>19 / 29</td>
<td>46.8 M</td>
<td>59.6 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTECTION, HLP &amp; MA</td>
<td>630 K</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>672 K</td>
<td>26 / 44</td>
<td>65.3 M</td>
<td>40.5 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILD PROTECTION</td>
<td>303 K</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>200 K</td>
<td>27 / 45</td>
<td>30.1 M</td>
<td>0.5 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE</td>
<td>353 K</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>272 K</td>
<td>29 / 39</td>
<td>36.2 M</td>
<td>1.3 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER &amp; NFI</td>
<td>311 K</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>64 K</td>
<td>10 / 19</td>
<td>47.4 M</td>
<td>10.8 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>730 K</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>732 K</td>
<td>19 / 32</td>
<td>33.4 M</td>
<td>22.5 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCA (CWG)</td>
<td>135 K</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52 K</td>
<td>12 / 12</td>
<td>28.6 M</td>
<td>4.4 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.0 M</td>
<td>10.7 M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 2

Remaining Humanitarian Needs

The Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment round 10 (MCNA X) was conducted between June and August 2022 in the remaining 26 IDP camps and in 64 Districts with at 200 IDP or returnee households (HHs) according to the IOM-DTM Master list of March 2022. The MCNA randomly surveyed 12,839 HHs as per the below table aimed to cover areas with data-proven needs of particular interest to Durable Solutions (DS) actors, in order to align with and inform future objectives in programming.

**Top Five Reported Priority Needs identified by the MCNA X**

The top five most commonly reported household priorities nationwide were as follow: 1) Livelihoods support/employment, 2) Shelter/Housing, 3) Healthcare, 4) Food and 5) Need to repay debt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POPULATION GROUP</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-Camp IDPs</td>
<td>2.3K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-Camp IDPs</td>
<td>5.9K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>3.7K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host Community</td>
<td>0.9K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.8K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Top Five Reported Reasons Not to Return to Area of Origin (AoO)**

1. House in AoO has been damaged/destroyed.
2. Lack of livelihood/income generating activities in AoO.
3. Fear/trauma associated with returning to place of origin.
4. No financial means to return and restart.
5. Lack of security.
2.1
Affected Population:

Population movements, IDPs and returnees

As of June 2022, of the six million people displaced during the ISIL crisis, over 81 per cent have returned, while 1.2 million Iraqis internally displaced since 2014 are still displaced, including 180,000 persons hosted in 26 camps (25 in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and one in Nineveh Governorate).

Population movements over time

As of 30 September 2022, the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) identified 1,173,812 IDPs (201,614 households), a decrease of 3,422 IDPs since the previous round collected in April – June 2022. Where Tikrit, Al-Hamdaniya, and Mosul districts had the largest decreases in the number of IDPs, the slight decrease in IDPs within these districts is attributable to rehabilitated housing and improved service provision in the area of origin, along with a lack of livelihoods and means to remain in the area of displacement. A total of 8,670 IDP movements were observed between July and September 2022, this includes 1,974 individuals displaced for the first time, 5,867 individuals who are in secondary displacement and 829 individuals who failed to return.7

As of 30 September 2022, DTM identified 4,978,674 returnees (829,779 households), an increase of 8,886 returnees since the previous round collected in April – June 2022. Mosul, Tuz Khurmatu, and Al-Hawiga districts saw the largest increase in the number of returnees. The slight increase in these districts reflects factors such as financial assistance to families intending to return, better access to services in the area of origin and challenges paying rent in the area of displacement. While Al-Khalis, Hatra, and Al-Rutba districts witnessed the largest decrease in returnees due to a lack of livelihood opportunities and services in the area of origin.8

IDPs by shelter category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shelter Category</th>
<th>IDPs (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Settings</td>
<td>889.1 K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camps</td>
<td>179.4 K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Shelter</td>
<td>104.6 K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.76 K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Returnees by shelter category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shelter Category</th>
<th>Returnees (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residence of Origin (Habitable)</td>
<td>4.77 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Shelter</td>
<td>190.1 K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Settings</td>
<td>14.2 K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.1 K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 30 September 2022, the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) identified 1,173,812 IDPs (201,614 households), a decrease of 3,422 IDPs since the previous round collected in April – June 2022. Where Tikrit, Al-Hamdaniya, and Mosul districts had the largest decreases in the number of IDPs, the slight decrease in IDPs within these districts is attributable to rehabilitated housing and improved service provision in the area of origin, along with a lack of livelihoods and means to remain in the area of displacement. A total of 8,670 IDP movements were observed between July and September 2022, this includes 1,974 individuals displaced for the first time, 5,867 individuals who are in secondary displacement and 829 individuals who failed to return.7

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Living conditions

- Critical shelter has slightly decreased during 2022 due to sharp drops in Al-Hatra, Al-Baija, Sinjar, Al-Khalis, Tooz Khurmato, Daquq, Al-Rutba, Al-Hawiga, Al-Muqdadiya, Al-Falluja.
- Access to safe and healthy enclosure unit improved alongside critical shelter since 2021.
- Majority of households in critical shelter live in informal sites.

Per cent age of households living in critical shelter by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Out-of-camp IDP</th>
<th>Returnee</th>
<th>Host Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Protection risks

Missing civil documentation impedes people's ability to access basic services such as education, healthcare and social security benefits, and can lead to restricted freedom of movement, increased risk of arrest and detention, exclusion from restitution and/or reconstruction programmes, and an inability to participate in public affairs in the country. Children who lack birth certificates are also at risk of statelessness. Further, the lack of civil documentation can also impede access to critical protection interventions, particularly for persons with specific child protection and GBV needs requiring referral to public authorities. Access to civil documentation is the main entry point for Iraqis to access public services but remains a challenge for IDPs and returnees as well as host community members, including for those with real or perceived with affiliations with extremist groups.

The National Protection Cluster has worked extensively on civil documentation, and since 2019, over 365,600 documents have been issued out of which over 153,400 documents have been secured through UNHCR assistance.

The 2022 Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment shows that some 433,000 individuals from the baseline of the 6.2 million internally displaced / IDP returnees are still missing at least one core document. Compared to the 2021 HNO/HRP, a reduction of households reporting that at least one member is missing a core document was observed, most notably among out-of-camp IDPs (from 25 per cent of out-of-camp households in 2021 to 15 per cent in 2022). In addition, it must be noted that there is currently no baseline related to Iraqi populations not directly affected by ISIL/forcible displacement who may have had issues with respect to accessing civil documentation as well.

Main barriers to accessing civil documentation reported in the MCNA include the high cost of obtaining/renewing documents and the complexity of procedures, which may also be obstacles faced by other vulnerable populations in Iraq not displaced or directly affected by ISIL violence. As such, to ensure access to identity, there is a continued need for mobile civil documentation missions coupled with advocacy and legal assistance to remove barriers, particularly for complex cases.

Women and girls, particularly female-headed households, women with disabilities and those perceived to be affiliated with extremist groups are at heightened risk of GBV. FHH, women, and girls are socio-economically vulnerable compared to male populations, resulting in higher food insecurity, and more frequent use of harmful coping strategies, which also compromises women and girls’ mental, sexual, and reproductive health with life-threatening consequences, including child marriage and transactional sex. In addition, transactional sex is reportedly used as a negative coping strategy for survival, largely because of economic hardship and protracted displacement. Moreover, female-headed households reported missing at least one key civil and legal document, which is a barrier to accessing services. Women have also reported limited/restricted access to protection, cash, livelihood, shelter, specialized mental health, and legal assistance. 20 per cent of households reported that women of reproductive age (15-49) face difficulty in accessing specialized reproductive health services, among households with women of reproductive age.

The lack of, or hindrances to these essential services increase their exposure to certain types of GBV risks, negatively impacting GBV survivors’ recovery and reintegration efforts and their transition journey from victimhood to survivor hood.

The GBVIMS recorded a significant increase of reported incidents by 63 percent compared to the same period in 2021. 83 percent of GBV incidents are linked to domestic violence by close family members, which has reportedly been increasing compared to 2021 when it was 77 percent also affecting the most vulnerable, i.e. elderly people and people with disabilities. According to the report, forced marriage recorded 6 per cent of the reported incidents while early marriage recorded 7 per cent which can be attributed to an increase in negative coping mechanisms, but also owing to misunderstandings rooted in traditional, cultural, and social norms; lack of awareness of women’s rights and abilities; and structural and legal obstacles have contributed to the continued marginalization of women, social exclusion, and low attainment of their wellbeing as compared to their male counterparts.

Explosive Ordnance (EO) continuous to threaten and impact the safety of communities, hinder access to productive land and hamper returns in affected areas. According to data recorded in the national mine action databases, 2,530 square kilometers land is contaminated with EO and require extensive resources to survey and clear.
2.3 Lack of minimal access to basic services

Health

- 36 per cent of households reported having had at least one person with an unmet health care need within three months of data collection, among households with a reported need.
- Top-5 most-commonly-reported barriers to healthcare: Cost of services/medicine, the treatment centre was too far away/no means of transport, public health clinic did not provide a referral, no treatment available for my issue at the health facility, no medicine available at the health facility/pharmacy.

WASH

- At least 95 per cent of all population groups nationwide reported having access to improved functional sanitation facilities and improved functional handwashing facilities.
- 92 per cent of the IDPs in camps and 93 per cent of the IDPs out of camps reported they have access to an improved water source. Last year this figure was 84 per cent of IDPs in camps and 90 per cent for IDPs out of camps.
- Regarding the per cent of households that reported having access to sufficient water for drinking and domestic purposes, there is a slight improvement observed since last year among IDPs out of camps (from 80 per cent to 82 per cent) and returnees (85 per cent to 90 per cent) whereas for IDPs in camps significantly decreased (from 67 per cent to 48 per cent).
- Most commonly reported water quality issues across all populations nationwide are related to not clear water, unpleasant water tastes, and unpleasant water smells.

Education

- 83 per cent of school-aged children reportedly attended formal education regularly (at least 4 days a week) in the 2021-2022 school year while schools were open.
- 28 per cent of households with at least one school-aged child who reportedly did not attend formal school regularly (at least 4 days a week) in the 2021-2022 school year while schools were open, among HHs with children. Among IDPs in camps, the most commonly reported barriers to enroll in school are “we are not able to register or enroll our children in the school” and “lack of interest of children in education” whereas for ODPs out of camps and returnees the main barrier is “we cannot afford to pay for the school related expenses”.

2.4 Lack of income to sustain daily living

Emergency Livelihood

- 61 per cent of households with reported debt value larger than 90,000 IQD per household member.
- 31 per cent of households reportedly spending more than 25 per cent of their total expenditure on health care.
- 74 per cent of households reportedly spending more than 40 per cent of their total expenditure on food.
- 24 per cent of households reported having at least one adult (18+) unemployed and seeking work.

Food Security

- 95 per cent of households by Household Food Consumption Score (FCS) - per cent ‘Acceptable’ FCS (top category)
- 95 per cent of households by Household Hunger Scale category - per cent ‘Little to no hunger’ (top category)
- Among the vast majority of households that reported incapability of meeting basic needs 26 per cent have reported having taken on debt to purchase food. More than 50 per cent of the HHs reported spending more than half of total income in food expenditure with peaks of 75 per cent for 1/5 of the households, reflecting increased economic vulnerability.
- Female-headed HHs were also more likely to report food as an unmet priority need (66 per cent), compared to male-headed HHs (53 per cent), which suggests a higher proportion of female-headed HHs were struggling to meet their basic needs or prioritized their expenses differently.
### Food security categories

- **Host Community**: 48% Food secure, 4% Vulnerable to food insecurity, 49% Food insecure
- **In-camp IDPs**: 54% Food secure, 4% Vulnerable to food insecurity, 44% Food insecure
- **Out-of-camp IDPs**: 63% Food secure, 3% Vulnerable to food insecurity, 33% Food insecure
- **Returnee**: 1% Food secure, 1% Vulnerable to food insecurity, 1% Food insecure

### Food consumption groups

- **Host Community**: 94% Poor, 4% Border line, 2% Acceptable
- **In-camp IDPs**: 95% Poor, 5% Border line, 0% Acceptable
- **Out-of-camp IDPs**: 93% Poor, 7% Border line, 0% Acceptable
- **Returnee**: 98% Poor, 2% Border line, 0% Acceptable

### Livelihood coping strategies

- **Host Community**: 50% Stress coping strategies, 12% Crisis coping strategies, 7% Emergency coping strategies
- **In-camp IDPs**: 64% Stress coping strategies, 9% Crisis coping strategies, 9% Emergency coping strategies
- **Out-of-camp IDPs**: 56% Stress coping strategies, 7% Crisis coping strategies, 7% Emergency coping strategies
- **Returnee**: 47% Stress coping strategies, 6% Crisis coping strategies, 6% Emergency coping strategies

### Food expenditure share groups

- **Host Community**: 53% Low, 20% Medium, 13% High, 12% Very High
- **In-camp IDPs**: 51% Low, 18% Medium, 11% High, 18% Very High
- **Out-of-camp IDPs**: 70% Low, 15% Medium, 9% High, 5% Very High
- **Returnee**: 38% Low, 20% Medium, 17% High, 28% Very High
3.1 People facing serious protection risks and/or life-threatening needs who are not able to receive government assistance.

Ensuring access to public services remains a major challenge especially for IDPs and returnees but also for vulnerable host community members, including for those with real or perceived affiliations with extremist groups, illiterate populations, those living in remote locations as well as those at risk of statelessness such as Bidoons and Faili Kurds including due to their nomadic way of life.

Persons who are missing civil documentation are at special risk to be excluded from government social assistance and are unable to access basic public services such as education, healthcare, and social security benefits and suffer from restricted freedom of movement, increased risk of arrest and detention, exclusion from restitution and/or reconstruction programmes, and the inability to participate in the public affairs of the country. Children who lack birth certificates are also at risk of statelessness, especially those born to parents with real or perceived affiliation with ISIL. Further, the lack of civil documentation can also impede access to critical protection interventions, particularly for persons with specific child protection and GBV needs requiring referral to public authorities. In the absence of being able to access government social protection, cash assistance can help in accessing basic needs of population while making efforts to link them with the existing social protection schemes. During 2023, the Iraq Cash Forum will continue supporting the efficient and quality delivery of cash with a special focus on linkages with Social Protection and advocacy towards integration of vulnerable population groups. In addition, UNHCR will work to ensure that people at risk of statelessness receive the necessary legal documents in addition to working in areas with high civil documentation needs. Moreover, UNHCR will collaborate with the MoI and relevant authorities on establishing temporary offices for the issuance of Unified ID. An inter-ministerial committee has been set through an MoI ministerial order to discuss the temporary Unified ID offices, and UNHCR is an observer of the committee. UNHCR legal assistance partners are actively involved in the missions by identifying target beneficiaries, preparation of applications, and sensitization of IDPs, returnees and vulnerable Iraqi populations on requirements.

On another front, the complexity of procedures to obtain documentation, lack of required documents/evidence, lack of awareness about procedures, practical hurdles (such as distance to reach civil affairs and nationality departments, financial barriers, etc.), and at times, (real and/or perceived) discrimination, are reported to hinder some individuals/families from obtaining nationality documents or proof of nationality. Lack of proof of nationality and barriers to accessing documentation can leave persons at risk of statelessness and prevent access to rights.

The loss or destruction of civil documentation is a major protection issue facing IDPs and IDP returnees, many of whom face numerous barriers to obtaining and renewing civil documentation, particularly those with perceived affiliation to extremist groups. The 2022 MCNA shows that over 430,000 individuals still lack at least one core civil document (26 per cent of IDP households in camps, 15 per cent of IDPs in urban settings, and 12 per cent of returnees - down from 21 per cent, 25 per cent and 16 per cent in 2021, respectively). Access to nationality and civil documentation is a key aspect of the UNHCR IDP protection strategy and ensures people's ability to access public basic services, freedom of movement, access to reconstruction programmes, and the ability to participate in the public affairs of the country. This is also linked directly to the UNSDCF interventions especially on the Durable Solutions pillar to ensure that citizens of Iraq have access to civil documentation which in turn will provide them access to the public services. To ensure better access for IDPs, returnees and vulnerable local community members to obtain new and replace their missing civil documents in areas of return and displacement, UNHCR also continues to support the rehabilitation of civil affairs offices, including in the context of the rollout of the new UIDs (which will gradually replace both the CSID and INC), in particular in conflict-affected areas.

3.2 People reliant on humanitarian services, where the government is unwilling or not yet able to take over.

CCCM

In 2023 main priorities for CCCM partners is to continue addressing life-threatening needs for IDPs in displacement sites including formal and informal sites who are unable to receive government assistance through targeted site risk reduction initiatives, partner coordination and information management, advocacy and government liaison. While doing so CCCM will also work on building the capacity of both local government and IDPs in disaster risk reduction and response through capacity building trainings, meetings, peace dialogues, and others. CCCM will work closely with Protection and Durable solution actors to address protection needs and facilitate equal access of IDPs to more longer-term solutions and address barriers of return for IDPs with perceived affiliation, social and tribal engagement issues.

People in informal settlements like Ameriyat Al Fallujah and Bzebiz will be especially vulnerable since these are not considered as formal camps by the Government of Iraq and thus, they will be expected to access services like the general population. However, these people still suffer from disrupted livelihoods and are unable/unwilling to return to their areas of origin for several reasons. Based on current funding status, IOM and WHO respectively will be providing primary healthcare services in these locations till mid-2023. However, a sustainable solution needs
to be provided by the Government, as these agencies will not be able to continue indefinitely. In addition, in camps like Hasansham, where people do not have adequate documentation, it would be difficult to access public services. Therefore, humanitarian services would need to be continued in these locations.

Health

Moreover, the Directorate of Health in Duhok is in discussion with the partners to plan for a sustainable solution to provide health services to the in-camp IDPs from January 2023 onward, since, as they claim, the Directorate does not have the capacity to takeover this support. WHO is set to provide services till mid-year; work needs to be done to ensure these IDPs do not fall short of basic healthcare after June 2023. Supporting and sustaining vaccination against measles, polio; supporting emergency-affected women to access primary healthcare is a priority, noting that outreach programmes in KRI funded by both humanitarian and development funding have ensured that low post-COVID vaccination rates have risen from dangerously low levels.

Sustained Livelihood

During 2023, there is a need for coordinated efforts to support IDPs transition from status-based aid to sustainable livelihood support in order to cope with the prospected closure of the IDPs camp sites. WFP will support the access to skill enhancement and livelihoods programs in order to provide market relevant skills to affected population and work in coordination with key stakeholders for synergic interventions and advocacy with relevant institutions. The humanitarian response needs also to take into consideration the possible stress on food systems and natural resources in the Areas of Return, WFP is working on supporting alternative livelihoods and natural assets building restoration programs in collaboration with the relevant ministries and key partners.

Child Protection

For child protection, priority will be to deliver services until authorities can take over with the adequate mandate, structure and resources. The response to the return of children from NES will be important within the overall response.

Education

For education, in addition continued support to affected populations, creating sustainable and permanent arrangements for the education of IDP children in KRI will be a policy priority; and supporting the continued implementation of the Refugee Education Integration Policy. For the creation of solutions for IDP children, it is important to recognize that this is as much a process that requires technical solutions as well as political decisions that touch on some of the central difficult issues in inter-regional relations and will require creativity and advocacy at all levels.

Critical Shelter

Shelter assistance provides an important protection measure to IDPs, particularly those at risk of GBV, disabled, elderly and children, as presented elsewhere in this document. During 2023, it is anticipated (per the findings of the 2022 MCNA, that a minimum of 144,000 IDPs in informal sites remain in acute need of shelter assistance. Partners will continue to provide shelter assistance as part of a settlement approach, in a way that enhances mobilizing the community to reduce other risks and promote engagement with authorities as part of facilitating access to services. The community engagement facilitated by the shelter assistance creates an access and engagement opportunity for other forms of humanitarian assistance.
Part 4
Response by Other Actors

4.1 Response by the Government

What will the government take over as part of the transition planning?

The Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as local authorities, have taken key steps in furtherance of the transition and handover. In federal Iraq, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) has established a committee to help provide civil documentation to all children who are living in IDP camps, orphanages, and out-of-camp areas. If implemented, such measures could help significantly reduce vulnerability among IDP families. This process is not yet functioning in the urban areas, and it still excludes children born to parents with perceived affiliation with ISIL. Therefore, those children remain without civil proper civil documents.

The Ministry of Education has launched the National Strategy on Early Childhood Development, which will have special provisions to ensure the development of vulnerable children, including IDP children. The Refugee Education Integration Policy (REIP) was launched in June, and the first phase has been activated, to integrate the first four grades into the regular KRI education system. This has overall been very successful, resulting in increased enrollment. This process will be phased out and completed by August 2024. The Federal Ministry of Health is working with the Health Cluster to assume the role of coordination of the health sector, subsequent to cluster deactivation.

In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the Ministry of the Interior requested that the Directorate of Water and the Directorate of Municipalities and Tourism start planning to assume responsibility for the provision of WASH services in the camps in the KRI. By the end of 2022, WASH services have been taken over by the authorities in most of the IDP camps in KRI. Authorities in Duhok have agreed to allow IDPs living in camps to undertake shelter upgrades, to improve their living conditions with the construction of semi-permanent structures; the United Nations is providing technical advice and assistance to this effort. In Ninewa governorate, local authorities have agreed to take over the provision of WASH services to Jeddah 5, and operationalization of this arrangement is under discussion. Both Federal and KRI Ministries have also established inter-ministerial coordination groups to coordinate emergency WASH interventions. UNICEF will continue to support these groups to ensure they remain active.

In addition, UNICEF humanitarian response activities are supported by government capacity development activities through its Country Programme, in all sectors, including WASH, Health and Nutrition, Child Protection, Education and adolescent and youth engagement and social protection. It will be important to ensure linkage between humanitarian response and social protection reform to reach and support conflict-affected populations that have benefited from humanitarian action, including populations returning from Northeast Syria, who overwhelming are children and women.

UNMAS has, since June 2021, engaged the Directorate for Mine Action as the co-chair of the MASC. The coordination functions will be transferred to a sector coordination forum composed of relevant governmental entities, donors, and mine action operators.

Building the capacity of Government institutions for smooth transition in different sectors

Throughout 2022, Clusters have initiated engagement with relevant line ministries, many have supported developing ToRs for government-led coordination sectors, some conducted capacity assessments to identify which services and functions the government can take on and what capacity-building might be needed.

Most clusters have prioritized capacity-building and awareness raising initiatives among civil society actors, local case management staff/social workers, etc.

In the health domain, WHO is working to strengthen Iraq’s health system by starting with the information management pillar; this includes installation of DHIS2 – starting with Tuberculosis and Immunization departments - to have real-time aggregate and case-based data; and conducting the HeRAMS assessment country-wide, to have information on service availability and readiness in government health facilities. Simultaneously, to address the residual needs of population of humanitarian concern in a more sustainable manner, WHO is also working with the Directorate of Health in Sulaymaniyah, to develop a model for provision of quality Primary Health Care services from public health facilities; this should be replicated in other locations during 2023. Through collaboration and capitalization of comparative advantages of partners, these initiatives will assist with ensuring sustained quality health services within a resilient health system. Meanwhile, a costed Action Plan for Family Planning and Behavior Change Communication has been developed jointly between the MoH and UNFPA; they are working to set up Centers of Excellence for Family Planning in different governorates. Also, UNICEF is supporting infrastructure to digitalize birth registration offices, and training Directorates of Health on financial planning and budgeting.

In relation to mine action, UNMAS has implemented several capacity building activities and provided technical advice to enhance the overall coordination of the sector and transferred knowledge to the national mine action authorities. During 2023, UNMAS will continue to deliver mine action elements of its mandate and provide technical support to its government counterparts.
Moving to the protection domain, significant efforts have been extended by the National Protection Cluster who collaborated with the Global Protection Cluster Human Rights Engagement Task Team (HRE TT) and the Advocacy Task Team (Advocacy TT) to reinforce the capacity of protection actors and government counterparts regarding different protection/human rights-related topics in order to identify opportunities for stronger engagement with human rights mechanisms and develop protection advocacy interventions to amplify the voice of individuals in vulnerable situations. The overarching objective focused on developing local protection actors’ ownership of human rights tools to enhance the protection of the affected population and avoid a protection gap asthe cluster is deactivated. The complementary objective was on effective advocacy methods in light of the cluster’s deactivation. Human Rights Engagement and Advocacy Workshops were delivered in September in Erbil with participants from Federal Iraq and KR-I, including government representatives, judiciary members, National Human Rights Institution representatives and multiple national/international NGOs, human rights groups and UN agencies. On the other hand, Judicial engagement workshop was conducted by UNHCR as the Cluster Lead Agency to enhance the coordination and cooperation with the judicial corps and law enforcement agencies and to strengthen the knowledge and understanding of international protection to improve the protection environment. Participants were judges and representatives from the Residence Departments from Federal Iraq in October 2022, including officials from MoMD, MoJ, MOFA, MoLSA, Baghdad Residence Directorate and Judges from Appeal Courts in Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah Aldin, and Anbar.

To support the resolution of more complex legal cases and with a longer-term objective of building sustainable systems, UNHCR continues to take the lead in terms of policy-level dialogue with the Government of Iraq and relevant ministries on removing barriers to documentation and advocating for specific vulnerable populations. Such advocacy messages, for example, have so far included: advocating that Iraqi Nationality Certificates and Civil Status IDs remain available while issues with the Unified ID Card rollout persist; advocating that a political and administrative solution be found so that IDPs in disputed territories can obtain their identity and civil documentation either through the transfer of their files from Civil Affairs Directorates in their previous areas of residence to Civil Affairs Directorates in their current areas of residence, or alternatively through the organization of mobile missions to the concerned disputed territories; advocating more broadly that IDPs be able to seek and obtain their identity and civil documents in their area of displacement and, more broadly, anywhere within the country; advocating that applicants of civil documentation are not asked to undergo ikbar or tabrea’a; advocacy for appropriate allocation of government staff to run Civil Affairs Directorate offices; or, adopting best interest procedures instead of DNA testing in complex cases regarding families among others.

While for the Education domain, an education consortia is established, partners in education are seeking funding opportunities and projects to build upon the durability of relevant ministries (MoE primarily, and MoYS, MOLSA, MoMD where necessary), and are planning to deliver capacity building and training initiatives on school/centre management to education professionals at the Ministry of Education and its directorates to facilitate a coordinated approach for the development of plans, tools, and activities such that sustainability is built in. This three-step process will include modeling, partnering, and supporting, whereby modeling will have education partners lead government counterparts, partnering will be a joint process, and supporting will have government professionals lead on actions and delivery as developed in partnership with education partners providing quality guardrails and digressive management and oversight. Via the education consortia, partners will work to bring a multi-sectoral approach, in line with the humanitarian transition plan in Iraq, ensuring that a protection perspective is taken into consideration, from community to government levels via Community Education Action Groups (CAEGs), governorate-level Task Force (TF) groups, and the national-level Policy Advocacy Group (PAG). These groups will be strengthened and leveraged at differing scales and interlinked to support locally informed governance and strengthen access to quality education. To sustain these advancements, an Education Policy and Advocacy Advisor will develop policy papers and action plans, in consultation with GoI, UN, and the PAG, to support the formal integration of the PAG into the newly formed government, ensure legislative efforts and reforms are reconciled with ministry practice, and facilitate the inclusion of the specific needs of vulnerable children and youth in education policy.

4.2 What is being covered by UNSDCF, DS Framework

While focusing on the remaining humanitarian needs in 2023, it is important to shed light on the efforts/ action undertaken by other coordination forums who are focusing on making a longer-term impact and ensuring sustainability. Considering the requirements of the transition phase and the move towards durable solutions and sustainable development, some cluster lead agencies who led the humanitarian response in their respective areas of specialty for years, are also participating in the inter-agency durable solutions mechanism at all levels and are engaged in durable solutions programming from the field/ technical levels (ABCs) to the strategic direction level (DSTF). UNHCR draws an example to this as an active member of the ABCs and DSTF. This engagement has enabled UNHCR to provide the expertise in areas of core competency (especially protection) to catalyze critical analysis and programming among all partners at all levels so that adequate dividends are realized in the achievement of durable solutions for all displaced populations. Linked to system-wide efforts to achieve SDG 16.9 - legal identity for all - UNHCR will continue prioritizing the provision of legal assistance to IDPs and IDP returnees and vulnerable Iraqis to enable their access to the identity and civil status documentation to exercise their fundamental rights and enhance access to public services, access to return grants, compensation schemes, (contributory and non-contributory) social protection schemes, including cash transfers, subsidies, and allowances, as well as essential public services such as education and health services and support freedom of movement and access to livelihood opportunities.

On another important aspect, as mine action is a live-saving and a critical enabler for stabilization, peacebuilding, and development efforts. The United Nations Inter-Agency Durable Solutions Strategic and Operational Framework and the Government of Iraq National Plan for getting the displaced back to their liberated areas identify explosive ordnance contamination as a major obstacle to resolving the displacement situation, and the clearance of residential and agricultural areas as critical to the creation of conditions for sustainable returns and the achievement of broader humanitarian objectives. Mine action activities, including explosive ordnance risk education, survey, and clearance are part of the UNSDCF and the DS ABC plans of action.
In addition, and as GBV concerns continue to exist, during the development of the 2022 HRP, the GBV sub-cluster proposed to amend Pillar two of the UNSDCF “Improved people-centred economic policies and legislation that contribute to inclusive, gender sensitive and diversified economic growth”, and to consider the inclusion & prioritization of GBV survivors. Similarly, under the OUTPUT 5.1.2 of Pillar 5 “Livelihoods: Displacement affected populations have improved access to sustainable livelihoods and income and their engagement, as well as strengthened engagement in economic activities”, the GBV sub-cluster highlighted the need to include survivors and at-risk population of GBV as a priority.

In general, since 2020 there has been a recognition that addressing protracted displacement in Iraq requires more than what the humanitarian community can do on its own but also collective stabilization, development and government collective efforts. The 2020 United National Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) was amended in 2021 to incorporate a fifth priority focusing on ‘achieving durable solutions’. In the same year in June, the Iraq Inter-agency Durable Solutions Strategy and Operational Framework (DS Framework) was drafted to compliment the March 2021 GOI National Plan for IDPs.

The DS Framework adopts an approach of promoting programs for IDPs, returnees and other displacement affected populations to be supported to pursue and achieve voluntary, safe and dignified durable solutions to their displacement through return, local integration or settlement in other parts of Iraq. Specific objectives under the framework will look at supporting government leadership, housing land and property rights, access to livelihoods, basic service provision, documentation and rights, social cohesion, safety and security and facilitating voluntary, safe and dignified returns. As a nexus structure, the DS coordination mechanism, at the strategic and operational level will support multisectoral planning, coordination and implementation programs supporting durable solutions and provide a strong basis for the development approaches agreed on in the UNSDCF. In addition to the priority of durable solutions, the other priorities in the UNSDCF include social cohesion, economy, governance and the environment.
Part 5

Transition Overview

5.1 What is Transition of the Humanitarian Coordination System?

According to the IASC guidance on exit strategy for humanitarian actors in the context of complex emergencies, the exit strategy is primarily defined as a process of moving from emergency to rehabilitation and development addressing a change in the roles of the UN agencies and other humanitarian organizations in the country, thus affecting the functions their respective staff may play in the country.1

With 81 per cent return of all six million people ever displaced during the ISIL crisis, and the closure of most of the IDP camps, the humanitarian strategies and tools were no longer appropriate to address remaining needs, but rather development approaches are required to address the needs of both IDPs/IDP returnees and local populations on an equal footing. A humanitarian transition was needed whereby the UN, coordination bodies, and humanitarian actors in Iraq work on moving from emergency to resilience building and support durable solutions for the remaining IDPs in camps, out of camps and in informal settlements, as well as to enhance the means of living for the other Iraqis and support the development and rehabilitation country wide especially in areas witnessing and expecting returnees, underpinning a human rights-based approach and ensuring the principles of equality and inclusivity in the delivery of services. This would require using more fit-for-purpose strategies, programmatic response, and tools to address the remaining humanitarian needs in 2023 in addition to the other types of needs in the country that would require durable solutions and a more sustainable and long-term programming.

5.2 Why did the Humanitarian Coordination System Transition?

The Government and people of Iraq are in a substantially improved position compared to 2017, as the Government regained control over the territory. Oil prices have significantly increased since early 2021, vastly improving state revenues and allowing the state to step up services provision. This, combined with the success of the democratic Iraqi elections in October 2021 and the security and economic threats declining in a notable manner, have resulted in notable improvements nationwide and a reduction in humanitarian needs by beginning of 2022 as the number of vulnerable IDPs and returnees had been decreasing, to approximately 990,000 people (IDPs & returnees) were in acute need of humanitarian assistance in 2022 compared to 11 million people in 2017.

In addition, there is a notable decline in humanitarian funding for Iraq. Funding has decreased from a height of nearly $1.8 billion in 2016 to just $265 million in 2022, which is insufficient to maintain core services in all IDP camps, and to fill the gaps in public services. Prevailing trends indicate that most international humanitarian funding to Iraq will end or decline rapidly within the next three years. The Coalition-related stabilization activities are set to end in 2023, and the UN development framework is valid until the end of 2024.

The combination of those elements provides space for the Government to gradually assume responsibility for the needs of the population, while also benefiting from continued international assistance.

5.3 What has been Achieved through Transition Planning?

The humanitarian community in Iraq has taken several steps in support of the transition and scaling down of the collective, whole-of-system, international humanitarian architecture. Since late 2021, the Humanitarian Coordinator as well as Cluster Lead Agencies have met regularly with counterparts in the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to formally notify them about the transition plans and seek their collaboration in moving towards government-led service provision.

By end of 2021, the Government of Iraq (GoI) issued a National Plan on Internal Displacement and requested the UN to include a pillar on the objective of ending internal displacement in the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNDSCF). Both were welcome steps and signals of Government commitment to resolving residual challenges facing the recovery of six million people that are or were displaced since 2014.

In 2022, the HCT held three retreats to outline the parameters of transition and discuss specific planning for camps and informal sites. At the request of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the HCT established a Transition Advisory Group (TAG), a small, focused group to have detailed discussion on the operational aspects of humanitarian transition with representation from all key constituencies including durable solutions actors, NGOs, cluster lead agencies and donors. The TAG designed the outline of the light strategy, which was endorsed by the HCT in August 2022, and based on which this HTO is built.

At the request of the HCT, by the end of June, the clusters developed a roadmap to guide their transition which was used to track progress made up until December 2022. Key messages on the cluster transition have been developed by the HCT and used by HCT members and partners during engagement with relevant government authorities.
Discussions on the future of the coordination architecture, including at the sub-national level, started by the clusters and other humanitarian actors with the Durable Solutions Technical Working Group (DSTWG) the main technical and operational platform through which durable solutions are being advanced in Iraq. DSTWG brings together UN, INGO, and NNGO humanitarian, development, stabilization, recovery and peacebuilding actors, and ensures close linkages with government, existing entities, IASC Clusters and the Priority Working Groups of the UNSDCF. The Area-Based Coordination (ABC) mechanisms at the sub-national level are scaling up, and conversations and discussions are ongoing to determine where it is appropriate for ABCs to temporarily absorb certain aspects of the inter-cluster coordination architecture at sub-national level in Iraq. Further discussions are needed regarding the coordination at national level. Initial HCT discussions proposed that the ICCG led by OCHA transit into the DSTWG by end of December 2022, keeping in mind that the durable solution structures are not necessarily meant to take on the totality of humanitarian response.

5.4 Clusters Transition Arrangements for 2023

At the end of 2022, the IASC deactivated clusters in Iraq at the request of the HC and HCT. This section provides an overview of handover entities which assumed critical cluster functions.

CCCM Cluster

According to REACH’s intention survey conducted in June and July 2022 in all 26 formal IDP camps in Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 97 percent of in-camp Internally Displaced Person (IDP) households (HHs) reported no intention to return to their Area of Origin (AoO) within twelve months following data collection. The most reported reasons not to return are related to safety and security concerns, the lack of livelihood options, and damaged/destroyed housing in their AoO. Only 3 percent of HHs reported an intention to return, the camps with the highest proportion of intended returns were camps administrated by Nineawa and Erbil, especially Qayyarah Jeddah 5 (25 percent of HHs), Khazer M1 (20 percent of HHs) and Hasan sham U2 (18 percent of HHs). This is seemingly to the dire living conditions in these camps.

25 KRG-administered camps (180k) will be internalized by UNHCR, who will work on shifting from assistance provided by humanitarian partners to a connection to camps to public services, aiming to transform such camps into formal settlements and thus ensure better local inclusion. This is in line with the IDPs’ intention to stay in the camps, and UNHCR will continue to advocate with relevant government counterparts for IDPs to be permitted to self-upgrade their shelters in the IDP camps. This would reduce the fire risk in the camp and offer them more dignified living conditions. This will also reduce maintenance and tent-replacement costs for the Government. UNHCR will also review alternative options to returning home for families with specific profiles, such as relocation in a third location in the country and will continue to advocate for conditions in places of origin to be upgraded to facilitate free and informed decision to return home in a dignified and sustainable manner.

Further to ongoing plans by the KRG to consolidate IDP camps in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok governorates, UNHCR communicated formally through a letter addressed to the KRG’s Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCCC), that all departures from camps, eventual returns to places of origin or relocations to out-of-camp locations in the country, must remain voluntary, safe, dignified, informed and sustainable. IDPs should be provided with a range of options, including local integration, with their intentions and preferred choice respected. In its former role as the CCCM Cluster lead agency, UNHCR recommended that any consolidation of camps be organized and planned, with sufficient information and reasonable notice provided to the camp populations, to allow them time to take an informed decision and prepare for their departure. UNHCR also expressed readiness to support the authorities in informing IDPs, requesting additional information about the sequence and timeframe of the consolidation plans. In addition, UNHCR requested confirmation of the availability of return grants from the Ministry of Migration and Displacement, so that families can be supported should they choose to return to their areas of origin.

IOM will continue its leadership role in Jeddah 5 camp (J5), which is currently hosting 782 HHs/ 3,683 individuals. With the recent Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD) decision to close J5, IOM is advocating for a timely, orderly, and informed closure procedure that is conducted in a voluntary, safe, and dignified manner and is working closely with the Tribal Engagement team to address barriers of return to households with perceived ISIL affiliations, tribal and social cohesion issues.

According to the findings of the 2022 Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (MCNA), 994,000 individuals remain in protracted displacement in informal IDP sites in 2022. CCCM partners will continue to work towards addressing urgent humanitarian needs of this population while also facilitating their access to durable solutions. IOM supported capacity building of partners to internalize the CCCM Cluster focal points responsibilities within their own structures. Continuing in 2023, CCCM partners will directly engage with local governments and coordination mechanisms including Area-Based Coordination (ABC) groups to address issues related to IDP evictions, needs and gaps, and addressing barriers to return, with IOM representing relevant issues in national forums as needed.

Education Cluster

Both the Ministries of Education in KRI and the federal education ministry in Baghdad have formally communicated their decision to establish an Education in Emergency Coordination Committee within the Ministries, where partners can also engage. ToRs for the said committees are being finalized and the capacity building needs are being determined by relevant authorities. The same process is expected to commence soon with the Federal Ministry of Education in Baghdad. Post-cluster a key issue will be how to integrate IDP children into permanent education systems, as there is a parallel system for IDP children in KRI, noting that the integration of refugee children into the education system in KRI is ongoing, through the Refugee Integration Education Policy. This will require engagement at all levels and dialogue between KRG and Federal institutions.

Emergency Livelihood Cluster

Capacity building initiatives are ongoing for handing over the IDP and Refugee dashboard to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. For a smooth transition on service delivery provision (i.e. Cash for Work of EL Cluster), EL cluster is converted to a sub-group under the durable solution structure to work jointly towards developing guidance and approaches along with Cash and Livelihoods Consortium for Iraq (and Iraq Cash Forum).
**Food Security Cluster**
The cluster has transitioned to an agriculture sectoral working group led by Cluster Lead Agencies/partners. A transition rational Document was developed, which will be revised with the partners along with the agriculture working group ToR. The objective is to ensure that Food Security aspects are well embedded in the agriculture working group and that the working group corresponds to the technical/coordination needs and is well equipped to capture food security aspects and needs in the country’s current context, as well as contingency planning, and avoid duplication with other existing coordination platforms.

**Health Cluster**
Having revamped the Health Cluster Strategic Advisory Group into a Transition Advisory Group, with the inclusion of the federal and KRG MoH focal persons and relevant partners, the Cluster lead agencies and the Federal Ministry of Health are now working together to establish the most suitable coordination modality after cluster deactivation. Mapping of public health facilities surrounding camps and out-of-camp displacement locations has been conducted and shared with the Federal MoH. Federal MoH has nominated sub-national focal persons for inclusion in the ABCs. WHO has nearly completed the Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS) data collection and analysis in Federal Iraq; implementation within KRG is imminent. As a start to digitalizing the health information system, DHIS2 is to be rolled out in 5 governorates, starting with immunization data. WHO is also working toward integration of health services for IDPs into the public health system by establishing comprehensive primary healthcare services in selected health facilities and training MoH staff, with the aim to fully handover these services to the MoH mid-2023. In order to sustain the minimum basic services, a transitional plan is being developed. The plan includes utilizing functional government Primary Health Care Centers, after being expanded and renovated, or combining two or more facilities in camps when that is possible. This will ensure minimizing the cost of services without any sudden interruption in service delivery.

**Protection Cluster**
The Protection Cluster’s transition is in line with the roadmap and the risk analysis documents in the annex. Three main areas were identified to be prioritized in the Protection Cluster’s transition timeline: service delivery to beneficiaries, coordination and capacity building. Below is an update on the progress in these areas:

1. **Post cluster-transition protection activities:** The National Protection Cluster conducted two surveys aimed at measuring protection partners’ funding situation for general protection activities and case management gaps post-cluster deactivation. The results of the first survey indicate that out of reported projects, 40 per cent would end by December 2022, while 60 per cent (primarily legal assistance, followed by community-based protection and referrals) will continue in 2023. Results of the second survey on post-transition case management indicate that for case management activities, mostly composed of child protection (52 per cent) and gender-based violence (45 per cent), 50 per cent will end by December 2022, while another 32 per cent will end by first and second quarters of 2023, with all governorates in Iraq continuing to be covered by case management activities until mid-2023. Some activities will continue beyond this date but will not have country-wide coverage. Protection partners will also be continuing the provision of civil documents to IDPs/IDP returnees and expand to other Iraqis who may have specific obstacles to obtain documents proving their identity and Iraqi nationality (including at-risk of statelessness populations) as the key to accessing public services, move freely and apply for compensation and social protection schemes.

2. **Coordination:** The Protection Platform was created and activated in October 2022, co-led by UNHCR and OCHCR, with the participation of UN entities, INGO and NNGO representatives. The main goals of the Protection Platform are the coordination for high-level advocacy and the provision of guidance to partners, especially under the UNSDCF; to ensure protection issues continue to be addressed in accordance with applicable national and international legal framework. The centrality of protection will be at the core of the Protection Platform system-wide effort to reduce risks, support remedial action for vulnerable populations and strengthen people’s resilience. The core group has identified access to civil documentation as one of its core priorities in 2023, recognizing that the complex cases and bottlenecks that remain for IDP and returnees to access documentation, as well as vulnerable populations, is in need of high-level advocacy with relevant governmental counterparts.

3. **Capacity Building:** To ensure the centrality of protection as a system-wide effort to reduce risks, address displacement-linked vulnerabilities and strengthen people’s resilience, the Protection Cluster and the Durable Solutions Technical Working Group (DSTWG) conducted several workshops in September and December 2022 for ABC focal points, protection coordinators, ABC members and local authorities in ABC areas (East and West Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Ninewa (Baaj, Sinjar and Mosul)). The sessions in the workshops focused on the principles of the centrality of protection, leaving no one behind, protection mainstreaming and durable solutions with practical exercises, including how the ABCs can include protection in their workflows. The workshops were conducted in English and Arabic and simultaneous Arabic translation was provided. The attendance and active participation by the government officials including governors, deputy governors, mayors, Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD), directorate of planning and directorate of water, was very welcomed. The key takeaways from the workshops focused on the need to continuously engage with the local government/municipalities to ensure that protection is indeed centralized in the plans of actions of the ABCs, also there is a need for accountability and feedback mechanisms, inquiring on the complaint system available for the ABC interventions, and there is a need for clarifications on how ABC members chose their target areas and their target populations - a need for a transparent system, the role of the newly established local SDG committees and engagement in the design/planning of the ABC projects - enabling the participatory approach and government buy-in for shared responsibility, prioritizing the response and operationalizing the leaving no one behind principle, inquiring how to do it in practice and whether the international actors are following this principle and how to best ensure that all ABC members are operationalizing it and ensuring meaningful participation with ABC members, provincial coordination committees where they exist, government counterparts and the affected communities in all phases of the ABC interventions.
Child protection sub-cluster

Child protection does not have direct parallel structure in the government. Sustaining child protection activities requires the creation of Child Protection institutions in MoLSA. Discussions are at an advanced stage, and UNICEF will continue to support this process, including setting up child protection units and institutionalizing this at sub-national levels; strengthening the social worker work force with a child protection mandate and capacity, including budgets to prevent and respond to child protection issues; and government-led coordination of partners. Humanitarian partners will continue to provide services, including linked returns from Northeast Syria.

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) sub-cluster

In order to be efficiently able to respond to the needs of GBV survivors and at-risk group in the transition to development context, the GBV SC proposed a phased approach through which, the sub-cluster will transition to a sector approach, under the proposed leadership of government lead agencies and national GBV service providers at the Federal level as well as Kurdistan Region of Iraq, with technical, operational and funding support from UN agencies, INGOs, national actors and donor agencies. The expected results of the phased approach include:

- Increased coordination among stakeholders implementing GBV activities at the national level as well as sub-national/governorates.
- Increased representation at the Durable Solution Technical Working Group, Area Based Coordination and Protection Platform
- Enhance advocacy at various forums, both UN and government-led to mobilize resources, promote partnership.
- Increased protection of women, children, persons with disability, elderly, female & child headed households, widowed and divorced women, as well as adolescents.

The sub-cluster worked on building the capacity of the national actors including government counterparts. At the KRI level, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) will be the chair while the Social, Educational, and Economic Development Foundation (SEED) will be the co-chair. At the federal level, the Women Empowerment Department (WED) at GoI will be the chair, whereas the GBV SC will circulate an expression of interest for the co-chair role. UNFPA will provide technical support to the new coordination structure.

The coordinating agencies will be responsible to ensure the smooth running of the GBV Working Groups at their respective regions and take lead in the designing of effective guidelines and standards and provide technical support to relevant stakeholders with technical support from UNFPA as a last resort for GBV prevention and response in Iraq. The Government of Iraq (GoI) and Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRI) under the development context have the primary responsibility to ensure provision of quality GBV services to survivors and at-risk groups of GBV through its mandated and designated entities. Women Empowerment Department (WED) and Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs (MoLSA) are responsible for designating the human resources required to lead GBV WG coordination groups, at national and governorate levels.

Mine Action sub-cluster

The sub-cluster worked with relevant national mine action authorities to transfer the functions to fully government-led sector coordination by 31 December 2022. The sector will be led by the federal Directorate of Mine Action in Baghdad, and by the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) in KRI. The MA SC has conducted a mapping of durable solution engagement among the sub-cluster partners to ensure sustainability of coordination of humanitarian mine action within the UN-led coordination structure.

Shelter/ NFIs Cluster

The SNFI Cluster has transitioned area-level coordination of remaining shelter interventions to DSTWG/ABC. Shelter humanitarian partners will coordinate with ABC focal points to provide input on needs and to promote the area-based intervention model. At the national level, some of the SNFI’s functions will be incorporated into the existing Housing-House, Land, and Property (HLF) subgroup under DSTWG, whose primary function is to provide guidelines for HLP and Shelter-related activities, such as compensating scheme and shelter intervention in informal settlements. While the NFI-related activities will be phased out by end of 2022 as needs have considerably reduced.

WASH Cluster

Two government-led sectoral working groups were established in Baghdad and in Erbil. The working group in Baghdad is led by the Ministry of Construction, Housing and Public Municipalities (MoCHPM), with two meetings held in September and November respectively. The working group in Erbil is led by the Ministry of Municipalities and Tourism (MoMT) and the General Directorate of Water and Sewerage (GDWS, with a first meeting held in October and a second meeting held in December. The ToRs are currently being finalized and the needs for capacity building are being identified.

Continuation or Deactivation of Other Coordination Mechanisms

Cash Working Group (CWG)

The Cash Working Group (CWG) has handed over to the recently created Iraq Cash Forum (ICF). The new group aims to support the quality and efficient delivery of cash and voucher assistance (CVA) by providing strategic coordination, technical advice, and advocacy to all CVA actors in Iraq. The new group will focus on three strategic areas:
1) Durable Solutions, with a special engagement with the Livelihoods technical sub-group; 2) the use of CVA for Climate Change affected population; and 3) Social Protection, with a focus on linkages with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), alignment with existing Social Protection schemes and Shock-Responsive Social Protection. In November 2022, the new group was formed with 70 members, and it will sit under the HCT during 2023.
The coordination transition structure for 2022-2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clusters/Sub -Clusters</th>
<th>Agencies/Platforms/WGs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clusters/Sub -Clusters</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agencies/Platforms/WGs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>MoCHPM WWG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>EIE Management Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Protection Platform</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection: Mine Action</td>
<td>Directorate of Mine Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection: GBV</td>
<td>Government and NGO led sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection: Child Protection</td>
<td>Government and CSO led sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>IOM (J5) IOM+MOMD (J1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
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<td>Shelter</td>
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<td>Emergency Livelihood</td>
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<td>CWG</td>
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**2022**
- HCT
- ICCG

**2023**
- HCT
- DSTF
- DSTWG
Part 6

Annexes

6.1 Clusters Risk Analysis developed in June 2022 (clusters transition roadmap)

Background:
During the joint HCT/DCG/ICCG retreat on 31 March, it was agreed that Clusters/ICCG would work on a risk analysis for potential consequences after the exit of the internationally-mandated humanitarian coordination structures. This action point was further discussed at the subsequent meeting of the HCT’s Transition Advisory Group (TAG) on 6 April 2022. TAG participants expressed interest in the risk analysis articulating what might be at risk if the services currently provided by humanitarian organizations were to end without any other entity stepping in to fill the gap, as well as what the risks might be if the capacity-building, coordination and other systems-related elements were to not be successfully picked up by another entity. Further, TAG participants requested a timeline associated with each cluster transition plan.

The attached risk analysis, prepared by the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG), focuses on cluster transition plans and timelines, looking at what could go wrong and what the impact would be related to the two key elements, requested by the TAG, namely 1) impact if no-one were to take over the humanitarian service delivery to beneficiaries and 2) impact if the proposed post-cluster coordination set-ups did not materialize.

Transition Risk Analysis Document:
This document contains one-page from each cluster, focusing on:

1. **Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe**: top-line messages on how the cluster’s plan to transition service delivery and coordination and a timeline for the cluster transition activities during the rest of 2022.

2. **Cluster Transition Risk Assessment**: top-line messages on what the impact would be on beneficiaries if the cluster’s current humanitarian service delivery ends with no-one taking over, and if coordination, capacity-building, etc. is not picked up by another entity.

3. **Likelihood of Risk and Mitigation Measures**: top-line messages on the likelihood of the cluster’s transition plan not being successful, leading to the risks identified, and on mitigation measures to avoid those risks.

These one-pagers thus represent a summary of each cluster’s transition risk analysis and strategy, with more detailed analysis and planning undertaken by each of the clusters.
**CCCM Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe** (As of June 2022)

**Service Delivery to Beneficiaries:** Camps: identification of opportunities for further handover of responsibilities to relevant authorities, including at municipal level and in relation to public services provision, of management of the 25 KRG-administered camps currently supported by UNHCR. IOM will continue its management of Jeddah 5. Informal sites: in smaller sites, exit strategies are integrated within CCCM interventions by IOM and NGOs. For highest priority sites, progress is needed on support for durable solutions to responsibly reduce humanitarian services, including CCCM.

**Coordination:** Camps: relevant Cluster functions for the 25 KRG-administered camps will be internalized by UNHCR, with IOM continuing its leadership role in Jeddah 5. Informal sites: CCCM partners continuing in 2023 will engage directly with local coordination mechanisms, with IOM representing relevant issues in national forums as needed.

**CCCM Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:**

**Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over:**
- Camp CCCM response: current planning by UNHCR & IOM will gradually reduce services through proper handover to relevant public services providers.
- Highest priority informal sites CCCM response: if humanitarian & CCCM support ceases without progress toward durable solutions, populations will be at permanent risk of exclusion: unable to achieve durable solutions, at heightened risk of eviction, deterioration of living conditions, with high protection risks for vulnerable families. CCCM partners are playing an important role in supporting inclusion of informal sites within transition planning.
- Overall camp response: withdrawal of service delivery without government takeover risks deterioration of safe, dignified living conditions to below living standards for Iraqi communities. Withdrawal of household-level assistance without evidence-based targeting, sufficient planning, or government takeover will most negatively impact families with no income and pre-existing vulnerability, potentially resulting in food insecurity & exacerbated protection risks.

**Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity:**
- Informal sites: coordination transition relies on ABCs, with wider coverage than current eight ABCs

**CCCM Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:**

**Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks:**
- Camps: budget allocation is cited as a main barrier to government taking over services
- Highest profile informal sites: limited progress made so far on joint humanitarian-durable solutions planning

**Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:**
- Camps: continued high-level advocacy on GoI & KRG budget allocation for camp services
- Informal sites: progress on site-level plans between humanitarian & DS actors to meaningfully identify durable solutions options, inclusion in durable solutions programs, and early identification of any residual necessary humanitarian activities to advocate for 2023 funding continuation

**Timeline for Transition Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; 2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cluster coordination transition strategy agreed with CCCM partners</td>
<td>Transition of centre-south governorate CCCM focal points</td>
<td>Full coordination transition to CLAs / CCCM partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Camp Roadmap drafted &amp; agreed</td>
<td>Engagement with stakeholders on camp roadmap implementation</td>
<td>Camp roadmap implementation, &amp; monitoring of handover impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of highest-priority informal sites &amp; drafting of site-level plans</td>
<td>Continuation of drafting site-level plans for highest-priority sites, including targeted durable solutions engagement</td>
<td>Implementation of site-plans; operational planning for remaining 2023 CCCM informal site support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Education Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe
(As of June 2022)

Service Delivery to Beneficiaries: The Education Cluster will hand over most activities to MoE and dev partners.

- 67,123 children targeted through non-formal education programmes (including ALP) 13,216 children targeted through structure and school-based PSS and MRE. 9,196 children through ECCD, in Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul and Hamandiya will be handed over to MoE.

- No civil documentation process could marginalize returnee children in Anbar, Salah Al Din, and Ninewa.

- 67,123 children might be at risk of dropping out of any mode of education.

- Schools will be without PSS services in Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul and Hamandiya.

- Incomplete integration of refugee, IDP and community education might lead to fragmentation and strikes.

Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity: (below are just examples)

- Cluster-harmonized costing standards for different education services could fragment; no rapid response leadership; no IM will create evidence and gap analysis for decision making across the sector.

- 83 MoE led advocacy efforts on including lack of civic doc at all levels in Anbar, Salah al Din, and Ninewa.

- Strategic note on inclusive transition pathways from non-formal learning to formal education.

Coordination: Education Cluster Iraq has already initiated discussions with MoEs on replication and institutionalization of coordination within MoEs broader structure i.e., national and sub-national levels.

Education Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:
Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over: (below are just examples)

- No civil documentation process could marginalize returnee children in Anbar, Salah Al Din and Ninewa.

- 67,123 children might be at risk of dropping out of any mode of education.

- Schools will be without PSS services in Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul and Hamandiya.

- Incomplete integration of refugee, IDP and community education might lead to fragmentation and strikes.

Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity: (below are just examples)

- Cluster-harmonized costing standards for different education services could fragment; no rapid response leadership; no IM will create evidence and gap analysis for decision making across the sector.

Education Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:
Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks:

- It is likely that no/few funds from MoE are allocated beyond salaries, possible that integration will not take place or reversed due to vested interests; likely with high impact on children that civil documentation issuing will slow.

Mitigation measures to avoid these risks: (below are just examples)

- Consultation with both MoEs, alignment of cluster transition plan with MoE policy framework and not just humanitarian frameworks; sharing of cluster database and strengthening MoEs IM capacity; clear and specific coordination manual for MoEs; donor and sector engagement and joint decision making; understanding of MoEs budgets and priorities.

Timeline for Transition Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 &amp; 4 2022</th>
<th>Q3 &amp; 4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Policy actions/advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Unit at the MoE:</td>
<td>• Coordination units in MoEs</td>
<td>• Transition Pathways from non-formal to formal learning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Cluster SAG into Transition Facilitation Group (TfG)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Connecting with DS/ABC, and</td>
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<td>development forum</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Emergency Livelihoods Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe (As of June 2022)

**Service Delivery to Beneficiaries:** The ELC aims to hand over its Job placement to MoLSA and integrate Cash for Work into UNSDCF. The ELC expects that partners will continue delivering both ELC core activities during 2022 and 2023.

**Coordination:** The coordination function will be handed over to MoLSA and implemented by DoLSA in the governorate. The coordination function will be active in priority governorates where the PIN is high, and ELC partners are active.

**Emergency Livelihoods Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:**

Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to the above-mentioned risks:

The main risk of the transition is handing over the ELC coordination functions to MoLSA. Among the Ministries, only MoLSA has mandates compatible with ELC functions. However, the ELC, besides its capacity to advocate the transition, also relies on establishing a productive relationship with the MoLSA, which will contribute to a smooth transition.

**Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:**

- The ELC will re-evaluate its partners’ current operational capacity to ensure that the target population will receive emergency livelihood services.
- If the MoLSA disagrees with taking over coordination function in priority locations, the ELC will further coordinate with ABC groups to incorporate the ELC coordination functions.
- In addition, the ELC can coordinate with respective Governor’s offices to support the coordination of the ELC services during 2023.

**Timeline for Transition Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Decision on Timeline and Criteria</td>
<td>Strategic Engagement with Government.</td>
<td>Strategic &amp; Sector Engagement with DS/Dev/Gov on Workstreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging with ABC groups on the governorate level to capture the ELC activities and coordination needs of the cluster that can be integrated into ABC functions in the area.</td>
<td>Mapping of Dev/DS/Gov Capacities &amp; Entry Points</td>
<td>Initiating sector approach for a gradual transfer of coordination responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLA advocacy with (line Ministry) on the Development of Roadmap/ Workstreams</td>
<td>Progress Evaluation against pre-established criteria/ Decision on 2023 HPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building of DoLSA on Coordination and the ELC tools.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Food Security Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe
(As of June 2022)

**Service Delivery to Beneficiaries:** The cluster aims to hand the distribution of food assistance in the IDP camps to the government, while agriculture-based cash for work and cash+ schemes will be integrated into the UNSDCF, where applicable. Coordination activities will be continued by partners and CLAs.

**Coordination:** The Cluster plans to transition coordination to a working group led by CLA and partners.

**Food Security Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:**

**Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over:**
- The livelihoods of vulnerable farming families (returnees and IDPs out of camps) who rely on agriculture for their food and income will be further eroded.
- IDP camp populations will have no access to food on a regular basis, which could result in the deterioration of their food security status.

**Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not managed and scaled-up by another entity:**
- Inconsistencies, duplications, lack of inclusion and coverage
- Lack of programmatic and geographic synergies

**Impact if capacity building in data collection, monitoring and analysis is not transferred nor enhanced:**
- Key Data and information will not be available nor disseminated. Delays in preparedness and response.
- Lack of coordination and advocacy may further deteriorate the vulnerability status of the concerned populations and broaden the existing response gaps.

**Food Security Cluster Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:**

**Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks:**
- Govt lacking financial and human resources may lead to inconsistency of their participation in the WG. Which might make it difficult to hand over the coordination form and activities to the government by the end of 2022.

**Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:**
- Sensitize FSC partners, including the government and make sure that are involved in the process from the beginning
- The cluster will train the NNGOs and government officials on service mapping, information sharing, response monitoring and coordination, and will provide technical support on agriculture related activities.
- Engagement with the relevant ministries to identify the main priorities, challenges and needs to meet the requirements of a sustainable transition.
- Connect with the global and regional AgWG as necessary to identify best practices, streamline guidance and inform initiatives for various thematic areas while transitioning.
- The CLAs will advocate for the active participation of relevant government stakeholders in the AgWG.
- The cluster will work closely with DSTWG to ensure effective linkages during the transition process and will encourage partners to actively participate in the ABCs at the sub-national level.

**Timeline for Transition Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapping of relevant actors and entry points</td>
<td>Launching the Agriculture working group, identifying linkages between the AgWG and other existing coordination mechanisms.</td>
<td>Transition of core activities to govt/partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with ABCs on capacity building and clarification of coordination roles.</td>
<td>CLA advocacy with (MoMD, MoA, MoT, MoP, UNSDCF, etc) on the integration and implementing of food distributions and agriculture based activities.</td>
<td>Connect FSC partners with relevant agriculture platforms, coordination groups, Ministry of Agriculture departments, research institutions, universities, and other relevant actors to facilitate the adoption of innovative agriculture activities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance the government’s capacity of information sharing, emergency preparedness and coordination.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Health Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe (As of June 2022)

**Service Delivery to Beneficiaries:** The Health Cluster is overseeing the provision of primary healthcare services in and out-of-camps throughout Iraq. As the humanitarian funding is winding down, the cluster will work on transitioning all the services currently provided to populations of humanitarian concern to the government. The transition will be gradual and will start by phasing out the support to PHCCs (out of camps) serving local communities and IDPs; and later, the in-camp primary health services will be handed over, anticipated to be by the end of 2022. Among the HRP activities, the Health Cluster endeavors to integrate capacity building activities, cash and voucher assistance, and physical rehabilitation of patients into the Durable Solutions Program, being long-term interventions.

**Coordination:** The CLA and Cluster will continue to advocate with the Ministry of Health (MoH) to transition coordination and leadership roles to them, based on their capacity and readiness to do so. In addition, as per the developing situation with the DSTWG, they will be invited to participate in partner coordination forums, to facilitate partner interaction with them.

**Health Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:**

**Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over:**
- 179,922 IDPs in camps, 75,080 IDPs out of camps and 132,996 returnees will not receive essential primary healthcare services as these are targeted under HRP 2022 and will not access Health Services unless alternative solutions are found.
- 373,455 children below 17 years of age will lack access to services, of whom, nearly 69 thousand under-fives will be vulnerable to vaccine-preventable and epidemic-prone diseases.
- About 97,400 women of childbearing age will face difficulty accessing reproductive health services, and about a tenth of these may face increased risk of maternal and newborn mortality due to obstetric complications.

**Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by other entities:**
- Health Cluster partners will not coordinate their efforts and will end up leaving enormous gaps in service delivery, and possibly duplicating services and wasting the scarce resources remaining in the humanitarian operations.
- MoH will not be ready to takeover coordination and leadership roles to support health service-delivery under the transition phase, while the DSTWG does not have technical capacity to do so.

**Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:**

Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks: Given the current status of the MoH's coordination, leadership and monitoring capacity; and the lack thereof with the DSTWG; the likelihood of the transition plan not being successful is quite significant and requires further joint advocacy at the highest level.

**Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:**
- The Cluster will continue to partially oversee the coordination efforts during 2022, especially in view of transitioning some activities to the MoH and DSTWG at national level, and the Directorate of Health (DoH) and ABCs at sub-national level.
- The Cluster plans to revamp the Strategic Advisory Group into a Transition Advisory Group comprising partner agencies involved in Durable Solutions and Development programming.
- The CLA will support the digitalization of the health information system through installation of DHIS2, conduct a HeRAMS to determine the gaps in health services country-wide, and support integration of the EWARN system into the routine surveillance.

**Timeline for Transition Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cluster extends invitation to DSTWG FPs into Cluster Coordination forum on regular basis, and supports development of a monitoring framework with the M&amp;A sub-group</td>
<td>Cluster facilitates increased involvement of DSTWG in coordination forum to allow partners more interaction with them as necessary, based on developing situation</td>
<td>Eligible partners coordinate with DSTWG regarding long-term interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLA initiates roll-out of HeRAMS to determine the gap in health service provision, and DHIS2 system to allow for evidence-based programming in the health sector.</td>
<td>CLA analyzes and publishes HeRAMS report for partners and MoH to identify gaps in the health sector and address these under DS</td>
<td>CLA and Cluster continue to advocate with donors to support durable solutions and development activities in health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster maps existing camp services and project closures</td>
<td>Cluster continues to scale up engagement of MoH in coordination, leadership and service-delivery roles.</td>
<td>Partners phase out from out-of-camp locations and handover some HRP activities in camps to MoH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster revamps SAG to TAG, incorporating agencies supporting durable solutions and development activities</td>
<td>TAG meets on a regular basis, advising and adopting interventions suitable to durable solutions</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
National Protection Cluster/General Protection Transition Plan and Timeframe (As of June 2022)

Service Delivery to Beneficiaries: Core protection activities to be continued by UNHCR and protection partners (subject to funding); overall, the Protection Cluster foresees handover of protection activities to I/NGOs/CSOs, UNSDCF/PWG's and Government.

Coordination: Creation of a Strategic Forum UNHCR-OHCHR co-led (w/ key UN and I/NGOs participation) at national level to inform/advise development and UNSDCF stakeholders on key protection issues, human rights/ rule of law issues. Operational coordination through the DSTWG/ABCs, where existent and to extent feasible.

National Protection Cluster/General Protection Transition Risk Assessment:

Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends w/ no-one taking over:

- Overall, vulnerable individuals risk rights violations; increased risks of (1) resumption to negative coping mechanisms, (2) increase in psychosocial distress/trauma, (3) marginalization of specific groups/individuals (e.g., people w/ perceived affiliation); (4) increased exposure to exploitation, recruitment, radicalization, and overall social inequality leading to further waves of tensions.

- In specific re: legal assistance, vulnerable individuals w/out core documents will face limitations in exercising basic rights w/ severe impact on their access to health, education, food, safe shelter, social protection schemes and other vital services. Achievement of durable solutions will be hampered.

Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity:

- Current ABCs limited in number & geographical scope and not protection focused; risks of duplication in service delivery, assessments fatigues, limited prioritization for those mostly in need. Plus, lack of/limited centrality of protection focus may lead to practices contrary to do no harm.

- Should authorities not commit & allocate human & budget resources for capacity building of social workforce re: protection activities, risk of increased resumption to negative coping mechanisms.

National Protection Cluster/General Protection Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:

Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks:

- For the most part, both KRI and Federal Iraq authorities have limited protection expertise; structural barriers re: protection interventions remain; authorities are often the perpetrators of rights violations.

- Risk that authorities won't assume responsibilities as primary duty-bearer for all Iraqis remain significant (including for conflict-affected people).

Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:

- Since 2019, over 4,000 individuals (Government and humanitarian actors) have participated in capacity building activities in GP (including HLP issues) w/ an average of delivery by 20 partners.

- UNHCR as CLA & relevant protection actors to continue advocacy w/ relevant Gov counterparts to – among others - (1) allocate budget to protection interventions; (2) ease procedures to access core legal documentation (including HLP core docs); (3) include protection vulnerability criteria and use of non-discriminatory approaches in social protection schemes; (4) train social workforce for MoLSA; (5) increase allocation of budget towards HLP compensation mechanism.
PART 6 ANNEXES

29

Child Protection Sub-Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe (As of June 2022)

Service Delivery to Beneficiaries: The Child Protection Sub-Cluster (CPSC) will handover core child protection activities in camps to government. At the same time, critical case management activities for children who have experienced or at-risk of extreme violence, exploitation, child survivors of GBV, and children in families with perceived affiliation to ISIL will continue to be provided by civil society organizations and cluster lead agency UNICEF based on funding availability.

Coordination: The CPSC plan to transition coordination to a Government and Civil-Society Organizations (CSO) led sector coordination mechanism.

Child Protection Sub-Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:

Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over:

- Child protection concerns will not be monitored or addressed. As a consequence, more than 300,000 vulnerable children will continue to be at risk and face vulnerabilities due to existing underlying factors. We will likely see higher likelihoods of hazardous child labour, child marriage, GBV and more abuse and exploitation.

- Currently over 37,000 children at significant risk of, or experienced violence, child sexual, physical, and psychosocial abuse, are identified for case management support; if we stop case management, they may remain in abusive situations which could be life threatening.

- 33,200 children under arbitrary detention and more than 25,000 children without civil documentation are currently targeted for CP service. These children will risk of never establishing legal identity, leading to restrictions of freedom of movement and an increased risk of arrest and detention, no access to education, and life-long marginalization.

Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity:

- Without regular and systematic monitoring of child protection concerns and risks, there will be no protection analysis.

- Duplication of efforts and/or gaps in the response for the remaining humanitarian caseload may the CP response to be ineffective, inefficient, or untimely.

- Impunity for perpetrators and normalizing violence against children will increase, especially among the most marginalized and vulnerable children such as those in IDP camps, informal settlements and in host communities.

Timeline for Transition Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP Cluster transition Strategy agreed w/ NPC (SAG) members and UNCHR/OHCHR</td>
<td>Creation of Strategic Forum (UNHCR &amp; OHCHR co-led) and ID of focal point/PWGs in the PWGs (UNSDCF)</td>
<td>Kick off of UNHCR/OHCHR co-led Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapping of capacity-building needs of relevant actors through NPC (SAG) and definition of capacity building plan + Mapping of development protection actors and donors</td>
<td>Implementation of capacity building interventions and engagement of protection I/NGOs, CSOs in coordination mechanism under DS structure + engagement w/ development protection donors</td>
<td>Continuation and/or handover of core activities to I/NGOs, Civil Society and clear linkages established w/ PWGs/UNSDCF for protection interventions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Engagement w/ DSTWG co-chairs re: ABCs capacity-building needs, clarification of coordination roles for protection and assumption of some functions (as feasible) | Continuation of engagement w/ DSTWG chairs and ABCs on merging/adapting existing NPC/GP structures and approaches. | Handover of operational protection “coordination” of partners’ interventions to ABCs (as feasible and relevant) and clear definition of linkages w/ the Strategic Forum and DSTWG/ABCs.

Cluster members and CLA engagement w/ relevant Govt counterparts on policy changes re: access to civil documentation for vulnerable individuals, and inclusion of vulnerability criteria in social protection schemes (MOLSA).
Child Protection Sub-Cluster Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:

Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks:

We need to gradually transition child protection responsibilities, including CP coordination with the support of CLA. Transferring responsibility to government agencies and finding sustainable solutions for IDPs remains challenge, because while government departments can implement ongoing activities using existing NGO staff, there are no government budget lines to tap into (in contract with other social services like water and education), and continuation of activities will be difficult without continued humanitarian funding until the budget lines are created. There is a high likelihood that transition of CP coordination and activities will be delayed from the proposed schedule.

Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:

- CLA will continue to advocate with MOLSA to endorse the CP social workers’ ToR, budget for CP service delivery, establish CP specific units, assume sector coordination with CSOs.
- Engagement with CwC and MoLSA in Iraq to establish the child protection sector coordination.
- Ensure that child protection social workforce have the necessary capacity to respond in accordance with child protection principles and CPMS. Development of a clear transition roadmap agreed with humanitarian, development, and government actors and a program closure/transfer guidance to minimize harm.
- Continue to seek limited humanitarian funding for a longer transition.

Timeline for Transition Activities

| Q1 & Q2 2022 |
| Q3 2022 |
| Q4 2022 |

- Map actors providing CP
- Capacity-building of relevant CP actors
- Discussion with MOSLA/DOLSA on CP service provision and coordination
- Engagement with ABCs and Durable Solution WG members on clarifying coordination roles
- Develop programme transition guidance to minimize harm

- MoLSA’s role in CP service provision and coordination to be clarified and agreed.
- Engage with MOLSA to conduct Social Workforce Assessment (lead by UNICEF) and endorse the social workers’ ToR and as well as establish specific units for child protection, appoint child protection focal points.
- Capacity building of sector coordination

- Initiating sector approach for gradual transfer of coordination responsibilities to MOLSA/ DOLSA and CSOs
- Handover the core CP activities in camps to MOSLA and COSs.
- Agreements with CSOs and UNICEF to continue the critical lifesaving CP service
- Transitioning cluster/sector roles and responsibility to CP Sector coordination
GBV Sub-Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe
(As of June 2022)

Service Delivery to Beneficiaries:
The GBV SC Cluster plans to hand over the GBV specialized activities to
the government led GBV sector. The provision of legal response, income
generation and job placement related activities will be integrated in the
revised UNSCDF.

Coordination: The GBV Sub-Cluster plans to transition coordination
leadership structure to a government-led sector approach in Centre
South as well as Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

GBV Sub-Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:
Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one
taking over:
In the likelihood of this particular scenario, existing GBV survivors,
especially those living in camps, will be highly affected. As per GBV
SC impact analysis exercise, discontinuation of services may result
in 14,649 GBV survivors not able to receive GBV Case Management,
2,261 legal assistance, 42,000 dignity kits, and 44,989 unable to receive
structured PSS services. This situation may lead to further exposure
to additional harm from GBV and complications as a result of its
consequences. Additional risks include, increase in exposure to Sexual
Exploitation & Abuse, survival sex, Child Marriage, Child trafficking, etc.,
as negative coping mechanism.

Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked
up by another entity:
• Risks of duplication of coverage in certain regions, with potential
  risk of leaving behind some of the underserved regions with
  emerging humanitarian needs as well as unmet GBV needs of
  survivors.

GBV Sub-Cluster Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation
Measures:
Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful
and leading to above-mentioned risks:
The likelihood is from low to medium in view of the above-mentioned
risks factors.

Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:
• In the event, the government is not able to fully or partially take
  over, and/or generate sufficient interest and resources, the GBV
  SC to ensure that DS partners provide life-saving GBV services in
  2023 for the residual caseload with humanitarian needs.
• Continued high funding advocacy by CLAs with the GoI and KRG
  as well as development and humanitarian donors with regards
to sufficient service coverage in the underserved areas posing
humanitarian needs.

Timeline for Transition Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. GBV Service Mapping and inter-sectoral referral Exercise</td>
<td>i. GBV sector TORs developed</td>
<td>i. Transition of core activities to govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Capacity-building of relevant actors</td>
<td>iii. government to co-host the GBV strategy and national action plan workshop</td>
<td>iii. Government nominated relevant ministry assumes the role of sector leadership role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Engagement with ABCs on capacity-building, clarifying coordination roles and response provision under DSTCF etc.</td>
<td>iv. UNFPA as CLA to advocate with (line Ministry) on taking over the GBV sector leadership role with technical support from UNFPA and UN agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mine Action Sub-Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe
(As of June 2022)

Service Delivery to Beneficiaries: The Mine Action Sub-Cluster aims to hand over the full coordination of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), clearance and survey, victim assistance and capacity building to the national mine action authorities (NMAAs) and the UNSDCF by 31 December 2022. Humanitarian partners will continue to deliver above activities subject to funding availability.

Coordination: The MASC plans to transition the coordination to a government-led mine action sector supported by UNMAS and the various implementing partners and operators. The MASC will promote coordination with the ABCs.

Mine Action Sub-Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:
Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over:
- More than five million people are affected by the risks of explosive ordnance (HNO 2022).
- More than 3.2 km² potentially left contaminated with explosive ordnance (National mine action database).
- Insufficient victim assistance services will further be exacerbated.

Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity:
The NMAAs lead coordination and oversee mine action activities in Iraq. However, due to extensive and complex explosive ordnance contamination, lack of human resources and current financial shortfalls, the two NMAAs require support from international community to address the needs of affected populations. Insufficient state budget funding, coordination, capacity building and support may lead to the following risks:
- Most at need areas will not be released and/or properly prioritized for mine action activities;
- Explosive ordnance victims will continue suffer from lack of services; and
- Duplication in delivering awareness raising activities which could leave some vulnerable populations behind.

Mine Action Sub-Cluster Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:
Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks: NMAAs have insufficient coordination between relevant international and national mine action stakeholders for effective management, planning and coordination of the sector as a whole. Lack of government willingness or failure to allocate state budget allocations for mine action would have a negative impact on effective sector coordination.

Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:
- UNMAS will support the sector coordination forum as part of its Technical Support Action Plan (2021-2023);
- UNMAS will continue to advocate for government budget allocation for mine action in coordination with concerned donors; and
- UNMAS and INGOs will contribute to capacity building of government officials and NNGOs.

Timeline for Transition Activities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapping of relevant actors and entry points</td>
<td>Strategy formulation for new coordination forum/action plan</td>
<td>Transition of core activities to NMAAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building of NMAAs and NNGOs on protection principles</td>
<td>Capacity-building to relevant actors by UNMAS and INGOs</td>
<td>Capacity-building to relevant actors by UNMAS and INGOs continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with ABCs on capacity-building, clarifying coordination roles etc</td>
<td>UNMAS advocacy with NMAAs on allocating government budget for clearance and survey</td>
<td>Linking the NMAAs with existing UN coordination platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage NMAAs in coordination mechanism with a view to handover</td>
<td>UNMAS advocacy for transparent prioritization and stronger M&amp;E</td>
<td>UNMAS support to sector coordination for full transfer of the coordination role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage with the NMAAs on formulation of HLP guidance note, and victim assistance standard</td>
<td>Engage with NMAAs on child protection mainstreaming in mine action activities</td>
<td>UNMAS support to enhanced sector coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shelter and NFI Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe

(As of June 2022)

**Service Delivery to Beneficiaries:** The SNFI Cluster aims to 1) hand over NFI interventions to MoMD with regards to preparedness/response (eviction/DRR); 2) hand over Shelter maintenance in IDPs camps (tents replacement in case of emergency – mainly fires) to UNHCR/MoMD/JCCC; and 3) target remaining shelter repair needs through development actors under Government responsibility.

**Coordination:** The SNFI Cluster plans to 1) transition the coordination of remaining Shelter interventions to DSTWG/ABC at area level and 2) incorporate some of the functions of SNFI into the Housing/HLP existing Subgroup.

**Shelter and NFI Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:**

**Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over:**

- Families affected by conflicts, hazards, or evicted from informal sites will remain vulnerable without emergency shelter and/or NFI assistance.
- Returnees will be subjected to secondary displacement.
- IDPs will be prevented to go back to their area of origin if an adequate shelter/housing is not provided.

**Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity:**

- Adequate and acceptable Shelter Standards might not be respected.

**Timeline for Transition Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapping of relevant GoI counterpart/entry points and Assess/Review GoI current capacity and existing tools to identify capacity building needs.</td>
<td>Advocacy with MoMD on taking over emergency NFI interventions and ensure IDPs camps maintenance (tents replacement by UNHCR/JCCC)</td>
<td>Remaining emergency NFI interventions handed over to MoMD and IDPs camps maintenance (tents replacements) handed over to UNHCR/MoMD/JCCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with ABCs to agree on coordination roles and cluster functions to be absorbed by ABC</td>
<td>Engage, jointly with UN Habitat, MoP/MoCH with a view to handover shelter coordination/interventions.</td>
<td>Remaining shelter interventions (CSU) integrated in DSTWG/ABC coordination mechanism, with support of Housing/HLP Subgroup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for sustainable transition and local integration of IDPs camps (where feasible) into existing urban settings (Shelter upgrade)</td>
<td>Empower families in IDP in camps (Duhok) to self-upgrade their shelters</td>
<td>Continue advocacy and liaise with local authorities to include shelter support for IDPs/Returnees in their strategies and extend Shelter Upgrade approach to other Governorates (Erbil and Sulaymaniah).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**WASH Cluster Transition Plan and Timeframe** (As of June 2022)

**Service Delivery to Beneficiaries:** The WASH Cluster will handover WASH activities in camps to the government; the handover of WASH activities in informal settlements is unclear; WASH infrastructure activities will be integrated into the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and continued by development/durable solutions partners.

**Coordination:** The WASH Cluster plans to transition coordination to a government-led sector (WASH Working Group).

**WASH Cluster Transition Risk Assessment:**

Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over:

- People remaining in camps will receive sub-standard water and sanitation services, leading to secondary displacement in informal settlements or returns to locations with insufficient recovery
- Returnees will have insufficient service recovery for water and sanitation services, potentially leading to failed returns and secondary displacement or an increase in negative coping mechanisms
- Water systems rehabilitated by partners will fall into disrepair due to insufficient staffing of Water Directorate
- Accumulation of solid and liquid waste, leading to latrine overflow, garbage buildup, and env. health concerns
- Increase in water-related diseases (cholera, acute watery diarrhea, scabies) for affected populations
- Protection risks for women and girls due to lack of menstrual products and longer walks to latrines/water points

Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity:

- Risks of duplication of efforts and/or gaps in the response for the remaining humanitarian caseload
- Inability to scale up WASH support in emerging crises, such as drought, flooding, or disease outbreaks

**WASH Cluster Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:**

**Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks:**

The transition of WASH provision in camps to government counterparts has been slow – conversations have been ongoing since August 2021, but as of yet, only a few services in specific locations have been handed over. While there is a commitment from JCC to take over WASH operations in camps, there is a possibility that transition of service provision will be delayed from the proposed schedule beginning in July 2022. The delay in the formation of government may also impact the ability to transition to a government-led sector due to a lack of budget or interest.

**Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:**

- Identify and plan for critical WASH activities that are truly lifesaving in case identified partners do not take over
- Early and continued engagement with government on the issue of transitioning camps and informal settlements
- High level advocacy through CLA and HC to government to facilitate budget allocation for humanitarian WASH activities and longer-term development needs in areas with insufficient recovery to date
- Engagement with durable solutions and development partners to facilitate continuation of life-saving activities into 2023 in case there are delays in the government taking over those key activities
- Development of a clear transition roadmap agreed with humanitarian, development, and government actors

**Timeline for Transition Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discussions with DSTWG and ABCs on WASH transition strategy</td>
<td>Agreed decision on all IDP camps for transition to government</td>
<td>Co-chairing WASH Cluster meetings with government counterpart(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy formulation for the WASH working group</td>
<td>Capacity building of WASH working group</td>
<td>IDP camps all transitioned to government for service provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp transition discussions with UNICEF, partners and gov’t counterparts to develop timeframe and actions</td>
<td>Engagement with development partners and donors for transition of infrastructure activities</td>
<td>Transitioning cluster/sector roles and responsibility to WASH working group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cash Working Group Transition Plan and Timeframe
(As of June 2022)

Service Delivery to Beneficiaries:
The CWG aims to continue in 2023 in an adapted form to continue promoting quality delivery of CVA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MPCA</th>
<th>CVA TECHNICAL SUPPORT:</th>
<th>CASH-BASED SOCIAL PROTECTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implemented by partners in coordination with DS as part of Nexus and MoLSA as part of alignment with Social Protection.</td>
<td>Continued by partners in coordination with DS and potentially with clusters transitioning to sectors, if any; New CVA outcomes integrated with UNSDCF PWG 2, potentially PWG 4 and also implemented by NGOs</td>
<td>In collaboration with government and Social Protection actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coordination:
The CWG will serve as the technical arm for CVA of relevant stakeholders. This role encompasses MPCA and sectoral outcomes and its potential convergence with Durable Solutions, and/or MoLSA’s social protection strategy.

Cash Working Group Transition Risk Assessment:
Impact on beneficiaries if service delivery ends with no-one taking over:

- Less impact on sustainability and efficiency that could result in an increase of negative coping mechanisms
- CVA tend to have a multiplier effect, contributing to sustaining livelihoods, local markets and economies. Limiting support to CVA and the CWG, would diminish the chances recovery and to address emerging challenges

Impact if coordination, capacity-building etc. is not picked up by another entity:

- Partners continuing cash distribution may duplicate each other’s leading to community tensions
- There might be a gap in capacity building to especially new actors using CVA and existing partners
- The opportunity of supporting the government in Cash Based

Timeline for Transition Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 &amp; Q2 2022</th>
<th>Q3 2022</th>
<th>Q4 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapping stakeholders + entry points</td>
<td>Strategy formulation</td>
<td>Capacity-building of relevant actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor consultations on strategies and financial resources</td>
<td>Identification of resources to support the transitioned CWG</td>
<td>Define plan of action 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with Govt on SP</td>
<td></td>
<td>Handover to the transitioned CWG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likelihood of Risks and Mitigation Measures:

Likelihood of the cluster transition plan not being successful and leading to above-mentioned risks:

- There are not enough resources to support the transitioned CWG
- Difficulties in defining coordination roles with development actors, Durable Solutions or the government

Mitigation measures to avoid these risks:

- Develop a clear strategy of the transitioned CWG to identify the support needed; Engage with partners and donors from an early stage to identify resources.
- Engage with development actors, DS, government and Social Protection actors from an early stage and define value-add and services CWG could provide in support of each focus area. Co-develop clear objectives, a plan of action and collaboration mechanisms with interested parties.
6.2
OVERVIEW OF THE 25 IDP CAMPS IN KRI

Kurdistan region of Iraq

In agreement with the Humanitarian Country Team’s decision, the CCCM Cluster was deactivated at the end of December 2022 and UNHCR internalized its relevant functions for the 25 IDP camps in KR-I. At the governorate level, UNHCR continues supporting camp management, including the governorate body (the Directorate of Migration and Crisis Response) in cross-camp coordination, planning and strategic decision-making and to lead joint advocacy with relevant partners.

Federal Iraq

IOM continues leading camp management for Jeddah 5 and informal sites. With the recent Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD) decision to close Jeddah 5, IOM is advocating for a timely, orderly, and informed closure procedure that is conducted in a voluntary, safe and dignified manner. According to the findings of the 2022 Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (MCNA), 994,000 individuals remain in protracted displacement in informal IDP sites. IOM’s camp management partners will continue to work towards addressing their urgent humanitarian needs while also working towards durable solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUHOK ADMINISTERED CAMPS</th>
<th>KEY FEATURES</th>
<th>UPDATES ON SOLUTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 136,730 ind. in 15 camps | Predominantly Ezidi families | **Shelter upgrade:**
| | According to the latest REACH intention survey, less than 1 per cent of IDPs in Duhok are contemplating a return to areas of origin in the next 12 months. | • 11 of the 15 camps are tented camps, with associated risks that led to fires; 13 causalities were recorded amongst IDPs during the last six years. Designed to be an emergency shelter solution, tents are not suitable for safe longer-term accommodation due to the combination of the tents’ material and the shelters’ proximity to each other. In addition, upgrading shelters in camps is an important aspect of providing dignified solutions for those remaining in camps. Hence, the request is to advocate for authorities to allow for self-upgrade by IDPs of their shelters in the 11 IDP tented camps (Bajid Kandala I, Bajid Kandala II, Bersive I, Bersive II, Cham mishko, Essian, Kabarto I, Kabarto II, Khanke, Shariya, and Shekhan).
| | Instances of failed returns continue, with families seeking camp re-admission. Between 2021 – 2022, over 1,000 families (4,700 individuals) have been recorded as reverse returns to Duhok to date, according to DMCR. | • KRG decided in early July 2022 to permit IDPs residing in tented camps in Duhok to self-upgrade their shelters.
| | WASH has been transferred to the Government as part of the transition. | The Directorate of Migration and Crisis Response (DMCR) is rolling out the initiative with technical guidance for shelter self-upgrade to concrete blocks with support from UNHCR. As of December 2022, nearly 1,300 (out of 14,314 camp residents) families have upgraded/ing their shelters, mainly in Cham mishko, Bajet Kandala, Sheikhan, Khanke and Kabarto camps.
| | **Camp governance:** | • The land ownership and subsequent issues (agricultural reclamation contract) preventing the upgrade in two specific camps (in Bersive I and II). Advocacy is ongoing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ERBIL CAMPS</th>
<th>KEY FEATURES</th>
<th>UPDATES ON SOLUTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 13,116 ind. in 3 camps | Most families originate from Nineaw (Mosul, Sinjar, Baaj) and Salah al-Din (Shirqat, Balad, Beiji) | **Government plans to consolidate the camps:**
| Harsham, Baharka (Erbil) Debaga (Makhmour) | Urban camps. | • Harsham, Baharka, and Khazer M1. The Government informed UNHCR that they will give the residents of these camps three options: i) return to their areas of origin; ii) relocate elsewhere in KR-I; iii) relocate to Hasansham U2 and U3. Advocacy ongoing for authorities to allow for self-upgrade by IDPs of their shelters.
| | | • The residents of the camps have lived in the area for many years with access to livelihood opportunities, education, and essential services, including access to education.
| | | • Accordingly, UNHCR advocates for local integration and turning these camps into neighborhoods.
### EAST MOSUL CAMPS
(ERBIL ADMINISTRATION)

#### KEY FEATURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14,272 ind. in 3 camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hasansham U2, Hasansham U3, Khazer M1 located in a disputed area in the Ninewa governorate administrated by the KRG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority from Ninewa governorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing serious protection issues, including restrictions on freedom of movement as identification is needed to cross the main checkpoints to Erbil or Mosul, meaning that IDPs without civil documentation cannot leave the camps. While, Asayish holds the ID documents of all camp residents, and any person wishing to travel to Mosul or Erbil needs a supporting letter from camp management, stamped by the camp Asayish, to pass through checkpoints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging and cumbersome for IDPs to access healthcare and livelihood opportunities outside of the camps.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### UPDATES ON SOLUTIONS

A joint UNHCR/IOM strategy for the East Mosul Camps:

- **Supporting solutions for IDP families living in the three East Mosul Camps (EMCs)** – Hasansham U2, Hasansham U3, and Khazer M1 – recognizing that long-term residence in the camps will not provide dignified and sustainable living conditions. The strategy aims to provide a comprehensive approach to support access to durable solutions pathways for the whole population of the three camps.

- **The population is divided into three categories** as they face different barriers to return;

  - **530 families are from the 13 villages** (located in the disputed area in Al-Hamdaniyah district, Ninewa governorate, currently controlled by the KRG’s Peshmerga Forces) in Hasansham, and the return of these families are not yet permitted by the authorities.

  - **Female-headed households/families with perceived affiliation** experience heightened protection risks within the camps. According to the intention survey conducted by UNHCR in 2021, 70 per cent of the female-headed households mentioned they are unable to return due to the perceived ISIL affiliation of their family members. Due to their profile, families face tribal and social cohesion barriers to returning to areas of origin and be less likely to be granted security clearances.

  - **Some 200 former detainees** live in the camps, mainly in Hasansham U3, some of whom have been reunited with their families who are also living in the camp. The number of former detainees is slowly increasing, as individuals are released by the KRG authorities. These are individuals who were detained by the Erbil authorities and General Assayish under the KRI 2006 Anti-Terrorism legislation (NB: this is a different instrument to the federal anti-terrorism legislation). They have been released after completing their sentence, or after being acquitted. Some have a release letter issued by the KRG, others do not. The release letter issued by the KRG although recognized by authorities in Federal Iraq, do not protect individuals from re-arrest and prosecution in areas outside of KRI, putting the IDPs at risk of arrest upon return. The former detainees are de facto unable to leave the East Mosul Camps, as they are not allowed to return to Erbil and risk arrest if trying to pass Federal Iraq checkpoints.

  - **The strategic approach aims to combine interventions aimed at supporting individuals and families to pursue their preferred pathway to solutions in a safe and dignified manner, ensuring all people residing in the camps will be ultimately assisted in addressing barriers to the achievement of their preferred solution or to identify alternative, viable solution pathways. This will require that IOM, UNHCR and other partners work in close coordination, ensuring that no population group or issue is de-prioritized or exposed to unnecessarily prolonging their displacement or vice versa to risks associated with safety upon leaving the camps. The proposed approach will be structured in phases, with the objective of supporting families with less complex barriers to pursue their preferred solution pathways in the first stages while initiating advocacy and dialogues aimed at supporting departures for other people in subsequent phases. |
### Sulaymaniyah Administered Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>KEY FEATURES</strong></th>
<th><strong>UPDATES ON SOLUTIONS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>11,033 ind. in 4 camps</strong></td>
<td><strong>Government plans to consolidate the camps:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbat &amp; Ashti (Sulaymaniyah): urban;</td>
<td>• Merging the Qoratu camp into the Tazade camp and the Arbat camp into the Ashti camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qoratu (Diya) &amp; Tazade (Sulaymaniyah): Garmian administration</td>
<td>• Some 250 prefabricated structures available in Tazade camp that could receive the 90 IDP families currently residing in Qoratu camp, and more than 560 empty plots for tents are available in Ashti camp to receive the 277 IDP families presently residing in Arbat camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UNHCR advocates for IDPs to self-upgrade their shelters in Ashti tented camp.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The main area of origin is Salah al-Din (Balad, Yathreb, Dujail). Other areas of origin include Diyala, Sinjar, Jurf al-Sakhar.

According to the latest REACH intention survey, 3 per cent of IDP HHs reportedly intended to return within the year. However, three quarters of those reportedly not intending to return within the year still reported a wish to return to their AoO one day.
### 6.3 Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Accountability to Affected Populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Area-Based Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AoO</td>
<td>Areas of Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Advocacy Task Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWG</td>
<td>Assessment Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Camp Coordination and Camp Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAG</td>
<td>Community Education Action Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Coronavirus caused by SARS-CoV-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Child Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVA</td>
<td>Cash and Voucher Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CwC</td>
<td>Communication with Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWG</td>
<td>Cash Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSTF</td>
<td>Durable Solutions Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSTWG</td>
<td>Durable Solutions Technical Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>Education Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Explosive Hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELC</td>
<td>Emergency Livelihoods Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWARN</td>
<td>Early Warning, Alert and Response Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSC</td>
<td>Food Security Cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSMT</td>
<td>Formal Sites Monitoring Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBVIMS</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDWS</td>
<td>General Directorate of Water and Sewerage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHO</td>
<td>Global Humanitarian Overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>General Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>HeRAMS</td>
<td>Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HERETT</td>
<td>Human Rights Engagement Task Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Household</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLP</td>
<td>Housing, Land and Property</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Needs Overview</td>
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<td>HPC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Programme Cycle</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<td>HTO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Transition Overview</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCG</td>
<td>Inter-Cluster Coordination Group</td>
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<td>ICF</td>
<td>Iraq Cash Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person/s</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IIC</td>
<td>Iraq Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IKMAA</td>
<td>Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency</td>
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<td>IMWG</td>
<td>Information Management Working Group</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>JRAM</td>
<td>Joint Rapid Market Assessments</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPMI</td>
<td>Joint Price Monitoring Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRI</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Mine Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCNA</td>
<td>Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>MFI</td>
<td>Market Functionality Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHPSS</td>
<td>Mental Health and Psychosocial Support</td>
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<td>MoCHPM</td>
<td>Ministry of Construction, Housing and Public Municipalities</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justic</td>
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<td>MoLSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoMD</td>
<td>Ministry of Migration and Displacement</td>
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<td>MoMT</td>
<td>Ministry of Municipalities and Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth and Sports</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Item</td>
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<td>NHC</td>
<td>National Health Cluster</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Protection Cluster</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAG</td>
<td>Policy Advocacy Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Post-Distribution Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>People in Need</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Refugee Education Integration Policy
Sub-Cluster
Social, Educational, and Economic Development Foundation
Shelter and Non-Food Items
Transition Advisory Group
United Nations
United Nations Country Team
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Population Fund
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
United States Dollar
Unexploded Ordnance
Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Women Empowerment Department
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
6.4
End Notes


2  * Total people reached indicates the sum of people reached figures in-camps, out-of-camps and returnees. ** People reached indicates people who have received at least one form of assistance. *** Beneficiaries for planned activities are sourced from the Activity Plan Module (APM) for Iraq here https://bit.ly/3G1NMyg - “Planned Activities” include records with the status “Planned” or “Confirmed”. 2) Figures that exceed the cluster plan target are to be reviewed; it is expected that these figures will be revised along with source data accordingly. 3) “Under-served” < 25% of the target, “On-track” = 25% to 100% of the target, “Possibly Over-served” > 100% of the target aggregated at the national level, however, gaps may still exist at district or sub-district level.

3  Exit Strategy for humanitarian actors in the context of complex emergencies, IASC, 2003

4  Co-led by IOM, UNDP and NGOs, the DSTWG defines operational approaches, frameworks and guidelines for the implementation of durable solutions.

5  ABCs are comprised of representatives of humanitarian, development, stabilization, and peacebuilding actors in key locations, as well as local government, who work collectively to identify key interventions to advance durable solutions. ABCs are established in Anbar, Diyala, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk and Ninewa Governorates

tation#cycle-48562

7  IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix – Iraq Master List Report no. 127 (July-September 2022)

8  Ibid

9  Critical shelter and informal sites were observed and recorded by enumerators. Critical shelter: damaged, makeshift, or non-residential shelters (tens, Refugee Housing Units, and religious or public buildings). Informal sites: more than 5 IDP families settled collectively; site not built to accommodate people; shared basic services; critical shelter; no formal management from authorities.

10  MCNA X, 2022

11  GBVIMS 3rd Quarter Analysis Report, 2022

12  According to IOM DTM dashboard (September 2022), 1.173 million people continue to live as displaced population in camps and outside camps

13  MCNA X

14  MCNA X, 2022

15  GBVIMS 3rd Quarter Analysis Report, 2022

16  Directorate for Mine Action and Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency databases

17  10-18 yrs old in ALP, 7-14 yrs in catch up classes, 6-14 in remedial classes. These figures include children in camp, out of camp and in return areas.

18  Children in camps, out of camps and areas of return

19  Children in camps, out of camps and areas of return

20  Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022